6.76.3

Roman Catholicks UNCERTAIN

Whether there be any True

PRIESTS

OR

SACRAMENTS

IN THE

Church of Rome:

Evinced by an Argument urg'd and maintain'd (upon their own Principles) against Mr *EDWARD GOODALL* of *Prescot* in *Lancashire.*

By *THOMAS MARSDEN*,
Vicar of *Walton* in the same County.

The Treatise divided into Two Parts. The First being *Explicative* of Terms. The Second *Argumentative.*

LONDON,
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THE EPISTLE TO THE PROTESTANT READER.

Courteous Reader,

IF thou art skilled in good Authors, I freely make thee Judge of these Papers, and covet thy Admonition, if thou seest any thing Material amiss in them, desiring nothing more than that Truth may take place. I have nothing more to say to thee, if thou art what I suppose thee to be.

But if thou art less seen in Books, I crave leave to give thee some Advice. Read over this small Treatise with a present Mind, and such Light may chance to beam forth from it upon thy Understanding, as may shew thee the crazy Estate of the Roman Church, notwithstanding the proclamations many make of its welfare.

If thou findest that not one Person of that Communion, measuring his State by their own Doctrine, can be certain whether he enjoys the Ordinary Means appointed by God for Man's Salvation, (which I pretend to prove) I would oblige thee to these few Things,

1. Heartily to pity them, and pray that it may be better with them. Pray, I say, that they may see and reject their Errors, and retain neither more nor less for Faith, than That once delivered to the Saints.

2. To praise God thou art in Communion with the Establish'd Church of England, whose Faith rests Unmoveable upon the Holy Scripture and Ancient Creeds, and whose Go-

vernment (for the Subſtance of it) is truly Primitive and Apoſtolical.

3. *As thou haſt found, ſo to hold faſt That which is Beſt. Let neither a fond Affection to Novelty, nor a groundleſs Admiration of Mis-called Antiquity turn thee aſide from the* truly Old Paths. *In Order to This, ſtrive to work thy Soul to an high Eſteem of Truth and Peace, the two Grand Legacies our dear Lord hath left his Church: For Theſe cannot be in ſafe Keeping, unleſs the Heart aſſiſt the Head, in Order to their ſafeguard. Cold Speculation ſecures not from the prevalency of Temptations. Men may part with Truth, not becauſe they like it not at all, but becauſe they hope by Exchanging it for Error, to get ſomething to boot, they like better. All times and places have Experience of This.*

Now if thou expectest to be aſſisted with ſome previous Inſtructions, for thy more Uſeful Reading of what follows; Know, I need but give thee Little here, having all along in my paſſage enlarged (ſome will ſay, to a fault) on ſeveral Heads, that I might acquaint thee with the whole Nature of the Subject, treated of. The Fourth Part of what I have written, might, I ſuppoſe, have ſufficed to have let my Adverſary know my Mind, ſo far as he hath obliged me to impart it. The Reſt is employed in Unfolding Things for thy ſake. And more I would have done for thee in this kind, had not the Multiplicity of my Affairs, which for many Years have divided my Endeavours into ſeveral Chanels, allowed me onely much interrupted parcels of time for this Occaſion.

Being jealous of being miſ-underſtood, I ſhall explain a few things here, which otherwiſe might poſſibly chance to be a Stumbling-block in thy Way.

1. *I frequently call men* Prieſts *and* Biſhops, *whil'ſt I am queſtioning whether they be truly Such. And I ſay, They* Baptize *and* Ordain, *whil'ſt I queſtion the validity of thoſe Acts. Which may ſeem to thee a ſort of Contradiction.*

But know, all Authors ſpeak in the like manner, who ſpeak of the like Matters, I deal with. The meaning is but this,

We

We call them Prieſts *and* Biſhops, *becauſe the Matter and Form of* Ordination *hath been Outwardly applied to them, and they are therefore* reputed *ſuch. In like ſort, I ſay, They* Baptize, Conſecrate, *&c. When the Outward Sacramental Action is performed, and They are therefore reputed to do ſo.*

But ſince the Roman *Church declares, That an inward inviſible Act of the Miniſter's Will, called his* Intention, *is neceſſary to the perfecting Ordination and Baptiſm,* &c. *I therefore queſtion How her* reputed *Prieſts or Biſhops can be known to be* true *Prieſts, or Biſhops: Or their* reputed *Baptiſm,* true *Baptiſm, according to their Doctrine.*

To ſave a Circuit of Words, Men generally ſpeak, as is aforeſaid; and the Meaning of the Words is eaſily known by the other Words they are connected with, in the Diſcourſe.

2. *Note, when at any time I call the Church of* Rome The *Church, it is where the Contexture of the Matter obligeth me to accommodate my Language to them, and not otherwiſe: for I am fully ſatisfied the* Roman *is but a Church, not* the *Church;* viz. *but a particular, not the univerſal Church.*

3. *If at any time I ſay to this Effect,* — Ordination and your other Sacraments, *I do but occaſionally ſuit my Words to theirs; as not at all approving their Number of Sacraments. God hath bleſt me with better eye ſight, I praiſe his Name for it, than to agree with the* Roman *Church in any One point, wherein She diſagrees with the Church of* England.

I add, Thou art not in a Diſcourſe of this Nature to expect a Stile dreſs'd with briſk Metaphors, or pretty little Turns of Wit, nor yet with much variety of Words. To ſpeak openly and with ſure dependence, is the Province of a Diſputant, and all that a Wiſe man looks for from him.

This is all I had a mind to tell thee, and ſo I bid thee heartily Farewell.

The

The General

CONTENTS
OF THE
FIRST PART.

SECTION I.

Matter of Fact related. 2

SECTION II.

Mr. G. *Unseasonably calls for Explication of Terms. His request is granted. The Order of proceeding in it set forth.* 7

SECTION III.

What Councils have dealt with the Intention. The Roman *Church requires it as necessary to a Sacrament.* 10

SECTION IV.

The Intention of doing the Exterior Action is not required, but presupposed. 16

SECTION V.

The Intention defined. That of the End required. 22

SECTION VI.

The End particularly considered is not required; but generally. The Virtual Intention is required, and held sufficient. 32

SECTION VII.

R. *Catholicks not certain of their Priesthood taken in general by any simple or absolute Certainty. Nor certain of it taken in special by any simple, or so much as a Moral Certainty.* 35

SECTION VIII.

The several Explications before given, summ'd up. And the Question resolved into its parts. 41

The

The General CONTENTS of the SECOND PART.

SECTION I.

THe *General Order of proceeding. The first part of Mr.* G's *Letter set down and examined.* 43

SECTION II.

Mr. Goodall *sets forth the Argument, and his Answer to it, as follows.* 50

SECTION III.

A more general view of the mistakes of Mr. G's *Answer.* 54

SECTION IV.

The Intention of the Bishop in Ordination cannot be made appear either by Reason or Authority. 60

SECTION V.

The Intention is not knowable by Authority, whether Divine or Humane. 71

SECTION VI.

Roman *Catholicks have but a bare Opinion to secure them of the point.* 78

SECTION VII.

The Ordaining Bishops not certain whether there be true Priests in the Roman *Church.* 88

SECTION VIII.

Consequences drawn from the Uncertainty of the Roman *Priesthood: and the feeble condition of that Church, issuing from thence, shewn.* 97

SECTION IX.

The Banks Mr. G. *hath cast up to secure the* Roman *Priesthood, taken in general, cast down.* 109

SECTION X.

Mr. G's *Argument, urged by way of Retort, examined and enervated.* 127

IM-

IMPRIMATUR

Liber cui Titulus, Roman Catholicks uncertain whether there be any true Priests, *&c.*

Guil. Needham RR. in Christo P. ac D. D. Wilhelmo Archiep. Cantuar. a Sacr. Domest.

April 20. 1688.

THE UNCERTAINTY Of any True Priests or Sacraments In the ROMAN CHURCH:

Proved againſt Mr. *EDWARD GOODALL.*

UNIV. LIB. CAMB.

The Firſt Part,

Being chiefly Explicative of Terms.

SIR,

WERE You and I called to repreſent all the accidental Diſcourſe that paſſed between us, when I was laſt at Your Houſe, I fear we ſhould vary in our Reports: for when you undertook within an hour after to tell part of it at the Inn, you found your ſelf to be contradicted by thoſe that heard us. And indeed, we penetrated ſo little into the Merits of any Point we ſpoke of, (but how that happned our Auditors can beſt ſay) that it would not be worth the while either for us to tell, or others to hear, the unready fruitleſs ſtory of it.

However, to make way to our preſent buſineſs, I think fit to entertain the Readers (for as your Papers have already, ſo mine may meet with more eyes than

yours and mine) with a little of what paſſed before the cloſe of our Altercations. Which being done, I ſhall proceed to the work which you have ſince ſcored out for me. And for better Order-ſake, and that you may with more eaſe let me know the Faults you find with me, I ſhall divide my Paper into ſeveral Sections and and Paragraphs.

SECT. I.

Matter of Fact related.

§. 1. WHEN you alledged that our Orders in the Church of *England* were *invalid*, in the judgment of *Roman* Catholicks, (a thing I could not wonder at, having cauſe to believe *You* had renounced them) I ſtraight juſtified them by thoſe of the Church of *Rome*, unto which our firſt Reformed Biſhops were admitted. You ſaid, They had indeed been good, had our Biſhops kept to the old Ordinal; but that They forſook *it*, and only gave power to *diſpenſe* the Word and Sacraments, which any Deacon might do: and that afterwards, perceiving the Nullity that happened by it, They again alter'd the Form, and gave power to do the Office of a Prieſt. Thus you.

§. 2. TO *this* I returned, That Words and Phraſes might be changed, and yet their matter remain the ſame: and that ſo it was in this caſe. You took the word *diſpenſe*, I told you, in too narrow and crampt a ſenſe, making it denote only *diſtribution*, with reſpect to the Euchariſt; whereas Our Church made it *there* ſignifie Conſecration alſo. I added, Scripture-Language would ſecure us in this: for S. *Paul* himſelf ſets forth the entire Office of the Goſpel-Miniſtry by Οἰκονομία, the *Diſpenſation* of the Goſpel; and all Goſpel-Miniſters (thoſe of the higheſt rank not excepted)

cepted) by Οἰκονόμοι, *Diſpenſers* of the Myſteries of God. Which you could not gain ſay.

And hence I concluded, that the *Alteration ſpoken of*, was Verbal only, and not Material.

§. 3. This ended, to occaſion you to take a view of ſome Fetters which the *Roman* Church had put upon her own claims, I denied that She could be certain, *according to her own principles*, that ſhe hath any true Prieſthood. I thought, Sir, ſome of your Councils had put the ſtamp of Faith upon a Doctrin which would in its juſt conſequences ſo far blot the Evidences of your Prieſthood, (and of all other your things that depend upon it) as to make them not certainly Legible, and therefore I uſed thoſe words---*according to your own principles.*

And finding you not forward to prevent me by proving the Affirmative, I gained your leave to make good the Negative, which I attempted to do by the following Argument.

§. 4. "*All Churches that make Prieſtly Ordination de-*
"*pend upon a Condition, that no man living knows whether*
"*it be fulfill'd, muſt be uncertain, whether they have any*
"*true Prieſthood.*

"*But the* Roman *Church makes Prieſtly Ordination de-*
"*pend upon a Condition, that no man living knows whe-*
"*ther it be fulfill'd:* Ergo,

"*The* Roman *Church muſt be uncertain whether ſhe*
"*hath any true Prieſthood.*

§. 5. When I complained of your repeating my Syllogiſm imperfectly, you alledged it was a long one, and therefore deſired me to write it down for the help of your memory. To gratifie you, I writ the whole as it ſtands, ſaving, that I only hinted the prædicate of the *Minor*, as ſufficient for your help.

After peruſal of it you denied the *Minor*, which I proved thus,

§. 6. "*The Intention of the Biſhop is a Condition,* "*which no man living knows whether it be fulfill'd or no.*

"*But the Church of* Rome *requires the Intention of the* "*Biſhop to Ordination:* Ergo,

"*The Church of* Rome *requires a Condition to Ordina-* "*tion, which no man living knows whether it be fulfilled or* "*no.*

§. 7. Now, in compliance with the words of the former Syllogiſm (not adverted to, through haſt, when I form'd the Second) I ſhall preſent the Matter of this latter *thus*,

"*The Intention of the Biſhop is a Condition, that no* "*man living knows whether it be fulfill'd.*

"*But the* Roman *Church makes Ordination depend upon* "*the Intention of the Biſhop:* Ergo,

"*The* Roman *Church makes Ordination depend upon a* "*Condition that no man living knows whether it be ful-* "*fill'd.*

I have not, Sir, made this digreſſion for your ſake, who did not before by word, nor ſince by writing, find the leaſt fault with my *barely* verbal Alteration: I did it only out of a reſpect to Decorum. But I muſt go on with it a little for the ſake of the leſs diſcerning Reader.

The *minor* Propoſitions, wherein the variation lies, I will place together, for the more eaſie compariſon of them.

"*The Church of* Rome *requires the Intention of the Bi-* "*ſhop to Ordination.*

"*The* Roman *Church makes Ordination depend upon the* "*Intention of the Biſhop.*

Upon the firſt view of them thus placed, it appears that they are equivalent Propoſitions, giving the very ſame ſenſe; and ſo are both alike true, or both alike falſe. For by the word *requires*, I mean, requires *as neceſſary*. This I have added, leſt any ſhould be apt to conclude,

conclude, They ſee another perſon becauſe they ſee another dreſs.

But to return from this unneceſſary Digreſſion.

You denyed the *Major* of my ſecond Syllogiſm, alledging that it was not univerſally true, foraſmuch as the Ordaining Biſhops knew whether they intended to Ordain or no.

§.8. To this I replied, by Explicating what I meant by theſe words, *the Intention of the Biſhop, viz.* the Intention of ſuch as were *truly and indeed* Biſhops. Upon which I added, That your Biſhops know not whether they exert that Intention which your Church requires to Ordination, for want of certainty that thoſe duely Intended who Ordained them, and conſequently that themſelves are true Biſhops. For it is not the Intention of a man conſider'd otherwiſe than as a true Biſhop, that will ſerve to the purpoſe of Ordination. Nor can any Biſhop be ſurer that *his* Intention (together with the due application of Matter and Form) is effectual to Ordination, than he is, that *his*, who undertook to Ordain him, was ſo. But how he ſhould be certain of that, I am to learn.

§.9. The Sum then is, Nothing ſhort of all this I have expreſt, will reach home to the purpoſes of your Church; and therefore your Councils have fallen ſhort of their main end, if in handling this matter they require not *all this* in their Definitions; or at leaſt preſuppoſe not that part of it as neceſſary, which they do not formally require. And ſure I am, That none is more ſure that he Intends as a Biſhop, than he is ſure, That he is a Biſhop: Which aſſurance he may begin to ſeek when he pleaſes, but I am confident he will never find it, till he hath found a Caſement in his Ordainer's breaſt, through which he may view his very heart.

The *Major* then (for ought I ſee) remains true in the moſt extended ſignification of the words, no man living

living (no, not the Ordaining Biſhops themſelves) knowing that the Condition of the requiſite, effectual Intention of any Biſhop is fulfill'd in Ordination.

Although, Sir, I ſpoke not all theſe words to you, yet you know I expreſt the full matter of them.

§. 10. But becauſe you was not ſatisfied with this Notion, (but why you ſhould not, let others judge) I limited the Signification of thoſe words [no man living] by contradiſtinguiſhing *all men* to the Ordaining Biſhops. And then the ſenſe ſtood thus, No man living, except the Ordaining Biſhops, know whether the required Intention be preſent in Roman Catholick Ordinations. Which explication of the words you accepted.

I was well content, I confeſs, to take up with this for that time, as thinking with my ſelf, That the Romaniſts might well forbear their mighty claims, if it could be made appear (and this I never doubted) That no Prieſt, nor Deacon, nor Sub-deacon, nor any of the leſſer Orders, nor any one Lay-perſon amongſt them can be certain, That there is any true Prieſthood in that Church, nor any true Sacraments given or received in it.

§. 11. I would with your patience, add one thing more. Immediately after I had received my Paper from you, you demanded to have it in keeping: and when I told you there was no reaſon you ſhould have my Script in exchange for your vaniſht breath, you acted a ſort of triumph, telling me I durſt not give it, as being conſcious to my ſelf of its infirmities. You too often dared me to give it you, with repeated promiſes you would anſwer it. At laſt, wearied with importunities, I gave it, and you engaged to anſwer it, under your hand.

I have not reported this out of any deſign to blame your zeal, but to let others know you may thank your ſelf

ſelf for it, if I chance to toil you a little more than you have a mind of.

§. 12. Sir, I hope your memory when a little rubb'd up, will ſerve to aſſure you, That what I have now related as matter of Fact, is ſubſtantially true. However I am ready to give you a Certificate of any part of it, which you ſhall pleaſe to queſtion, Signed by the hands of the then preſent Gentlemen.

SECT. II.

Mr. G. unſeaſonably calls for Explication of Terms. His requeſt is granted. The Order of proceeding in it ſet forth.

§. 1. NOW I come to acknowledge the receit of your Letter, dated *London September* 29. in Anſwer to my Paper delivered to you about the *Sixth* of *Auguſt*. It is, I hope, the iſſue of mature advice and deliberation, and therefore may ſave me the trouble of expecting from you any thing of greater moment on this ſubject. 'Tis ſome ſatisfaction to know the uttermoſt ſtrength of an enemy. You pronounce it a *full Anſwer* to my Argument; and *full* admits not of increaſe. You alſo inſinuate it probable that I may acquieſce in it, which indeed I ought to do if it be a full Anſwer; Truth being the thing you and I are to run in queſt of, and to reſt in, being found. But if I chance not to ſee your Anſwer *ſuch*, (as in truth, I cannot, for want of eye-ſight, or for want of Object) and will therefore purſue the point further, you invite me to ſtate the Caſe diſtinctly and clearly. Your words are theſe,

§. 2. "*If you have any thing more to Offer againſt us, "be pleaſed to ſtate the point diſtinctly and clearly, by telling "us what ſort of Intention you think is required in theſe "Councils,*

" *Councils,* [viz. *of* Florence *and* Trent] *as a Principle* " *of our Church, when you ſay, That the Intention of the* " *Biſhop is a Condition which no man living,* viz. *contra-* " *diſtinguiſhed from the Ordaining Miniſter, knows whe-* " *ther it be fulfilled, or no. Whether you think an Ha-* " *bitual, Actual or Virtual Intention be there declared;* " *and whether ſuch as is converſant about the Act which is* " *exerciſed, or about the End; and whether this End be* " *Proximate or Ultimate. As alſo what certainty you ſpeak* " *of in your Propoſitions, whether it be Moral, Metaphyſi-* " *cal or Mathematical. That ſo I may return you a diſtinct* " *anſwer.*

§. 3. Sir, Your requeſt that I would explicate the Terms in my Propoſitions, is reaſonable; but it had been more reaſonable you ſhould have made it ſooner, if you really doubted of my meaning in them. Firſt, to write a deliberate Anſwer from a ſeven weeks conſideration of the Terms I uſed, and after that to ask the meaning of them, is wonderful inartificial: ſuch a ὕςερον πρότερον, as a perſon of your ſtanding in an Univerſity is ſeldom guilty of.

While you look upon my Words as Equivocal, you can faſten no determinate ſenſe on them, and then except you had run through all the various ſignifications of them, and ſhew'd that none of them would be ſerviceable to me againſt your Church, you have anſwer'd but at a venture, and fought hoodwinkt.

Had you proceeded after this manner: Sir, If you mean, That the Intention is required to be converſant only about the Sacramental Act, none in his wits can miſs it; and ſo no uncertainty ariſeth thence: if about the end, you miſtake our doctrine; or, we are ſure the Miniſters of the Sacraments, always carry their Intention ſo far. If you mean an actual Intention is required, you miſunderſtand our Church; if an habitual or virtual, this is indeed required, but then the Miniſters can never fail of Intending ſo, *&c.* Had

Had you done this, you had not needed now to crave of me the Explication of the Terms, as having your ſelf met with them in all their ſhapes, and rendred them unuſeful to my intereſt. But not having done this (as will appear beneath) you have run the risk of making an impertinent anſwer, whatſoever it may prove to be, at laſt.

Not to ſpeak *ad idem*, is to ſpeak to no purpoſe, and you know not you have ſpoke *ad idem*, till you know what I mean.

§. 4. Had you askt me at *Preſcot* what I meant by them, I muſt have told you, or become the object of your ſcorn: for he that cannot explain the Words he hath ſpoken by way of Argument againſt another, will be thought to want common Wit, or Language; and he that will not explain them to a fair inquirer will be ſuſpected to have ſpoken no good ſenſe. But you were not then doubtful of the Terms, as appeared by your bare denying a Propoſition, without more ado.

§. 5. Or, had you, by the Poſt, called me ſhortly after, to this performance, I muſt for the ſame reaſons have been your Obedient Servant. But not to ask this till your Anſwer was given, is a very great rarity.

§. 6. However, though it come unſeaſonably for your ſelf, your requeſt is juſt, and I will ſet my ſelf to fulfil it. And I ſhall the more largely explicate the Terms you mention, (with ſome other things, if I find, as I go on, that occaſion requires it) for the ampler ſatisfaction of the Reader; for ſaving my ſelf all future trouble in this kind; and for bringing the matter in Controverſie to a more evident period.

In Order to this work, I ſhall require that two things be granted me by the Romaniſts.

§. 7. 1. That when your Councils ſpeak of the Intention of the Miniſters of the Sacraments, they mean ſomething by their Words; and alſo expreſs their Senſe

in ſuch ſort that it may be underſtood. To deny me this would be to blaſt the reputation of your Oracles.

§8. 2. That the Romaniſts, (at leaſt) whoſe Faith is guided by, or reſted upon ſuch Councils, are, and have been able to declare the true Senſe of their Decrees and Definitions. This follows from the other: for if the Councils writ intelligibly (which I take for granted) the Romaniſts have concern enough to inquire into, and skill enough to find out their Senſe; and therefore ſhall be concluded to have done ſo.

This being premiſed, I ſhall explicate the Terms (ſo far as is needful) from Roman-Catholick Authors. What they mean by them, I muſt mean by them; otherwiſe our Controverſie can be nothing elſe but a ſtrife about words.

§. 9. To do this more Orderly, I ſhall ſhew, (1.) What your Councils ſay of the Intention (2.) In what manner of quality, or under what Notion they require it, with relation to the Sacraments: whereof they make Orders one. (3.) About what it is converſant there. (4.) What ſort of Intention is required. (5.) What certainty I ſpeak of, when I deny that the Roman Church is certain of her having any true Prieſthood. This done, I ſhall attempt to judge of the ſtrength or weakneſs of your Anſwer, according to the ſtate of the Queſtion.

SECT. III.

What Councils have dealt with the Intention. The Roman *Church requires it as neceſſary to a Sacrament.*

§.1. *Firſt*, Two of your Councils only have dealt in this Matter. What they were, and what they have ſaid of it, I come now to ſhew.

Pope

Pope *Eugenius*'s Decree propounded by way of Inſtruction to the *Armenians*, was read and approved in the *Florentine* Council, and thereby made a Synodical Decree, in the year 1439. Wherein, after the Number and Names of the Sacraments are recited and fixed, and the Ends or Uſes they ſerve to, ſpecified: We read this, *Hæc omnia tribus perficiuntur, viz. rebus tanquam Materia, verbis tanquam Forma, Perſona Miniſtri conferentis Sacramentum cum intentione faciendi quod facit Eccleſia. Quorum ſi aliquod deſit, non perficitur Sacramentum.* i. e. "*All theſe* [*Sacraments*] *are perfected by three things,* "Viz. *Things as the Matter*; *Words as the Form*; *and* "*the Perſon of the Miniſter conferring the Sacrament, with* "*an Intention of doing what the Church doth: if any of* "*which be wanting the Sacrament is not perfected.*

§. 2. The Council of *Trent* in the year 1547. the 7th. *Seſſion*, 11*th. Canon* (*De Sacram. in genere*) ſaith thus, *Si quis dixerit, in Miniſtris dum Sacramenta conficiunt & conferunt, non requiri intentionem ſaltem faciendi quod facit Eccleſia, anathema ſit.* i. e. "*If any one ſhall ſay, That there is not required in the* "*Miniſters, whilſt they make and confer the Sacraments, an* "*Intention at leaſt of doing what the Church doth, let him* "*be accurſed.*

Thus have we ſeen what theſe two Councils have ſaid of the Point.

§. 3. *Secondly*, I am to ſhew in what Manner, or under what Notion they require the Intention. And here I doubt not to affirm, That they require it as Neceſſary to the very Being of the Sacraments; inſomuch that though all the Externals, according to Chriſt's Inſtitution be exactly performed, yet there is a Nullity in them, if the Intention be a wanting. The Council of *Florence* ſpeaks clearly enough to this purpoſe, making the Word, *Perfected*, equally reſpect Matter, Form and Intention: And conſequently a Sacrament may as well

be perfected without Matter, or Form, as without the Intention: That is, Not at all. This the dulleſt eye may find by a review of the Citation.

§. 4. I confeſs, the *Trent-Council* only ſays, The Intention is *required*, not adding How far, or in What manner, it is ſo: But that it means, required as *neceſſary* to the Being of the Sacraments, I prove by theſe Arguments:

§. 5. (1.) It will be granted me, that the two Councils determining or declaring the very ſame Article, muſt by their Words mean the very ſame thing. And Nature teaches me to make the more plain Unfolded Words of the former a Commentary upon the more general infolded Words of this. And then there can be no Orders or other Sacraments, where there is not the requir'd Intention.

§. 6. (2.) I prove it from the Stile of the *Trent-Council*, which makes the Word, [*requiri*] *required*, whereever it is mentioned in her Canons, to ſignifie *required as of neceſſity* to the thing it is applied to. For inſtance, in the 14th. *Seſſion*, 9th. *Canon. De Pœn. Sacram.* we read thus,--- If any one ſhall ſay, That the Confeſſion of the Penitent [*non requiri*] is not *required* in Order to the Prieſt's Abſolving him, let him be accurſed.

Again, in the 4th. *Canon*, thus, If any one ſhall deny that Contrition, Confeſſion, and Satisfaction [*requiri*] are *required* in the Penitent, as the matter of the Sacrament of Penance, *&c.* let him be accurſed. And ſo the Word is uſed elſewhere. And then the Senſe runs thus, As there can be no Abſolution without Confeſſion, ſo there can be no Sacrament without the Intention.

§. 7. (3.) I prove this from the *Rubrics* of the Maſs-Book of *Pope Pius* the V. corrected and ſet forth by the Decree of this very Council, *De Defectibus circa Miſſam occurrentibus, Num.* 1. Where we read, *Quicquid horum deficit, ſcil. Materia debita, Forma cum Intentione, &*

& Ordo Sacerdotalis in Conficiente, non conficitur Sacramentum. i. e.

"*Where any of theſe are wanting,* viz. *Due Matter, Form* "*with the Intention, or Prieſtly Order in the Conſecrator,* "*the Sacrament is not made up.*

Note here. Although the Euchariſt only be ſpoken of in this Citation, yet by Parity of Ground, Orders, and the reſt are equally concerned, as to the Intention. Thus then it hath appeared, That the Council of *Trent*, as well as that of *Florence*, makes the Miniſters Intention neceſſary to the Being of all the Sacraments.

§. 8. However, leſt it ſhould be ſuſpected, that I have taken a falſe Survey of the Matter, I ſhall go on to juſtifie it from *Roman* Authors, ſo far as can fairly be required to our preſent purpoſe.

§. 9. Of theſe ſome aſſert the Thing expreſly, and others by moſt certain and unavoidable implication.

§. 10. But before I produce them, I ſhall deſire the Reader to remember, in Order to the better underſtanding of what follows, That if ſome of the Authors I ſhall cite, declare the Intention of the Miniſter to be Neceſſary, or Eſſential, or Subſtantial, to this or that particular Sacrament (as Baptiſm, or the Euchariſt, *&c.*) it is as much as if it had been affirmed concerning all the reſt of them; it being by virtue of its generical ingrediency, that it belongs to any or all the Species. If it be neceſſary to Baptiſm as a Sacrament, it muſt be equally ſo to all the other Sacraments.

§. 11. Of thoſe that aſſert the Point directly, *Thomas Aquinas* ſhall ſpeak firſt. *

"*The Sacraments* (ſaith he) *require the Intention of the* "*Miniſter.* And *Cajetan* upon him thus, ‖ *The Mini-* "*ſters Intention is required to the Perfection of the Sa-* "*crament.*

* *Sacramenta requirunt Intentionem Miniſtri par.* 3. qu. 64. Art. 8.

‖ *Intentio Miniſtri exigitur ad perfectionem Sacramenti.*

Accord-

According to this Author it appears, That the Intention is not called for onely as a thing congruous in the Minister, or such as that he cannot but sin, if he confer the Sacraments without it: But it is required to the perfecting or making up the Sacrament it self. The very Nature of the Sacraments requires it, as well as the Church does.

§. 12. The *Summa Sylvestrina* affirms,* "*That there* "*are three things* [*de* Substantia--] *of the Substance of* "*a Sacrament*, viz. *Due Matter, Due Form, and the In-* "*tention of the Minister coupling together the Matter and Form.*

* Par. 2, *Verb. Sacram.*

§. 13. *Gabriel Biel* is of the same judgment, Who saith, ‖ "*That to constitute a fit Minister of the Eucharist* "[de necessitate requiritur--] *there is necessarily required* "*the Power of Order, the Faculty of Speech, and Integrity* "*of Intention.*

‖ Li. 4. Dist. 13. q. 1.

§. 14. *Johannes de Burgo* speaks to the same purpose, * "*To the Integrity of Baptism* (saith he) *three* "*things are required*, viz. *Matter, Form of Words* [& "Intentio Baptizantis] *and the Intention of the Minister.*

* *Pupil. Oc.* ca 2 *de Baptis.*

§. 15. *Dom. à Soto* speaks on the forecited place of *Aquinas* thus, ‖ "*The present Conclusion* [*of the Inten-* "*tion*] *is not onely understood of the Decent Ornament of* "*the Sacrament, but the Intention is of its Essence, as was* "*declared in the Council of* Florence.

‖ *Conclusio præsens non solum intelligitur quantum ad decentem Sacramenti ornatum, imo Intentio de ejus existit essentia, quemadmodum in Concilio Florentino declaratum est. in 4. Senten. Dist.* 1. q. 5. Art. 6.

§. 16. *Bellarmine* may serve me the labour of bringing in more Testimonies for this Point, Who declares it to be the judgment of Catholicks in general, adding withal that the Councils of *Florence* and *Trent* teach it.*

* *Sententia Catholicorum est, requiri Intentionem, &c. De Sacram in genere.* li. 1. cap. 27.

§. 17. When I spoke of producing some Authors that attest this Thing (not so expressly, but) by most certain impli-

implication, I meant it of ſuch as bring the Intention into the definition of a Sacrament. Now a definition being nothing elſe but an Explication of the Nature or Eſſence of a thing, their putting the Intention *there* infers that they held it neceſſary to the Being of the Sacrament.

§. 18. *Jo. de Burgo* tells us, in the forenamed place, * That the common definition the School Divines give of Baptiſm [*eſt talis*] is to this effect;

" *Baptiſm is the external waſhing of the Body with water* " *with due Intention, made under a preſcribed form of* " *Words.*

* *Eſt ablutio corporis exterior in aquâ cum Intentione debitâ, factâ ſub formâ Verborum præſcriptâ.*

I could in a good meaſure verifie this Authors words by ſetting down ſeveral definitions of the like ſort, out of *Summa Sylveſt. Gabriel, Alſtentaig* and others; which were founded before them by *Guil. Pariſienſis, Aquinas, Alenſis, Scotus, Occam, &c.* But I have no mind to burden my Paper with needleſs Ink, on this account.

§. 19. I ſhall trouble the Reader but with one definition more, which the ſame Author gives of Penance,

‖ " *The Sacrament of penance is the Abſolution of a Peni-* " *tent man, made with certain words pronounc'd by the* " *Prieſt, with due Intention.*

‖ *Pœnitentia eſt abſolutio hominis pœnitentis facta certis verbis cum debita Intentione, prolatis à Sacerdote.* de Sacram. Pœn. in. gener. cap. 1.

Now by the ſame reaſon that Baptiſm and Penance may be defined by the Intention; Order and the other Sacraments may be ſo.

Thus have I beſides ſetting the two Councils in full view, given a taſte of Roman Authors, that lived ſome of them, ſometime before either of them, ſome between them, ſome at and after the time of the latter; who agreeably declare the Miniſters Intention to be ſo neceſſary to the Sacraments, that there are none where that is abſent. Which was the thing I undertook to ſhew.

I have omitted to write ſeveral Citations at length in the Author's words, becauſe to do it would clog my Paper, and I am under no fears that diſguiſing their Senſe will be charged upon me.

'Tis a fault I confeſs, to overdo a thing, and I fear I am guilty of it, at preſent. But know, Sir, the greateſt part of this Section is not writ for your ſake, who, I acknowledge, did not call for it; but for theirs, whether of your or our Communion, that are not ſatisfied, That any ſuch Doctrin is eſtabliſh'd as matter of Faith in the Roman Church. I know there are ſuch of both ſorts.

SECT. IV.

The Intention of doing the Exterior Action is not required, but preſuppoſed.

I Am now to ſhew what the Intention, which the *Roman* Church requires, is to be converſant about, in the Sacraments.

You, Sir, ask me whether it be ſuch as is converſant about the *Act* to be exercised, or about the *End*. Now that the leſs learned Reader may underſtand the Nature of your Queſtion, and be thereby better enabled to judge how I proceed, I ſhall explain it to him from the Pen of *Gabriel Biel*, one of your own renowned Doctors.

§. 1. His words are theſe, * "*The Intention* "*may two manner of ways be carried to* "ſomething, *either as to its Object, or to its* "*Term or End. So the Intention of the* "*Baptizer may be carried to the Act of Bap-* "*tiſm as to its Object, and ſo it is nothing* "*elſe than to will the performance of that* "*Act. It may be alſo carried to ſomething* "*as its End*, viz. *to That for which he wills* "*to Baptize; as to will that to be done, for* "*which Baptiſm was inſtituted.* It

* *Intentio poteſt dupliciter ferri in aliquid, vel ut in Objectum; vel ut in terminum aut finem. Sic Intentio Baptizantis poteſt ferri in actum baptizandi ſicut in Objectum, & ſic nihil aliud eſt quam velle actum iſtum perficere. Poteſt etiam ferri in aliquid ut in finem, ſcil in illud propter quod vult Baptizare; ut velle fieri illud propter quod Baptiſmus eſt inſtitutus.* l. 4. dist. 6 q. 1.

It is but making the caſe of Ordination parallel with the inſtance given of Baptiſm, and all will be clear. If a Biſhop purpoſe, will, or intend barely to pronounce the words your Church uſes in Ordaining Prieſts, *viz.*---*Receive thou power to offer Sacrifice in the Church for the quick and dead, in the name of the Father, &c.* (which you make the form of that Sacrament) and to deliver to them the Paten with Bread, and the Chalice with Wine, (which you make the matter of it) without going any farther: in this caſe the Intention is ſaid to be converſant about the Act. But if he alſo will or intend the Effect or End, to which the Sacramental Act is inſtituted as ſubſervient, he is ſaid to intend the Effect or End.

§. 2. The Firſt, for diſtinction ſake, is by good Authors called the *Exterior* [outward] Intention, the latter, the *interior* [inward] or Mental Intention. Which Terms I ſhall uſe in what follows, for ſaving a Circuit of Words. And for the ſame end I will call the Application of Matter and Form the Sacramental Act, or Action.

Having ſaid this in a previous way, I come now to Anſwer your Queſtion, Whether your Councils require ſuch an Intention as is converſant about the Act, or End of the Sacraments.

§. 3. And I boldly affirm, 1. That it is not the Firſt only (if at all) which they require. 2. But that it is the latter.

And I hold my ſelf concern'd to make ample and firm proof hereof, in regard all the inferences I am to make againſt you in this diſpute, will eſpecially lye upon theſe two grounds.

1. For the Firſt, That it is not the Exterior Intention your Councils require by way of Decree or Definition, I ſhall endeavour to prove by theſe Arguments,

§. 4. (1.) This point is not proper matter for Councils to deal with. It is Matter of divine Faith, Worſhip,

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or Government that They (acting within their ſphear) are to debate upon, and Synodically to determine: and not Matter of common natural Knowledge, whereof the Heathen Philoſophers were as competent Judges as they. To an aſſent to Propoſitions of this (latter) kind, our judgments are to be wrought by the power and force of Reaſon: nor can our ignorance of them be conquered by any other weapons. This knowledge is not to be beaten into mens heads by bare Eccleſiaſtick affirmations and Anathema's. Nor did ever wiſe men take this courſe to do it. Well, The neceſſary preſence of the Intention, or Will, to all external Actions that are humane and free, is a point of mere natural Knowledge; it being in plain ſpeech nothing elſe but this, That a man willingly doth (acting humanely) the external actions he doth. Which [*Velle*] motion of the Will cannot be wanting to ſuch Actions, except in the caſe of Drunkenneſs or Frenzy, or ſomething elſe, which in like manner robs the Will of her Guide. Yea, it is ſuch a common Operation of the Will, we now ſpeak of, as no more concerns thoſe of the Sacraments than all other Actions in the World, that are humane and voluntary, whatever the Object, or End of them be. Thus when a man promiſeth a thing which at that time he reſolves never to perform, he yet intends to make that promiſe. When he threatens another only *in terrorem*, without purpoſing ever to execute that threat, he then intends to make that threat. And the Intention is ſo altogether preſuppoſed to outward Actions, that in common uſe of Speech we omit [ſay nothing of] it, in commanding, or forbidding, or reciting exterior Acts, *&c.* We ſay, Read me a Chapter; make ready my Dinner, *&c.* without adding any thing more. For though theſe Actions now mentioned, are *imperate* Acts of the Will; that is, though the Will commands the inferiour powers to do them, as the hands

to

to act, and the Tongue to ſpeak, *&c.* yet the Act of the Will [*viz.* the Intention,] is not ſo much as named when we ſpeak of ſuch Actions: and to do it would be ſuperfluous, inaſmuch as it is neceſſarily ſuppoſed to attend them. All men take it for granted that men intended to do, what they ſee them do in good Order. And this aſſurance is grounded on the mere Natural knowledge of the Nature of humane Acts, which are therefore called *Voluntary*, becauſe of the Will's Efficiency in them; or becauſe of their neceſſary dependence upon and connexion with the Elicite Acts of the Will.

§. 5. And in particular; for this Reaſon, Learned Men diſcourſing about our very Queſtion, make the Action of the Sacraments expreſs this intention, without otherwiſe naming it; except upon ſome ſpecial occaſion. Dom. *Soto* ſpeaks plainly with a reſpect to this Point (in 4. *Sent. Diſt.* 1. *q.* 5. *art.* 8.) *Actus enim exterior & volitio interior pro eodem reputantur.* i. e.

"*The exterior Act and the interior Volition* [*Act of the* "*Will*] *are reputed for the ſame.*

His meaning can be no other than this, The Outward Act is the Object of the Inward Act of the Will, and together with it doth compound or conſtitute one humane Action; and ſo may fitly denote the whole. Which is a very obvious Truth to all, whoſe thoughts have been any whit thinn'd and improv'd by Obſervation.

§. 6. Thus have I made it appear, That the Neceſſity of the Exterior Intention to all humane Acts (of which number are the Sacramental) falls under the Cogniſance of Natural Reaſon: And indeed it is ſuch Doctrine as hath been taught paſſing well in the Heathen Schools. Wherefore I conclude that your General Councils at *Florence* and *Trent* (which you muſt ſay knew and were mindful of their proper Province) did not gad ſo far out of their Way, as to determine and decree mere unrevealed Natural Points, ſuch as this we have in hand.

§. 7. To prevent miſtakes. I wot well there are ſeveral Points of Natural Knowledg revealed in Scripture, which are therefore (by accident) become alſo Points of Faith: And that if theſe were denied by any Body of Chriſtian People, Councils might congruouſly declare them. But the Exteriour Intention is none of theſe; and my Argument reſpects only ſuch as this.

§. 8. I add, if your Councils might draw within their Sphear mere Points of Natural Knowledge, like this I have inſiſted on; *Ariſtotle*'s Books might chance to be adopted into our Chriſtian Creed; which would look but odly. Could ſuch work rightly be done, it would be worth a Council's while to make a Compleat Courſe of Infallible Philoſophy, to ſave much pains and endleſs wrangling in your Schools. For if all ſuch things were once defined, a *Roman* Catholick could no longer queſtion them.

§. 9. But this onely upon Suppoſition your Councils have defined the Intention to be neceſſary to humane Acts. I, for my part, clear them from any ſuch guilt. But if you do, Sir, What means your Queſtion?

§. 10. It appears alſo, That there is ſuch an evident dependence of the Sacramental, and all other humane Acts upon the Will or Intention, that no Man of Senſe ever did or can queſtion it: And therefore beſides that the work were improper for a Synod of Divines, it were altogether needleſs and fruitleſs to determine it: it were to act without a Motive, in my Opinion. Thoſe that would do This, might at the next ſtep, be expected to decree it Neceſſary, That all Lectors open their eyelids when they read a Chapter; and that all Preachers open their Mouths when they exhort the People.

Now, Sir, you muſt either joyn with me in loading your Councils with theſe abſurdities, or in concluding, That it is not the Exterior Intention which is the Matter of their Decree and Canon.

§. 11. But

§. 11. But whatever you do, *Bellarmine* will befriend all I have ſaid on this Head. (*De Sacram. in gen.* l. 1. cap. 27.) *Neque tamen volumus à Concilio definitum id quod vult Catharinus, & Chemnitius vellet, nimirum ut ſolum intendat Miniſter facere actum exteriorem, quem Eccleſia facit: id enim non erat opus definire, cum à Nemine unquam negatum fuiſſet, nec poſſet negari.* i. e.

"*We mean not that That is defined by the Council, which* "Catharinus *means, and which* Chemnitius *would have;* "*namely, that the Miniſter ſhould onely intend to do that* "*Exterior Act which the Church doth: For there was No* "*Need of defining That, in regard it hath never been de-* "*nied by any body, nor could be denied.*

The Cardinal here declares, 1. That the Council [of *Trent*] did not define the Intention we now ſpeak of. 2. That they had no Motive to do it, foraſmuch as none ever did or could deny it. Whoſe Teſtimony ſhall ſhut up this Particular.

§. 12. (2.) I argue from the Nature of the Controverſie between *Papiſt* and *Proteſtant* about the Intention: Which cannot reſpect it in the preſent Sence of the Word, there being no Proteſtant, that I ever read or heard of, who denies its neceſſity to the Act. None of us ever aſſerted that any Madman (as ſuch) was fit to manage any Civil Concern, much leſs Spiritual. In this caſe then, we could hardly contend, becauſe we concur in the Thing. Or at leaſt, it would follow, That the Learned men of both Parties quarrel not onely about Trifles, but about juſt Nothing. Which thing, methinks, a *Romaniſt* ſhould be unwilling to impute (however he judge of us) to the wiſeſt Men of his own Communion. Hence then I conclude, That it is a further Intention than this of the Act, which the *Roman* Church requires: And this breeds the Quarrel.

§. 13. After all this: Were it ſuppoſed that your Councils had ſtoop'd to that impertinent and needleſs work

work of defining the Neceſſity of the Exterior Intention; You are not a-whit the ſafer, except they had onely done that. Had they done that, and ſtopt there, we could not poſſibly have inferr'd from thence, That you were therefore uncertain of the Truth of your Sacraments. But if they have required the Intention of the End, which lies not open to humane perception, you muſt ſtill be liable to my charge. And that it is ſuch a One which they require, I am to ſhew, in the next place.

SECT. V.

The Intention defined. That of the End required.

HAving already ſhew'd, that the Intention of the Act is not that which is eſtabliſhed in your Councils, I apply my ſelf to evince what it was, that is: I affirmed it was the Intention of the End or Effect of the Sacraments. And I ſhall prove this, according to my Method, from the Learned Writers of the *Roman* Church: Some of which aſſert the Thing expreſly; Others obliquely, by putting or ſtating Caſes, from which a very mean Underſtanding cannot but infer the truth of what I have affirmed. But before I produce them, I think fit to premiſe theſe things,

1. What Intention *properly ſo called*, is? According to the general conſent of School men, I may ſafely define it thus,

§. 1. "*It is an Act or Motion of the Will, tending to ſome "End, by or through ſome Mean or Means.*

To this very purpoſe ſpeaks *Aquinas*, *Gerſon*, *Gabriel*, *Sylveſter*, and Others. The words of ſome of them, I ſhall ſet down, but need not Engliſh them, the ſenſe of them amounting to no more than the Definition now given.

Motus

Motus voluntatis qui fertur in finem, ſecundum quod acquiritur per ea quæ ſunt ad finem, vocatur Intentio, ſaith *Aquinas,* (1ª 1æ *q.* 12. *art.* 4.) *Eſt actus voluntatis in aliquem finem tendentis per aliquid vel aliqua ad illum finem ordinata,* ſaith *Altenſtaig* from *Gerſon* (*verb. Inten.*) *Intentio eſt motus voluntatis tendentis in finem per aliquod medium,* ſaith *Sylveſt.* (*verb. Inten.*) *Intentio propriè accepta eſt volitio finis aſſequendi per media,* ſaith *Gabriel Biel* (*Repert. l.* 2. *diſt.* 38.)

§. 2. I note from hence, That the mere Intention of the Act, which took up our laſt Section, is not Intention, properly ſo called; inaſmuch as it came ſhort of the End, to which the Act was to ſerve as a Mean. I note alſo that the Miniſter then only properly intends whiles he celebrates the Sacraments, when he wills the End of them (conſidered generally or ſpecially; ſome way or other) as attainable by the Uſe of the inſtituted Actions.

§. 3. 2. I premiſe, That if my Authors prove the Intention of the End to be required, they alſo make out, That the Intention of the Act only is not required. Your queſtion, Sir, is disjunctive, Whether--- of the Act or the End. If I prove the latter, I remove the former.

3. I repeat my deſire to have it kept in memory, That the Sacraments faring all alike with a reſpect to the Intention, if my Authors ſhall, under that Relation, ſpeak of any of them, they as truly do it of all the reſt. Now to my Authority.

§. 4. I begin with *Gabriel Biel*, the clearneſs of whoſe words leaves no room for cavil. *

To the truth of Baptiſm the Intention of the Miniſter is required, not only in reſpect of the Act of Baptizing as its Object [viz. *as that which the Intention is only carried out to, ſtops at, or is terminated by,*] *but alſo in reſpect of its effect, as its End and Term.*

* *Ad veritatem Baptiſmi requiritur Intentio Miniſtri, non tantum reſpectu Actus Baptizandi ut Objecti, ſed etiam reſpectu ejus ut Finis & Termini.* l. 4. diſt. 6. q. 1.

This

This Author divides this concluſion into parts, and preſents Arguments for the proof of them. But it would be ſuperfluous to tranſcribe the whole. He ſaith, the Intention to do the Act is neceſſary; but adds [*non ſufficit*] that it is not ſufficient. And the Reaſon he gives amounts to this, That though the Act of Baptiſm be done with Intention, yet in ſeveral caſes it may become fruitleſs and void [there may be no Baptiſm notwithſtanding that Act] for want of another Intention, *viz.* that which reſpects the End. Again, our Author ſpeaks clearly, * *It ſufficeth not that the Miniſter intends to Baptize, as that is a Natural Act; but as it is a Sign inſtituted to a certain End.*

* *Non ſufficit Intentio exercendi Baptiſmum, ut eſt talis Actus in Natura, ſed ut eſt ſignum ad certum finem inſtitutum.*

§. 5. Here note, That none can uſe a Sign, *as ſuch*, but he muſt have a reſpect to the thing ſignified, to which the Sign, *as ſuch*, hath an eſſential Relation, and cannot be conſidered, as a Sign, without it. So that all Sacraments being [*in genere Signi*] Signs, as all the *Roman* Doctors do, and muſt teach; and the Miniſters being required to exerciſe them *as ſuch*, (as the cited place affirms) the Intention, according to them, muſt not be terminated or reſt in the Outward Act of the Sacraments; but it muſt in ſome manner reach the Effect or End of them, without which, we ſee, They are not made and conferred.

And hither (to ſave time) I refer *Bellarmin*'s ſaying, That the Action is to be done, not as it is a certain Natural work, *but as it is a Sacred work*, ‖ which equally proves our point, and is to be underſtood in the like manner.

‖ [*Sed ut eſt opus Sacrum*] *de Sacram.* l. 1. c. 27.

§. 6. *Gabr. Biel* writ in the time between the Two Councils, and hath ſpoken fully and plainly to our purpoſe: and his Seniors would aſſure us, had we a mind to conſult them, that his Language was no novelty in the

the *Roman* Church. *Alexander Alenſis* * may ſerve to do this, who is very liberal upon the ſame ſubject: *To Intend to do what the Church doth, is to intend to waſh outwardly to the end that God may waſh inwardly.*

* *Intendere facere quod facit Eccleſia, eſt intendere abluere exterius, ut Deus abluat interius,* de Sacr. Bapt quæſt. 8.

He tells us, the Sacramental Action [*eſt actio relata*] is a Relative Action, and that which it relates to, is the Action of God, and collects [*unde intentio reſpicit utramque actionem*] that the Intention reſpects both the Actions, as a Cauſe without which there cannot be a Sacrament.

Our Author hath here taught us by moſt tranſparent words, That the Intention muſt of neceſſity be carried to the Action of God, which is nothing elſe but the conferring of Sacramental Grace; and this Grace is the End or Effect of the Sacraments. Which was the Thing to be proved.

§. 7. *Guliel. Pariſienſis* ſpeaking of Orders, *cap.* 5. aſſerts the [mental] Intention to be Eſſential to the Form of the Sacraments; and that though the words be duly pronounced, yet a contrary Intention evacuates, and robs them of their meaning.

Again treating of Baptiſm, *cap.* 2. he declares, That vitious Miniſters cannot deprive the Sacraments of their due Effects, nor defraud the worthy Receivers of them: but he doth it with this reſerve, That they ſtrive not againſt them with a contrary Intention. He implies, All is nothing if that ſhould happen.

§. 8. *Aquinas* ‖ makes the Action void, "*When the Miniſter intends not to confer the Sacrament.*"

‖ *Cum aliquis non intendit Sacramentum conferre.* par. 3 q 64. art. 10.

I grant he ſpeaks a little before, as if it were ſufficient to intend the bare Action; (*art.* 8.) But beſides the contradiction he would in that caſe be liable to, the learned Romaniſts declare he meant no ſuch thing. I ſhall call two of them out to ſpeak to this, becauſe I would not have ſo great a man to ſtand in my way.

§. 9. Thus speaks *Cardinal Cajetan* upon the place, * " *His mind is not to be understood* " *as the words sound, as if there was not re-* " *quired in the Minister an Intention properly* " *Mental, but the Intention of the Church* " *expressed by the words would suffice, what-* " *ever the Minister may intend in his mind.*

* *Non est intelligenda ut verba sonant, puta quod non requiritur in Ministro Intentio propriè mentalis, sed sufficit Intentio Ecclesiæ per verba expressa, quicquid intendit ipse Minister interim.*

§. 10. ‖ *Dom. Soto* shall make up the pair, who was one of the most renowned Members of the *Trent*-Council. " *As the Opi-* " *nion that Intending to do the Act only is* " *sufficient, is a most false one; so it is not* " *at all S.* Thomas's*----For according to him* " *there is required not only an Intention of applying the* " *Matter and Form, but of the Effect it self.*

‖ *Ut Opinio illa falsissima est, ita nullatenus est S.* Thomæ *--- Requiritur secundum eum Intentio non solum applicandi materiam & formam, sed ipsum effectus.*

§. 11. *Aquinas*'s sense of the Article being fixt, let us further observe *Soto*'s judgment. He delivers it a little before thus, * " *Christ therefore sub-* " *stituted his Disciples to be Ministers of the* " *Sacraments that they might perform such* " *Offices with his very own Intention.* And he calls *This, an Intention like to that of God.*

* *Ea ratione Christus discipulos suos Sacramentorum Ministros sibi substituit, ut sua ipsius Intentione hujusmodi obsequia perficerent.*

Now it being plain, that the gracious Ends or Effects of the Sacraments are intended by Christ, he infers they are also to be Intended by his Ministers. And this he all along makes Essential to a Sacrament.

§. 12. I cannot forbear to recite what I meet with to this purpose in *Altenstaig*, *viz.* That it is required to intend to exhibit the matter and words of the Sacraments, ‖ " *as those things which* " *are instituted by Christ to a certain Effect;* " *and* This *is to exhibit them in the Faith of* " *the Church.*

‖ *Tanquam ea quæ ad certum effectum instituta sunt à Christo, & hoc est exhibere in fide Ecclesiæ.* Verb. Sacram.

§. 13. All I shall say by way of remark upon the several Authors already cited, is only this, That if the Reader hath born in mind, what I was to make out, *viz.* That

That the required Intention reſpects the End or Effect of the Sacraments, he cannot but ſee that they have manifeſtly proved it.

I deſigned alſo in a particular manner to confirm my Aſſertion from thoſe *Roman* Caſuiſts that have laid down Grounds, from whence the ſame appears by a fair and unconſtrain'd inference. But to avoid further tediouſneſs, I ſhall onely point to their uſual way of handling things of this kind; and ſubjoyn two particular inſtances, of a pretty odd Nature.

§. 14. They generally put the Caſe, That the Sacramental Form [or Words] may be abuſed by Addition, Subſtraction, Tranſpoſition, and falſe Pronunciation; and upon This they put the Queſtion, Whether a Sacrament be perfected in ſuch caſes. And they commonly reſolve it thus, If thoſe Additions, *&c.* be not corruptive of the Subſtance of the Form, [that is, if they pervert not the Senſe of the Words] there may be a Sacrament notwithſtanding: Provided ſtill (Mark that) that the Miniſter intends not that undue alteration; For if he doth, they conclude the Sacrament to be evacuated. Their Argument lies thus, He that on purpoſe corrupts the Form may be judg'd not to intend to do what the Church doth; and without this Intention there is no true Sacrament. But then if the intention be right, the Sacred Work is perfected, notwithſtanding the foreſaid imperfections. The Act is here ſuppoſed to be the ſame, whether it happen to prove a Sacrament, or no; it is the Mental intention then that makes or marrs all. Which was the thing to be ſhew'd.

§. 15. Now to the Inſtances. *Soto*, on the forecited Article, teaches thus,* "*If any Miniſter ſhould have a ſingular* "*Intention to Baptize* Peter *the King's* "*Son, excluſively of all other Perſons,* "Viz. *If he ſhould ſay in his Mind, if*

* *Si quis haberet Intentionem ſingularem Baptizandi Petrum, ſcilicet filium Regis cum excluſione cujuſcunque alterius, videlicet ſi mente diceret, Si non es filius Regis, non te Baptizo; tunc ſi quem alium baptizaret, ſeu fœminam, Sacramentum non eſſet validum, quia non interfuiſſet Intentio Baptizandi illum qui baptizatur.*

"*thou*

"*thou be not the King's Son, I Baptize thee not; then* "*if he ſhould Baptize any other Male or Female, the Sa-* "*crament would not be valid for want of his intending to* "*Baptize him, who is Baptized.*

§. 16. I take my ſecond Inſtance out of the Maſs book of Pope *Pius Quintus* ‖, corrected and ſet forth by Order of the *Trent*-Council; where we read,

"*If any Prieſt have Eleven Hoſts be-* "*fore him, and intend to Conſecrate* "*onely Ten, not determining which* "*Ten he intended to Conſecrate; in this caſe there is no* "*Conſecration made for want of the Intention.*

‖ *Si quis habeat coram ſe undecim hoſtias, & intendat conſecrare ſolum decem, non determinans quas decem intendit: in his caſibus non conſecrat, quia requiritur intentio. De defect. circa Miſ. occur. Num.* 7.

§. 17. We are not to imagine that in either of theſe Caſes, the Prieſt ſees his miſtake till the Action is over; and therefore muſt ſuppoſe him ſeriouſly to perform it, and for ought he knows really to confer Baptiſm, and conſecrate the Euchariſt. And yet afterwards it being found out that there are Eleven Wafers inſtead of Ten; and that the Child, waſht ſolemnly in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, was not the King's Son; here is neither Baptiſm nor Conſecration made, for want of an *abſolute* Intention. The Prieſt had as good have done Nothing.

Oh, the force and value of the Intention!

§. 18. But not to protract this over-long Section, I ſhall vertually cite a hundred Authors more to the ſame purpoſe, by ſpeaking a very few Words. All that make Matter, Form, and the Miniſter's Intention, neceſſary to the Sacraments, (and which of your Writers that treat of that Subject, do not ſo?) do mean by the word Intention the *interior* Intention, the *exterior* being included in the Act.

§. 19. *In forma intelligitur verbum vocale*; ſaith *Sylveſt.* (*Verb. Bapt.*) *i. e.* By the *Form* is underſtood the Word ſpoken.

And

And then by proportion; By *Matter* muſt be meant Matter applyed. And this is ſuppoſed to be ſpoken and done with the Will or Intention. Now then when beſides all this, the Intention is added as a diſtinct thing, it muſt be interpreted of the *interior* Intention. The bright Words of *Soto* ſhall Seal up this,

§. 20. *Si nulla eſſet intentio neceſſaria faciendi quod facit Eccleſia, vana eſſet aſſertio Doctorum & Concilii Florentini, qua definitur requiri præter Materiam & Formam, Intentionem Miniſtri: Nam in hoc quod dicitur Materia & Forma, intelligitur quod velit tam Materiam applicare quam formam. Actus enim exterior & Volitio interior pro eodem reputantur. Cum ergo inſuper addatur requiri intentionem, alia intentio intelligitur.* i. e.

'If the Intention of doing what the Church doth, was 'not neceſſary, the aſſertion of our Doctors and the Coun-'cil of *Florence* were vain, by which it is defined, that be-'ſides the Matter and Form, the Intention of the Miniſter 'is required: For in the naming the Matter and Form, it 'is underſtood that he [the Miniſter] intends to apply 'both Matter and Form: For the exterior Act and the 'interior Intention [of doing that Act] are taken for the 'ſame Thing or Act. When therefore it is further added, 'That the Intention is required, another [Intention] is 'underſtood.

§. 21. Thus, Sir, have I declared that the Intention your Councils require, is to be converſant about the End of the Sacraments; and ſhewed that the Stream of your Authors aſſiſt me with their Suffrage. If I err herein, they have led me out of the way: But then it is to your great harm, but not at all to mine. For if they underſtand not what your Councils require, as Eſſential to the Sacraments in general, then they muſt be uncertain whether they have any true Sacrament; and in particular, whether they have that of Orders, and ſo any true Prieſts. How can you be certain you have enough, if you know

not

not what is enough? were this the caſe, my point is proved from your confeſs'd ignorance, as much as it could be from the moſt ſhining demonſtration.

§. 22. Indeed, Sir, I have been more luxuriant in my proof of the ſubject matter of this and the foregoing Section, for theſe two Reaſons: 1. To lay a ſure Ground for the deductions I hope to draw anon, to your diſadvantage. 2. To confront ſome falſe Aſſertions of a certain Prieſt of your Communion, made ſome time ago, to a perſon of Quality, who was concerned to enquire of him what the doctrin of the Intention amounted to, as eſtabliſh'd by your Councils.

He affirmed to the Lady, as I can ſhew under her well known hand, theſe three things:

§. 23. 1. That the Intention reſpected the Exterior Act only, ſaying, That it is impoſſible for a Prieſt that is in his right Wits, to perform the exterior Action required, without Intending to do as he then doth.

Now I have proved that there is required an Intention of the End, which confounds his falſe account of the matter.

§. 24. 2. He ſaid, 'The *Roman* Church never declared the Doctrin of the Intention to be matter of Faith.

But I have proved it to be One, if a Decree or Definition of ſuch Councils as the Body of *Roman* Catholicks hold for General, can Oblige to Faith. And if theſe cannot do that, farewel Pope *Pius*'s Creed.

§. 25. 3. He only aſſigned this for the occaſion of the Councils medling with this matter, *viz.* That ſome held an Opinion that the Conſecrating and Conferring the Sacraments by madmen, who knew not what they were about, was valid.

But I have ſhewed, that it is granted aforehand, That the Exterior Action ſhould be Humane, *i. e.* the iſſue of previous Knowledge; which a mad-man, *as ſuch*, cannot

not exert. And I have alſo ſhewn that the Intention the Councils deal about, reaches farther, and is of another Nature. And ſo his frantick Story is void of Patronage.

§. 26. I confeſs School men, treating of their Matters, put every Objection that can poſſibly come into their too fine ſpun thoughts; but if a man hatch from thence in his head ſwarms of Sectaries, that are ſuppoſed ſeriouſly to embrace the matter of many of them, he can make them exiſt no where but in his fancy.

§. 27. And I doubt this is the caſe, when any one reports there were a Sect of people who held ſtark and ſtaring Mad men to be effectual Miniſters of the Sacraments. Authors do indeed ſpeak of Mad men with a reſpect to our Caſe, and pronounce them unfit Miniſters, becauſe they (*as ſuch*) cannot exert Humane Acts: but then their Argument amounts to this, becauſe Mad men cannot do the leſs, *viz.* Intend the exterior Act, much leſs can they do the more, *viz.* Intend the End or Effect of an Inſtitution; which is required by the *Roman* Church.

§. 28. I wiſh the Aſſertor would tell us, in what Age there were ſuch a Sect of men; in what Region they lived; who headed them; who began the Error; what Pens ſeriouſly defended it; what Biſhop excommunicated any man for holding it; or what Pope ſuſpended or deprived any Biſhop for embracing it. I would learn what Notoriety of Fact there was for theſe things, that it ſhould be worth a General Councils while to caſt an eye this way, and labour to ſtop the growing evil.

§. 29. I have read ſeveral Catalogues of Hereſies, ſome Ancient and ſome Modern, but I can find nothing like This amongſt them all.

I wiſh my plain dealing with him, to which I have had more than ſufficient provocation, may whet him to the innocent revenge of making good againſt me (if he

he can) his Affirmations above deſcribed. Till this be done, I ſhall conclude him either a moſt unlearned man; or one of a poor Spirit, who could find in his heart ſo to abuſe and impoſe upon a worthy Lady's want of skill in *Roman* Doctors and Councils.

Sir, I acknowledge I have ſtept out of our way, a while, to ſalute a friend; but I do not deſire you to take any notice of that, unleſs you pleaſe. However, thoſe that are more concern'd, will do it; and ſubſcribe to the juſtice of my Viſit.

SECT. VI.

The End particularly conſidered is not required; but generally. The Virtual Intention is required, and held ſufficient.

HAving already proved the Intention of the End to be required, I come now to view your next Queſtion, whether that End be Proximate or Ultimate.

§. 1. And I muſt ſay, I ſee not what Reaſon you have to ask this Queſtion here, the matter of it having no neceſſary influence upon the ſubject of our debate. For if it be the End, however conſider'd, whether confuſedly and in general, or diſtinctly and in ſpecial; it is alike out of the compaſs of the Inſpection of others, which is the formal Ground I argue from, to your Uncertainty of having a true Prieſthood or any Sacraments at all.

I ſay, if it be the End more generally conſider'd, *ex gr.* to do an Action as Sacred, as Relative to an Inſtitution, as a Mean to this or that indefinite End; all this comes to one, with a reſpect to my deſign.

§. 2. Nevertheleſs, I ſhall chearfully go ſome paces (though upon a needleſs Errand) which way you ſhall pleaſe to drive me. I affirm then, Your Councils and Doctors

Doctors require not the intending any End, thus, or ſo diſtinctly conſidered or ſpecified; but as ſomething in general, which Chriſt and the Church; or, Chriſt or the Church intends to do by the inſtituted Action.

§. 3. This *ſomething* is (it ſeems) ſufficient to the Sacraments, although very hardly, as we may learn from the words of the *Trent*-Council, which I ſhall here repeat, *There is required of the Miniſters of the Sacraments an Intention of doing, at leaſt, what the Church doth.* The *ſaltem* [at leaſt] ſounds, to me, a poor word, where a dogmatical Article is defined: however, I muſt take it as it is, and ſhall explain the matter briefly from your Authors.

§. 4. After G. *Biel* had told us (as is aforeſaid) That the Miniſters are required to will that to be done, for which the Sacrament was inſtituted; he immediately adds,

Et hæc Intentio eſt duplex, ſcil. *ſpecialis, quâ intendit ut Baptizatus fiat filius Regni; qui eſt finis remotus: vel propinquus, qui eſt remiſſio peccati Originalis & Gratiæ infuſio; aut quod fiat Chriſtianus & membrum Eccleſiæ militantis: vel generalis, ut fiat quod Eccleſia intendit, licet non cogitetur aut ignoretur vel etiam non credatur id conferri per baptiſmum quod Eccleſia intendit*, i.e.

"*And this Intention is twofold*, viz. *Special, whereby* "*he intends that the baptized perſon may attain Salvation;* "*which is the remote End; or that he obtain the pardon of* "*Original Sin and the infuſion of Grace; or that he be* "*made a Chriſtian or a Member of the Church Militant;* "*which is the proximate End of it. Or it is general*, viz. "*that That may be done which the Church intends, although* "*it be not conſidered, nor underſtood, or not believed that* "*That is conferred by Baptiſm which the Church intends.*

We ſee here, it is a very general and indiſtinct End that is ſet forth by theſe words, *what the Church intends or doth.* And our Author goes on to reach our point in his third Concluſion.

Ad veritatem Sacramenti non requiritur intentio Miniſtri reſpectu effectus Baptiſmatis in ſpecie: ſed ſufficit intendere quod Eccleſia intendit in genere, i. e.

" *To the truth of the Sacrament there is not required ſuch* " *an Intention of the Miniſter as reſpects the effect of Bap-* " *tiſm in ſpecial: but it ſuffices to intend what the Church* " *intends in the general.*

§. 5. *De Burgo*, (*cap.* 5. 2. *par.*) having deſcribed the Intention in the like manner concludes thus, *Requiritur ergo generalis intentio ad minus*, &c. i. e. *There is a general Intention required at the leaſt*, &c. Which exactly jumps with the ſenſe of the *Trent* definition. But I need cite no more for This, the *Roman* Doctors being generally of the ſame mind.

§. 6. You ask again, Whether the Intention required, be Habitual, Vertual, or Actual. To which my Anſwer muſt be the ſame your ſelves uſe to give, *viz.* The Habitual is too ſhort, as being no more than one aſleep may have: The Actual through humane infirmity and wandring of thoughts may ſometimes happen to be wanting in well-meaning Miniſters, and therefore is not neceſſarily required. But the Vertual is neceſſary to the Sacraments.

§. 7. By *Vertual*, *Roman* Catholicks mean the force of the Actual Intention, exerted a little before the doing of the Sacramental Action, *ex. gr.* If a Biſhop intends actually to make *N. N.* a Prieſt of Chriſt's Church, (or to do ſomething to him which Chriſt or the Church hath appointed the Action of Ordination for, or the like,) and goes to Church and attires himſelf, *&c.* for that purpoſe; though while he applies the reſpective Matter and Form, his mind happens to range out to ſome other Objects, yet the Action done by vertue of the late Actual Intention hath thoſe influences ſhed into it from the paſt Intention, which ſuffice to perfect the Ordination.

§. 8. I

§. 8. I ſhall ſet forth *Bellarmine*'s words to evince the point becauſe they are ſhort and clear, (*de Sacram. in gen. l.* 1. *c.* 27.) *Non requiritur neceſſario actualis intentio, nec ſufficit habitualis, ſed virtualis requiritur & ſufficit; quamvis danda ſit opera, ut actualis habeatur*, i. e.

" *Actual Intention is not required neceſſarily, nor is Ha-*
" *bitual ſufficient; but a Virtual Intention is required, and*
" *is ſufficient; although endeavours are to be uſed, that the*
" *Actual may be had.*

§. 9. To him I ſhall joyn a Book which will outweigh ten thouſand private Authors, *viz.* the Maſs-book of Pope *Pius* the 5*th.* (*de defect.* & c. *num.* 7.) *Si intentio non ſit actualis in ipſa Conſecratione propter evagationem mentis, ſed Virtualis, cum accedens ad Altare intendit facere quod facit Eccleſia, conficitur Sacramentum: etſi curare debet Sacerdos, ut etiam actualem Intentionem abhibeat*, i. e.

" *If there be not actual Intention in the very Conſecration*
" [*of the Euchariſt*] *by reaſon of the wandring out of the*
" *mind; but a Virtual one, when the Prieſt coming to the*
" *Altar intends to do what the Church doth, the Sacrament*
" *is made: although the Prieſt ought to take care, that he*
" *alſo actually intend.*

We conclude then that the Actual Intention is congruous, but the Virtual is neceſſary, and ſufficient.

SECT. VII.

Roman *Catholicks not certain of their Prieſthood taken in general by any ſimple or abſolute Certainty. Nor certain of it taken in ſpecial by any ſimple, or ſo much as a Moral Certainty.*

YOur laſt Queſtion is, What certainty I ſpeak of in my Propoſitions, (when I deny the *Roman* Church to be certain She hath any true Prieſthood) whether it be Moral, Metaphyſical, or Mathematical.

§. 1. Here I muſt premiſe a diſtinction in Order to the clear reſolution of your Queſtion. Your Prieſthood may be conſidered either confuſedly and in general, as inherent or exiſting in ſome perſons of your Church indeterminately conſider'd; as if it were ſaid, there are in the *Roman* Church ſome true Prieſts, although it be not known that This or That individual perſon be ſuch a one: Or diſtinctly and in particular, as inherent in Theſe or Thoſe perſons determinately conſidered, whoſe names may be told, or their perſons mark'd or pointed out. As if it were ſaid, Father *A.* or *B.* is a true Prieſt.

§. 2. Now for Anſwer: I deny the *Roman* Church is ſimply or abſolutely certain that ſhe hath any true Prieſthood, in the firſt ſenſe. The Propoſition is not evident by its own light to all that underſtand the Terms; and therefore I deny that you have for it the certainty of Intelligence: which is all one, I ſuppoſe, with that you call Metaphyſical certainty. Nor is it any Concluſion evidently deduced from firſt Principles, and therefore I deny that you have for it the certainty of Science: which is the ſame, I ſuppoſe, that you call Mathematical certainty. If you make good your Prieſthood either of theſe ways, our underſtandings could not reſiſt the evidence preſented, inaſmuch as the Reaſon of our aſſent to firſt Principles is the clear immediate connexion of the Terms; and the Reaſon of our aſſent to Scientifical Concluſions is the clear connexion of the Terms with an evident Medium. But your men never pretended to prove this point either of theſe ways, that I have heard of: nor would I have ſaid one word of this kind, had not the Terms of your Queſtion offered me the occaſion. However, to accommodate my ſelf to your thoughts ſo far as I can, I will ſuppoſe, You meant not to uſe thoſe words, *Mathematical* and *Metaphyſical*, in a proper ſenſe; but only in an alluſive way to denote by

by the m a ſimple Certainty, equal to that of Intelligence or Science, which you ſuppoſe to ſpring from a diverſe root, *viz.* Divine Revelation. But then I muſt anſwer on, as I have begun, by denying that you have any Certainty of Faith for the Matter.

§. 3. For the Propoſition taken in the ſecond Senſe, *viz.* That you have any Perſons in your Church determinately or ſingularly conſidered, as Father *A.* or *B.* who are true Prieſts; I deny that you have for it either the abſolute and infallible Certainty of *Faith*, or ſo much as a *Moral* Certainty, properly ſo called.

§. 4. And here it will be as needful a piece of work, as any I have yet done, to prepare the Reader for making a ſure judgment of what ſhall follow, to open the Nature of Moral Certainty. And becauſe your Authors are ſufficiently agreed about it, it will not matter much, which of them I call forth to deſcribe it. Let *Cardinal Bellarmine* be the Man, who ſets forth the Matter very diſtinctly (*De juſtif. lib.* 3. *cap.* 2.) He then (as others do) having divided Certainty into *Evident*, and *Obſcure* Certainty, aſſigns three degrees to both of them. Of the *Evident* he gives the firſt degree to firſt Principles, the ſecond to Science, the third to Experience. Of *Obſcure* Certainty he gives the firſt degree to Divine Faith, the ſecond to Humane Faith, the third to Opinion.

Having ſaid this in a previous way, I ſhall now produce what he ſays touching Moral Certainty. *Secundum gradum*, &c. "*Thoſe things* (ſaith he) *obtain the ſe-*
"*cond degree of Obſcure Certainty, which are believed for*
"*the ſake of Humane Authority, but ſo confirmed and cele-*
"*brated a One*, [ut omnem formidinem prorſus excludat]
"*that it altogether excludes all fear. Such as are theſe, That*
"Cicero *and* Virgil *were famous Men: that* Auguſtus *go-*
"*verned a great part of the World happily: that there are*
"*many famous Cities in Provinces at a great diſtance from*
"*us*,

"*us, as* Alexandria *in* Egypt, Conſtantinople *in* Thra-
"cia, Jeruſalem *in* Paleſtine, Antioch *in* Aſia. *And*
"*this is called the Certainty of Humane Faith, or Moral Cer-*
"*tainty; which although it be not ſo great, that it can be no*
"*way falſe, (for every Man is a Liar) yet it is ſo great,*
"*that he may deſervedly be judged temerarious, who thinks*
or diſputes againſt it. Thus *Bellarmine.*

§. 5. Hence it is obvious to collect, 1. That Moral Certainty is the experimental knowledge of others conveyed to us by due Teſtimony. 2. That this Certainty bred from the Evidence of the Motives (I ſay not of the Object) that cauſe our aſſent, ſo far fills the Mind with tranquillity and ſecurity, that there is no place left for rational doubts or fears, leſt our conceptions ſhould not be anſwerable to their Objects. And truly when I reflect upon my belief in this kind, and the grounds of it, (and fear can only ariſe that way) I find my ſelf no more tempted to doubt, whether there hath been ſuch a City as *Conſtantinople* in *Thracia*, which I have never ſeen, than I am whether there hath been ſuch a City as *Lisbone* in *Portugal*, which I have ſeen. Though it be not repugnant to the Nature of Man to be deceived, and to deceive; yet how ſuch Multitudes of Men of ſeveral ranks, qualifications and Countries, ſhould be deceived in a moſt ſenſible Object; or conſpire to deliver a falſehood for truth, eſpecially when by the report they could not hope to reap to themſelves any poſſible advantage, (this, I ſay) is ſo utterly unperceivable by any regular Thoughts, that he may well be deem'd to want the uſe of his reaſon, who is afraid of being deceived in his belief, that there hath been ſuch a place as *Conſtantinople*, upon ſo credible Teſtimony. The bare poſſibility of a thing's being otherwiſe than we judge it to be, (when the exacteſt diſquiſition can make no more of it) ſo little affects the Mind, that I have not ſo much as the Shadow and Figure of fear, leſt there ſhould not be ſuch a place as *Conſtantinople.*

I know indeed there may be ſome degrees of Moral Certainty proportion'd to the Motives or Mediums that beget it; but yet it belongs to the Nature of it in general, firmly to adhere to its Object, from the perception of truth and conviction of the Mind, ſo far that it is not in our power, acting reaſonably, to diſſent from it, or to fear that we judge amiſs.

This Point will yet look brighter, if I ſet forth what *Bellarmine* immediately ſubjoyns to the Words laſt cited.

§. 6. *Tertium gradum habent illa*, &c. "*Thoſe things* "(ſaith he) *have a third degree of Certainty, which reſt on* "*ſo many ſigns and conjectures, as render a Man ſecure and* "*exclude anxiety*, [non tamen formidinem omnem ex-"pellunt] *but yet expel not all fear; and this is called con-* "*jectural Certainty, and rather belongs to Opinion than* "*Faith.* Thus he.

§. 7. Now by comparing Moral and Conjectural Certainty, according to their Deſcriptions newly given, we find a conſiderable difference between them. The firſt ſhuts out fear, as being the reſult of a brighter Motive; the latter lets in fear through the in-evidence of its Medium. The firſt is a firm adherence to a Thing as true, the latter is an infirm adherence to a Thing as likely to be true. And therefore the firſt deſerves the Name of Certainty, but the latter is abuſively ſo called. Wherefore the Cardinal ſeeing what he calls *Conjectural* Certainty, unworthy to ſtand upon the ſame level with *Moral*, reaſonably thruſts it down into an inferiour Place.

§. 8. I know indeed that *Ariſtotle* and his Followers, ſpeaking as Natural Philoſophers, make not Humane Faith [or Moral Certainty] a Middle thing, nor place it in a diſtinct Claſſe, between Science and Opinion: But the Reaſon of that is, it was not their deſign to make any exact compariſon of the greater or leſs ſtrength

or

or weakneſs of Aſſents to particular contingent things, and to give them diſtinct Seats, accordingly; but to compare them in a lump with Science; and to ſhew, That the higheſt Aſſent below That, may poſſibly be falſe. And ſo they leave theſe two lapt up in a Bundel without diſtinction, under the Name of Opinion. But thoſe that ſpeak of them, as Moral Philoſophers do very manifeſtly, and upon good Cauſe diſtinguiſh them, as *Bellarmine* hath here done; making Moral Certainty to exclude fear, and Opinion to admit it. And none can queſtion, but when there is foundation for them in the Nature of things, diſtinctions are to be allowed.

§. 9. But if any liſt to retain the former way of ſpeaking, it will come to the ſame; provided we thus diſtinguiſh of Opinion, *viz.* Opinion is either moſt vehement and intenſe, ſuch as, Morally ſpeaking, excludes all fear; Or light and weak, which neceſſarily gives way to fear: And provided we make Moral Certainty the ſame thing with the firſt Member of this diſtinction: Men may be allowed to uſe what words they pleaſe in Polemical Diſcourſes, ſuppoſing we underſtand what they mean by them.

Thus, Sir, have I diſpatcht the Explication of thoſe Terms that you called for, and of ſome others which might puzzle ſome Readers, unleſs they were attended with ſuch help. This work I thought I was obliged to extend to an unuſual length for theſe Reaſons, (mentioned before) 1. To enable the more unlearned to become competent Judges of the ſtrength of my Arguments, or your Anſwers to them. 2. To ſave my ſelf much poſſible trouble of Papers, which might be multiplied upon Occaſion of a few Words left in ambiguity and darkneſs. When men are once ingaged in Controverſie, we find by daily Experience a ſmall matter ſerves almoſt endleſly to keep them doing, to the loſs of their time, and diſquiet of their Perſons. 3. I add, our Diſputative

putative part will look clearer, when we need not blend it with requiring and giving any explanation of words.

Now becauſe what I have done in this kind lies ſcattered in the ſeveral Sections, I ſhall gather them together, and in brief, preſent them at once to your view, in the following Section.

SECT. VIII.

The ſeveral Explications before given, Summ'd up. And the Queſtion reſolved into its Parts.

1. I Have declared, That your Councils require the Miniſter's Intention, as neceſſary to the Being of a Sacrament. *Sect.* 3.

2. That the Intention they require, is not that of the Outward Act, (its preſence to the Act being preſuppoſed.) *Sect.* 4.

3. But it is That of the End or Effects. *Sect.* 5.

4. That it is not neceſſary to Intend the End diſtinctly conſidered, as Proximate or Ultimate, but as ſomething in general, which relates to Chriſt's Inſtitution, or the Appointment or Practice of the Church, or the like. *Sect.* 6.

5. That a Virtual Intention is Neceſſary and Sufficient. *Sect.* 7.

Your Senſe of the Terms muſt (as was ſaid before) be mine: And that I have truly repreſented your Senſe, your Authors already produced, or referred to, will amount to a full Certificate. They will ſecure me upon the Suppoſition made, that the Doctrine of your Councils is capable of being underſtood, at leaſt by the leading Members of your own Church. If it be not, you magnifie thoſe your Councils without Reaſon, which either could not ſpeak intelligibly, or for ſome odd Ends ſeemed to define Faith, when they did Nothing.

6. I deny that your Prieſthood taken Indeterminately or in general, doth (in an Ordinary way, or without Special Revelation) admit the infallible Certainty of Divine Faith: Or that taken determinately, or in particular, it admits either the aforeſaid Certainty of Faith, or an Experimental, or yet a Moral Certainty properly ſo called.

§. 1. By certainty, I ſtill mean an Intellectual certainty, ſuch as is conſentaneous to its Object, which is the Meaſure and Foundation of it.

Theſe things being thus ſet in open view, it will be eaſily apprehended, That our Queſtion is a Complex Queſtion, and is reſolvable into two ſimple ones; which as they are ſtated, will ſtand thus,

§. 2. 1. Whether the *Roman* Church, which makes Prieſtly Orders neceſſarily depend upon the Ordaining Biſhops (at leaſt) Virtual Intention of the End of Ordination, can be certain with an abſolute or infallible Certainty of Faith, that they have ſome true Prieſts, in general.

§. 3. 2. Whether that Church---- can be certain with the aforeſaid Certainty of Faith; or with a Moral Certainty; That they have This or That true Prieſt in particular.

Now I deny to your Church the fore-named reſpective Certainties of their having a true Prieſthood, in either Senſe: and which is more, have taken upon me to prove the Negative; a task I cannot complain of, (though it be not very natural) becauſe I was, for once, content to take it upon my ſelf.

Pray mark, That I moreover deny a Theological Certainty of your Prieſthood taken in either of the Senſes of it above-mentioned. *That is*, I deny that it can be concluded either from two Revealed Propoſitions, or from one Revealed and another Evident by the Light of Nature.

Bellarmine's Silence of it tempted me to omit it in the laſt Section.

THE

THE SECOND PART BEING Argumentative.

SECT. I.

The general Order of proceeding. The first part of Mr. G's. Letter set down and examined.

HAVING finisht the Explications required of me, in a far other and ampler manner than was required, and whatever else I thought useful in a previous way, for the clearer sight of the point in question; I shall now declare in what general Order I purpose to proceed.

§. 1. 1. I shall evince by managing the Medium already exhibited, that the *Roman* Church is uncertain of their having any Priesthood; as Priesthood is taken *determinately*, or (as I may say) *in the parcels*.

This was the only thing I formerly stood upon, when I had occasion in a very short Paper (a single Folio page) to expose the Evils incident to *Roman* Catholicks from their doctrine of the Intention. Let me say, by the way, I mean that Paper, to which one of your Priests told me in your hearing, he had some years ago seen an Answer. I add, I wish I could see it too, that I might, for some reasons, compare it with yours.

And this was the only thing I intended to do at the firſt ſtarting of the Argument with you; as knowing it would enable me (when made good) to load you ſufficiently with unwelcome conſequences; and to ſet That in the light, which it would be your intereſt to keep in darkneſs.

§. 2. 2. I ſhall conſider a little (beyond my firſt purpoſe) how far your Prieſthood taken *indeterminately*, and (as I may ſay) *in the groſs*, will follow the fate of the other.

This being ſaid, I come to produce your Letter purporting an Anſwer to my Argument, and to examine its force. If I find my ſelf ſo bridled up by it that I cannot run my deſigned courſe, I will acknowledge the power of your Curb: but if not, I ſurely go forward to your loſs.

The former part of Mr. *Goodall*'s Letter.

"*Sir, It was alledged to you that the Orders of the* "Engliſh *Church had been by* Roman *Catholicks judged in-* "*valid by reaſon of your altering the Form of Ordination,* "*and ſufficient, diſcovering your Intention not to do as the* "*Church doth in that Sacrament. And your way of de-* "*fending your Ordination ſeemed to me very ſtrange, when* "*you retorted in this manner:* I deny, *ſay you,* that the "*Roman* Church is certain that ſhe hath any Prieſt-"hood or Sacraments according to her own Principles, "and I oblige my ſelf to deal with Mr. *Goodall* about "this point. Witneſs my hand, *Thomas Marſden.* I ac-"cepted and ſubſcribed, *Edward Goodall. For when you* "deny that we are certain that we have any Prieſthood "according to our own Principles; *it were but reaſon-* "*able for you to expect of us, that we ſhould be uncertain at* "*leaſt, that you have any, ſince you ſo earneſtly contend to* "*derive your Succeſſion and Orders from us,* [*See for this*

"Mr.

"Mr. Maſon, *Archbiſhop* Laud, *Biſhop* Bramhal, *Biſhop* "Taylor, *Dr.* Fern, *Dr.* Hammond, *&c.*] *And there is* "*an old rule, you know,* Nil dat quod in ſe non habet. "*But whatſoever you pretend of* our *being uncertain con-* "*cerning the truth of our Prieſthood, yet, for our comfort,* "you *are certain enough of it, and therefore you never re-* "*ordain thoſe Prieſts, who ſometimes, though rarely, Apo-* "*ſtatize from the* Roman *Catholick to joyn in your Commu-* "*nion. The words you have uſed in Stating the point againſt* "*the* Roman *Catholick Church are very extraordinary,* "*when you deny her to be certain that ſhe hath* any Prieſt-"hood or Sacraments, *according to her own principles.* Thus you.

The Examination of it follows.

Sir, Although the Prefatory part of your Letter here recited, does not at all affect my Argument by way of Anſwer, and ſo without any prejudice might be paſſed by without regard; yet on other accounts I find it my concern to diſſect it, and to expoſe its putrid parts.

§. 3. You then undertake two things in it, 1. To relate ſome matters of Fact which paſſed between you and me. 2. To inſinuate ſome diſadvantages incurred on my part, through (at leaſt) an unwary manage of things. Both theſe ſhall be inſpected.

For the firſt: Your Relation of Fact contains two things;

1. Your charging the Church of *England* with the invalidity of her Orders, both becauſe we had altered the Form of Ordination, and alſo diſcovered our Intention not to do as the Church doth, in that Sacrament; *as you term it.*

2. My attempt to diſcharge her by denying the *Roman* Church to be certain, that ſhe hath a true Prieſthood or Sacraments, according to her own principles; and

and obliging my ſelf to deal with you on that Head. This is what you declare for Fact.

Now I confeſs, were the caſe exactly ſuch as you repreſent it, I made but a very weak defence of *our* Church, how freely ſoever I might ſtrike at *yours*. To argue that my Coin is current, becauſe my Neighbour cannot prove his to be ſo, would be very inconcluding. But what would not a man give for Faith in a Hiſtorian!

§. 4. Sir, You have ſaid both too little, and too much, concerning your ſelf and me.

1. *Too little.* For when you affirmed our Orders to be *invalid in the judgment of* Roman *Catholicks*, I juſtified them by thoſe of the *Roman* Church unto which our firſt Reformers were admitted. And when you ſaid the Nullity of our Orders proceeded from our forſaking the old Ordinal, and from our giving power to the Ordained *only* to *diſpenſe* the Word and Sacraments, which, *ſaid you*, any Deacon might do; I ſhewed how you miſtook the thing by taking the word *diſpenſe* in too narrow a ſenſe, whereas it comprehends the whole duty of Goſpel-Miniſters; and therefore the alteration was only *verbal* and not *real*.

This Fact I have ſet forth more particularly, *Part I. Sect.* 1. whither I refer the Reader.

This, Sir, was a direct Anſwer to your Objection, and conſequently a perfect defence of our Prieſthood againſt your aſſault.

Now I am ſorry you ſhould conceal not only the forenamed Relation I made to your Orders, but alſo the Inſtance you gave, and my Anſwer to it, on purpoſe (as much as I can gather from your words) to make people believe I had nothing at all to ſay in behalf of our Miniſtry, but deſerted it at firſt view of your wretched Objection, and requited you with a bare Recrimination: Nay, which is yet more groſs, that I uſed *that* as a Medium, and my only Medium for the Vindi-

Vindication of our Church. Your own Conſcience, beſides the Teſtimony of our Auditors, (who were no Children,) can aſſure you that ſuch was the Matter of your Objection, and ſuch the Matter of my Anſwer, as is ſet down before.

§. 5. 2. You have ſaid *too much*, in reporting that to invalidate our Orders, you urged *our ſufficient diſcovery of our Intention not to do as the Church doth.* This, Sir, I am obliged to call pure fiction, no ſuch words being named but by me upon the Queſtion now in hand, after our ſlight skirmiſhes concerning the other were ended.

I could make your own Authors ridicule you about the very matter of your charge, but I forbear leſt you ſhould take ſome light occaſion from it to deſert your leſs grateful POST. What I quarrel is only your report: and truly I would hope that ſome cares or troubles had blended your thoughts when you writ theſe things, being loth to think there was much of Will in theſe Errors. However, I would as a friend adviſe you to be cautious hereafter, of treating even your enemies at ſuch a rate.

§. 6. For the Second, *viz.* the diſadvantages you ſuppoſe me to ly under by ſome unlucky or unadviſed proceedings on my part. (I know not well how to word it.)

§. 7. The firſt (reputed) diſadvantage is my ſtrange way of defending *our* Church by taxing *yours.* Anſwer, This is waſht off already by detecting (to ſpeak ſoftly) your partial Relation of Fact.

The Second is, If we make you Uncertain of your own Prieſthood, you muſt be ſuppoſed to be, at leaſt, Uncertain of Ours, who contend to derive our Orders and Succeſſion from you.

§. 8. Anſwer, 1. Pray, What mortal harm is this to us, who reſt not for any thing of moment upon the *ſole* judgment of the *Roman* Church? 2. For our deriving our Orders from you, we mean only this by it, that

that our firſt Reformers received their Orders from Chriſt by the Miniſtry of ſuch *Engliſh* Biſhops as were in Communion with the *Roman* Church; and theſe conſidered onely as Chriſtian Biſhops. Which ſurely might be done, and yet you may have embraced a Doctrine, which till you diſcard it, will render you uncertain that you *have*, and conſequently *convey* true Orders. And whether *that* of the Intention be not ſuch is to be the matter of the approaching tug between us, and therefore is to be referred to its proper place. 3. Your *Nihil dat quod in ſe non habet*, ſeems quite beſides our buſineſs; which is not to ſcan whether you *have none*, but whether you are uncertain of your having any Prieſthood. You may *have* and *give*, without being certain of either, whilſt you hold to the Doctrine of the Intention.

The third is, Though we pretend you to be Uncertain, *yet for your Comfort, We are certain enough of the truth of your Prieſthood, and therefore never reordain*, &c.

§. 9. Anſwer. You are, it ſeems, grown wonderful kind upon a ſudden, in granting us *to be certain enough of the truth of your Prieſthood.*

To be *certain*, is a great Word: *Certain enough*, a greater: And your Prieſthood is a great Matter to be certain of. You puzzle me to think How this ſhould be: For your great Writers allow not us (you call Hereticks) to underſtand Scripture, or Fathers, or Councils, but appropriate all this to the Sons of your Church. And then what Way is there left for us to arrive at this Certainty? But I will take your Word for it, and deſire you to remember againſt another time, that Proteſtants (whilſt ſuch) may be certain of Matters of no ſmall moment in Religion. But I ſhould not, I think, build too much upon this conceſſion, becauſe I have ſometimes found a trick in things of this kind, *viz.* Our judgment is good when we declare any thing in your Favour: But when

when we charge you (to the beſt of our judgments) with any Errours, We are very Idiots.

§. 10. This is ſurprizing alſo, that you build Comfort upon *our* Certainty of *your* Prieſthood. I had thought *Roman* Catholicks were ſo top ful of Comfort from their *own* Grounds, that there was no room left for *our* ſupplying them, but you have undeceived me here; We add, it ſeems, to your ſtock. Comfort is a precious thing; and you ought henceforth, inſtead of counting us a mere Offence to you, to acknowledge us for your Benefactors.

§. 11. But heark you. If we be certain of the Thing (which you grant) and you chance to be uncertain, how redounds this to our diſadvantage, unleſs our perfection be reckoned againſt us as a Crime? Or, what is the Reaſon of your mentioning our Certainty here? Is it, that if we be certain, you muſt be ſo too?

Non ſequitur. If one Man ſo hoodwink himſelf that he cannot rightly diſtinguiſh Objects relating either to himſelf or others, may not he yet *do both*, who keeps the muffle off his face. This is the caſe, You are hoodwink'd with the Doctrine of Intention (as will be found anon) but we are not ſo: And till you put *that* off, you will not be able to ſee any one man in your Church to be a true Prieſt. And, by the way, if you put off That, you withall put off your (pretended) Infallibility.

The Fourth is, That my Words are very Extraordinary, when I ſay, I deny the *Roman* Church to be certain that She *hath any Prieſthood or Sacraments*, according to her own Principles.

§. 12. The Extraordinary words you refer to, if I may gueſs by the ſcore of your Pen under them, (to expreſs which, I have put them in a different Character) are theſe,---- *any Prieſthood or Sacraments.*

Anſwer. The words are ordinary, that is, in familiar uſe, taken ſingle, or apart; and in their Contexture they are not otherwiſe, unleſs they give impertinent

Senſe or Nonſenſe. But till you be at leiſure to make this appear, I ſhall not be at leiſure to frame an Apology.

§. 13. But you may perhaps think it extraordinary, that I deny you to be certain ---- *according to your own Principles*, and may have put your *lineal Mark* under the foregoing Words by miſtake. For I perceive, that for ſome reaſon or other, you afterwards give me a *Memento* concerning them. If it chance to be ſo, (for that I ſuppoſe is but a ſmall Error) I ſhall return a few words to it:

Had I made a Doctrine common to you and us the Baſis of my Argument, though my manifeſt Inferences from it muſt have bound you, yet I could not properly have called this *Arguing from your own Principles:* But if I prove the undertaken Concluſion from a peculiar Article of your own, viz. *that of the Intention*; then you are uncertain that you have a Prieſthood, *&c.* according to your Principles; foraſmuch as a Concluſion evidently deduced is the genuine iſſue of its Principles or Premiſſes, and virtually contained in them.

§. 14. Thus have I (if I flatter not my ſelf) diſarmed the ſeveral diſadvantages you ſuppoſe me to have incurred, of all the Advantages you could hope to reap from them; and therefore abide hitherto in a ſtate of ſafety. Which is all a Man can deſire, conſidered as Defendant; and I have ſuſtained that Notion well-nigh throughout this whole Section.

Having done with the Proem of your Letter, I ſhall in the next place ſet forth the Anſwering part of it.

SECT. II.

Mr. Goodall *ſets forth the Argument, and his Anſwer to it, as follows.*

"----BUT your bare ſaying ſo, will not make the "World believe it. Let us then ſee how you "undertake to prove it. "*All*

"*All Churches*, ſay you, *that make Prieſtly Ordination* "*depend upon a Condition, which no Man living knows,* "*whether it be fulfill'd, muſt be uncertain whether they have* "*any true Prieſthood. But the* Roman *Church doth ſo.* Ergo, "*The* Roman *Church is uncertain, whether ſhe hath any true* "*Prieſthood.*

'You endeavour to prove your Minor Propoſition af-'ter this Manner,

"*The Intention of the Prieſt is a Condition*, ſay you, "*which no Man living knows, whether it be fulfill'd or no in* "*Ordination. But the Church of* Rome *requires the Inten-*"*tion of the Biſhop to Ordination.* Ergo,

"*The Church of* Rome *requires a Condition in Ordination,* "*which no Man living knows, whether it be fulfill'd or No.*

'I admit of the following Interpretation, wherein you ſay, *That by every Man living you mean all Perſons* '*contradiſtinguiſhed to the Ordaining Biſhops.*

'In anſwer to your Syllogiſms or forms of Argumen-'tation, you muſt give me leave firſt to diſtinguiſh in 'the major Propoſition of the former, between that 'Knowledge which is obtained by the Obſervation of 'the exterior Actions and Geſtures, and attention to the 'Words of the Prelates in any particular Ordinations; 'and that knowledge we have from the conſideration of 'the Nature and End of Ordination in general, and 'which is alſo neceſſarily deduced from other known 'Principles of the *Roman* Catholick Church grounded 'upon Divine Revelation.

'Firſt then, if you underſtand by *knowing* here know-'ing in the former way onely, which you ſeem to me to 'do, I deny this your firſt Propoſition to be true. For 'ſuppoſing (not granting) that the *Roman Catholick* '*Church doth make Prieſtly Ordination to depend upon a Con-*'*dition, that no Man living, contradiſtinguiſhed from the* '*Ordaining Biſhop, knows*, in the former way (*viz.* by ob-'ſerving only what is outwardly done, *&c.*) *Whether it*

'*be fulfilled or no*, yet it doth not follow that ſhe *muſt be* '*uncertain whether ſhe have any true Prieſthood:* Becauſe 'others, beſides the Ordaining Prelates, know, that ſhe 'hath true Prieſthood by the ſecond way of knowledge 'above-mentioned, that is, from the nature and end of 'the thing, and neceſſary deduction from other true 'Principles: For they know, as to the nature of the 'thing, that it is *Morally impoſſible* that all the Prelates in 'the *Roman* Catholick Church ſhould be ſo *Malicious*, as 'wilfully to have omitted any thing in Ordination, which 'they believed to be eſſential to it, and which the Church 'requires as ſo, ſuppoſing it poſſible for them to do it, and 'not be diſcovered. It is impoſſible for us to believe, 'according to our Principles, that they ſhould all turn 'Devils, and conſpire, as much as in them lies, to damn 'the whole Church in their time, and all ſucceeding 'Ages, when withal they could propoſe no advantage 'at all to themſelves by this, but the clean contrary. 'Again, *Roman* Catholicks hold this as a Principle, *viz.* 'That there is but one Holy, Catholick, Apoſtolick 'Church, and that *This*, in the Communion of which 'they live, is It; and that God will preſerve and conti- 'nue this Church to the Worlds end, and all this from 'Divine Revelation.

'Now they are not ſo dull therefore, as not to be able 'to conclude neceſſarily from hence, that they muſt al- 'ways have a true Prieſthood: For the Means is neceſ- 'ſary for the end. Therefore whatſoever Intention of the 'Prelates is by them believed, as neceſſary for this end, 'they do certainly believe according to their Principles, 'that God's Providence will ſecure it. His Omnipotence 'is able to make good his Fidelity. Remember now that 'you are arguing with *Roman* Catholicks, *according to* '*their own Principles*, and theſe laſt mentioned are cer- 'tainly ſo.

'Thus I have ſhewed the firſt Propoſition in your firſt

'Syllo-

'Syllogiſm to be falſe, though upon it your whole Ar-'gumentation depends. Secondly, If you mean by '*Knowing* that way of Knowledge which is thus neceſſa-'rily deduced from Principles, and the Nature and End 'of Ordination, then for the laſt mentioned Reaſon, 'the *Minor* of your former Syllogiſm, and the *Major* of 'your latter are both falſe. For the *Roman* Church 'doth not make Prieſtly Ordination depend upon a 'Condition which no man living beſides the Ordaining 'Biſhops know, (*viz.* in the way of knowledge laſt men-'tioned) whether it be fulfill'd. And the Intention of 'the Ordaining Biſhop is not a Condition, which no 'man, beſides himſelf, thus knows to be fulfill'd. If 'you underſtand the word *knows* in one of theſe ſenſes 'in your firſt Propoſition, and in another in your fol-'lowing, then your Syllogiſm is vicious, becauſe 'it hath four terms.

'My Anſwer will be made more clear by an Inſtance 'which I ſhall uſe by way of Retort upon your Argu-'ment. You take it for a Principle amongſt you, That 'there is a certain number of thoſe that are truly elected 'to Salvation, in your Communion. And you will 'allow this alſo as a principle that theſe Elect muſt 'have true ſaving Grace in their hearts, as a condition 'neceſſary to their Salvation; which ſaving Grace be-'cauſe you do not know to be in any particular man, 'therefore you cannot be certain that he is one of thoſe 'that is Elected to Salvation: yet you would ſay that 'the man were a very bad Logician, and *maliciouſly* bent 'againſt you that ſhould thus argue: That Church 'which makes Salvation depend upon a Condition, 'which no man living knows whether it be fulfil'd in 'order to Salvation, muſt be uncertain whether they 'have any who ſhall be ſaved in their Communion. 'But the *Engliſh* doth ſo. *-Ergo*, The *Engliſh* Church 'is uncertain whether they have any which ſhall be 'ſaved in their Communion.

'True

'True Grace in the heart is a condition which no man 'living knows whether it be fulfill'd or no in order to 'Salvation. But the *Engliſh* Church requires true Grace 'in the heart in order to Salvation. *Ergo,*

'The *Engliſh* Church requires a Condition in order 'to Salvation which no man living knows whether it 'be fulfill'd or no. For you will ſay that in the general 'way of knowledge beforementioned you know certain-'ly that this Condition is fulfill'd, though you know it 'not as to particulars. The Argument may be thus ap-'plied to any Chriſtian Church in the world, or to all 'of them together; but you ſee it is vicious upon the 'ſame reaſon that I have alledged againſt yours, as is ma-'nifeſt: Therefore ſo is yours too. I deſire you alſo to 'take notice here, that I do not deny that the Intention 'of the Ordaining Prelate may be ſufficiently known in 'both the ways of Knowledge abovementioned, which 'will make the caſe different from the inſtance but now 'brought. But it is enough for the preſent that I have 'fully anſwer'd your Argument.

SECT. III.

Mr. G*'s Anſwer ſumm'd up, and ſome ſtrictures made upon it.*

SIR,

I Have done you juſtice in truly exhibiting your An-ſwer, and have preſented it at once, as it lies in your Paper, to the Readers view; leſt if I had given it in parcels, and interpoſed my Reflections by the way, it might have been ſaid, I had robb'd it of ſomewhat of its beauty or ſtrength by breaking its face or dependance. The ſum of it (to my underſtanding) comes to this,

§. 1. The Ordaining Biſhop's Intention is knowable either by the obſervation of his doing the Exterior Acti-on,

on, and his Geſture, in particular Ordinations: or by conſidering of the nature and end of Ordination in general, and alſo by deductions from other known Principles of your Church grounded on Revelation. You deny not but it is knowable both of theſe ways, but you ſeem to fix your confidence eſpecially on the latter: and ſo between hope and fear, apply your diſtinction to ſeveral of my Propoſitions. *Suppoſing, not granting*, ſay you, it cannot be known *that* way, yet it may *this* way, and ſo if the firſt way fail, our Church is not yet uncertain of her Prieſthood. Then you tell more particularly what you mean by Nature and End of Ordination. 1. As to the Nature of the Thing, that it's Morally impoſſible all the Prieſts of your Church ſhould *maliciouſly* conſpire to omit in Ordination any thing which they believe to be eſſential to it, and which the Church requires as ſuch; and thereby endeavour to damn the whole Church. 2. That this is a Principle with you, That the *Roman* Church (*I mean it in your latitude of ſenſe*) is the Univerſal Church, which Chriſt hath promiſed to maintain and propagate to the worlds end. 3. That your Prieſthood is a neceſſary mean to this end, and therefore God's power will make good his promiſe, by the continuation of your Prieſthood. Laſtly, you pretend to retort the like Argument I have urged againſt you, and that *it* failing, mine muſt do ſo. *To this purpoſe you.*

§. 2. In the way to the work I chiefly intend, I ſhall acquaint you with a few of the incongruities of your Anſwer, reſerving the farther ſifting of it to its proper place.

§. 3. 1. When you have diſtinguiſht of *Knowing a Condition to Ordination* to be gained either by obſerving the Ordaining Prelates exterior Action, Words and Geſtures, *&c.* Or by conſidering the Nature and End of Ordination, *&c.* You ſay, if I underſtand by *knowing*, know-

knowing in the former way only, *which* you ſay, *I ſeem to you to do*, then the firſt Propoſition of my firſt Syllogiſm is falſe.

Now that the Reader may ſee whether you dream not both of my ſenſe of the word *knowing*, and alſo of the falſeneſs of the Propoſition, I will ſet it down before his eyes. It is thus,

All Churches that make Prieſtly Ordination depend upon a Condition which no man living knows whether it be fulfill'd, muſt be uncertain whether they have any true Prieſthood.

Let it be noted that theſe are the very firſt words put by way of Argument upon the Queſtion, and then let any man tell me what he ſees in them that hath any appearance ſo groſly to ſhackle and confine my ſenſe of the word *knows*. Nay, I muſt firſt be ſuppoſed to act the mad man before I could ſeem ſo to mean: for to what purpoſe do I charge another with the ignorance of a thing, and hope to annoy him with conſequences drawn from that ignorance, if all this while I ſuppoſe that though he cannot know it *one way*, yet he may know it well *another*, and ſo is not at all ignorant as I pronounce him to be. Sure it muſt be thought I meant it could no way be known, ſpeaking relatively to the charge I give, which appears in the ſtate of my Queſtion.

Now, Sir, I leave it to judgment what a ſorry ſhift you have made to get a colour to accuſe a Propoſition of Falſehood. I alſo leave it to judgment, whether it is not moſt probable that the Un-Scholar like courſe you took of deferring to call for the State of the Queſtion, till your Anſwer was given, was not choſen on purpoſe, that when your Matters failed, you might have this to ſay, *for ought I knew he might have underſtood the terms otherwiſe.* But it will not ſerve you for a Blind, even to the meaneſt capacity that reads what I have ſaid of this, *Part I. Sect. II.*

It

It remains then that your Suppoſition is falſe, and my Propoſition true, for any thing you have ſaid, as yet.

§. 4. 2. I note, If your making and applying the ſaid diſtinction to the former Syllogiſm be either a neceſſary or proper work, then you were wanting to your cauſe at *Preſcot*, where you barely denied the *Minor* without any hint of diſtinction or limitation offered; or ſaying one word to the *Major*.

§. 5. 3. You put me in mind, that I am to prove you Uncertain *according to your own principles*. Which is a needleſs office, ſince you find me doing it already, if you own (as you muſt) theſe two Articles to be your Principles, *viz. That the Intention is neceſſary to the Sacraments*, and *That Ordination is truly and properly a Sacrament*. But then for you to take a poor colour from *thoſe words* to mention your other (fanciful) principles, particularly your believing your ſelves to be the Catholick Church, and to aim at obliging me by vertue of *thoſe words of mine*, to ſubmit to your deductions from them, is an apparent deſign to eſcape from me, and ſuch as betrays your apprehenſion of the neceſſity you are under to quit the field. I have accounted for the ſenſe of *thoſe words* before, and will keep you within juſt Boundaries.

§. 6. 4. I ſhall ſhew from the manifeſt drift of your Anſwer, that it is not a *full* Anſwer as you pretend, and your undiſcerning Friends proclaim it to be. This will appear as follows.

§. 7. I purpoſed at firſt, as I have told you, only to prove you Uncertain of having any true Prieſts *in particular*, becauſe the Prelat's Intention is not diſcoverable in your particular Ordinations (an Opponent, let me ſay, *by the way*, may be allowed to give the Senſe of his own words, provided the Senſe he gives make againſt his Adverſary, and ſo contain him within the compaſs of an oppoſition to him.)

§. 8. I add, it appears you apprehended That to be, at leaſt, part of my meaning: for when you had diſtinguiſh'd of Knowing the Prelate's Intention either by obſerving his Actions Words and Geſture in particular Ordinations, or by conſidering the Nature, *&c.* you ſay thus, *If you underſtand by Knowing here, Knowing in the former way only, which you ſeem to me to do, &c.* I meant, Sir, at that time what in part I ſeemed to you to mean, *viz.* to confound the certainty of your Ordinations *in particular*. And it was ſufficient to argue from your Not knowing by any ſort of means the Ordainers, Intention in particular Ordinations to your Not knowing the Ordained, in particular, to be true Prieſts; there being *with you* an eſſential dependance between the one and the other. The reſt your words fix upon me you ſhall hear of afterwards, as you have done in part already.

§. 9. You knew I meant this, as appears; and now I refer it to all diſcerning Readers whether you have hinted one ſingle ground in your Anſwer in Bar of ſuch my attempt againſt you; or ſo much as pretend you have. For ought you have ſaid, I may go on with my deſign againſt you without ſtop or *remora*. I perceive you thought, I might alſo by defeating your Certainty of having any Prieſthood, in particular, go on to conclude by way of Induction your Uncertainty of it, in general; and therefore you have caſt up ſome ſort of Mud-walls (whoſe ſtrength I ſhall try anon) to ſecure your ſelf on that ſide: but you have left your ſelf naked and open, where you were ſenſible I muſt firſt aſſault you. Which hapned not, I think, for want of regard to your cauſe, but becauſe you had no general ſtory to tell, which would ſeem to ſecure you, as to this.

§. 10. 5. I apprehend not your Anſwer to be either neceſſary or artificial. When you hold the Intention knowable in both the ways you mention, and conſequently

quently that my Propoſitions you apply your diſtinctions to, are altogether or abſolutely falſe, what need you as Reſpondent, do more than Simply deny them? In a courſe of Argumentation, a full ſtop is that way put to Falſhood; and ſo there needed not very many Words to have effected this. It is the Truth of Propoſitions in one Senſe, and not in another, that makes diſtinctions requiſite; and therefore yours cannot be requiſite while you deny Mine to be true in any Senſe. The manner of applying Diſtinctions by Learned men evinces all I ſay, which uſually runs thus, If *the Word*, or, *&c.* be taken in *this* Senſe, your Propoſition is falſe for *this* or *that* Reaſon; but if in *that* Senſe, I may grant the Thing without any diſadvantage to my ſelf.

But if a Man pleaſes to make an unneceſſary diſtinction, ſaying, Such a Propoſition may admit theſe two Senſes, but it is falſe in both of them; and if he proceed to aſſign Reaſons why it is not true in one of thoſe Senſes, me-thinks Order requires he ſhould likewiſe do it in the other, there being the ſame Reaſon he ſhould omit or perform it in both.

§. 11. This, Sir, is your Caſe; your Anſwer is made up partly of a diſtinction, which is unneceſſary upon your Suppoſition of the abſolute falſity of my Propoſitions; and partly of (ſeeming) Reaſons given why they are falſe in one of the two Senſes, mentioned; but there is no Cauſe alledged why they are not true in the other: Wherefore I conclude your Anſwer is neither neceſſary nor Artificial.

I heartily beg the Readers pardon for having ſpent too much time in the more general conſideration of your Anſwer, which yet I have done to undeceive the Applauders of it. I ſhall now bend my ſelf to my Undertaken Province, *viz.* to prove the Major of my ſecond Syllogiſm, to which your diſtinction may (in ſome ſort) be applied, though it could not congruouſly to any Propoſition in the firſt.

SECT. IV.

The Intention proved not to be Knowable by Reaſon.

SIR, the Propoſition which you deny, and I am now to prove, is this, *The Intention of the Biſhop is a Condition which no Man living knows, whether it be fulfill'd or no in Ordination.* To be ſhort and clear, I put it thus, *No Man knows whether or no the Biſhop's Intention be preſent in Ordination.*

We are to keep in mind, that his Intention of the End (in ſome ſenſe or other, in ſome degree or other) is here meant *, and that the Intention is a mere interior Act of the Will, as was ſhewn above ‖. This premiſed, Thus I prove the Point:

* *Par. I. Sect. 5.*

‖ *Par. I. Sect. 4. §. 1.*

§. 1. "*No man knows whether the Biſhop's Intention be "preſent or no in Ordination, either by Reaſon or Authority.* "Ergo, *No man knows whether or no the Biſhop's Intention "be preſent in Ordination.*

All the ways whereby the Intention can be ſuppoſed to be known are put in the Antecedent; if Which be proved, the Conſequent muſt be good.

Now I proceed to prove the Parts of the Antecedent in Order.

1. It cannot be known by Reaſon, as I prove thus,

§. 2. "*No man knows whether or no the Biſhop's Intention "be preſent in Ordination, either by the Evidence they have "of it* in its ſelf, *or* in any Effects of it: *Or* (which comes "all to one) *no man knows it either by Intuition or Diſcourſe,* "Ergo, *No man knows by Reaſon whether or no it be preſent "in Ordination.*

All the ways that can be ſuppoſed to know the Intention by Reaſon, are reckoned up in the Antecedent; and therefore if That be made good, the Conſequent ſtands firm, by reaſon of its juſt dependance on it.

I ſhall evince that it can be known neither of theſe ways; and ſhall uſe more and freer words to do it, than a rigorous frame of Argumentation would admit, becauſe Men not bred to the ſtrict formality of diſcourſe may that way judge more naturally of what is offered; and might otherwiſe be at ſome loſs.

§. 3. I ſhall, in paſſing, deſcribe *Seeing of a thing in it ſelf*, or intuitive Knowledge to be That which is formed by the proper *Idea*, or Similitude of the Thing known, and when the Underſtanding is carried immediately to the Object, without the help of Diſcourſe. It may be illuſtrated by our Experience of Senſitive intuition, *ex. gr.* We immediately know thoſe proper Objects of Sight that are ſet before our eyes; and not by any run of our thoughts from one thing to another, in order to get the Knowledge of them. By this we may meaſure the Nature of intuitive Intellection. Now to the Point.

§. 4. 1. The Intention of one Man cannot be known to another, *in it ſelf*, or by intuitive Intellection. For though God hath given us Faculties to aſſure us immediately of the proper Objects of our Senſes, and of thoſe Verities uſually called Firſt Principles, or Common Notions, by which we meaſure the knowledge of other things; yet he hath not thought fit to give us *any*, immediately to inſpect the ſecrets of another's heart. Now the Intention of the Biſhop, whereof we treat, is moſt properly one of thoſe Secrets.

Liberty and Freedom is Eſſential to the Will, (which is the onely power capable of exerting that Act:) and therefore, though it be furniſhed with all præ-requiſites to its Acting, yet it may *intend*, or it may not; and how can any man pretend to know whether it do, or not? Humane Underſtanding cannot penetrate the receſſes of that free immaterial power, nor break open that beſt ſecured of all created Cloſets.

§. 5. So far are the particular mere Acts of the Will from

from being pervious to the eye of man, that according to the moſt and greateſt Authors, the Angels themſelves cannot (at leaſt, this way) know them. *Aquinas*, *Cajetan*, *Suarez*, *Valentia*, *Vaſquez*, *Hurtad*, and many more, determine the Thing, as I have ſaid: And indeed the caſe is ſo clear, that I need but touch upon the words of one or two of them.

The Queſtion in *Aquinas*, is *, *Whether the Angels know the thoughts of the heart?* And he reſolves it in the Negative, upon this ground ‖, *It wholly depends upon the Will that any one actually conſiders any thing.* Becauſe the Will is the only power in Man, that is formally free, and this power ſets the underſtanding on work, he concludes that the particular acts of the underſtanding cannot immediately be known by the Angels themſelves. If then theſe cannot be known for the Reaſon alledged, much leſs can the mere Acts of the Will, which is intrinſecally and formally free.

* *Utrum Angeli cognoſcunt cogitationes cordium.*

‖ *Ex ſola voluntate dependet quòd aliquis actu aliqua conſideret. Pars* 1. *Quæſt.* 57. *Art.* 4.

Cardinal *Cajetan* words it thus *, *We ſay that the Thought, becauſe it is voluntary or free, is therefore naturally ſecret, or hidden.*

* *Dicimus quod Cogitatio, eo quod volita ſeu libera, eſt naturaliter occulta.* in locum.

Suitably to theſe two Authors doth *Hurtad* offer the ſame Doctrine by way of remark ‖. *Mark*, ſaith he, *that only the Acts of the Will are the Secrets of the Heart.*

‖ *Adverte ſecretum cordis eſſe ſolos actus voluntatis. Metaph. Diſp.* 12. *Sect.* 4. § 30.

Now if the Will be ſealed up from the view of Angels, much more is it from that of Men. Were it needful, Saint *Paul*'s Queſtion would put this Point out of doubt, 1 *Cor.* 2. 11. *What Man knoweth the things of a Man, ſave the Spirit of Man which is in him?*

§. 6. It will farther appear, that theſe Secrets fall not within the immediate cognizance of Man, if I ſhew in a few words, that they are onely open to the eye of God, Who

Who at once knows all things, paſt, preſent, and to come, by a pure and immutable Act; that is, by his very Eſſence. The Authors newly named, having denied that view to Created Beings, go on to appropriate it to God. I will only mention *Aquinas*'s Words, which are ſhort and plain *.

"*Thoſe things which depend on the Will* "*onely, or which are in the Will onely,* "*are known to God alone.*

* *Ea quæ ex voluntate ſola dependent, vel quæ in voluntate ſola ſunt, ſoli Deo ſunt nota. Loco citato.*

But a far greater Authority, *viz.* the Scripture, leaves no doubt for this, aſſerting in many places, that God reſerves the Knowledge of thoſe Secrets to himſelf, as an incommunicable Prerogative. I need refer but to a few. *Jer.* 17 9,10.---- *I the Lord ſearch the Heart, I try the Reins.* 1 *Chron.* 29. 17. 1 *Sam.* 16. 7. *Pſal.* 7. 9. *Acts* 1. 24, *&c.*

The Sum of what hath appeared here, is, That the Intention of the Ordaining Biſhop is not Knowable *immediately or in it ſelf*, by any created intellect: Nor can it be ſeen in its Cauſe, by reaſon of that Dominion a Free Agent hath over its own Acts; which it may, or may not, exert, when it pleaſes.

If it be askt me, Why God hath given any Faculty to any of his Creatures, which as to its particular tendencies, is impenetrable to the ſharpeſt eye of Man or Angel; I might take up with reſolving it ſolely into the Divine pleaſure. However, it ſeems congruous to Reaſon, it ſhould be ſo: Which thing I ſhall ſet forth in the Words of *Balthazar Tellez* *, and ſo ſhut up this particular.

"*Natural Order*, ſaith he, *and the Ex-* "*cellency of intellectual Creatures did re-* "*quire that the Secrets of their Hearts* "*ſhould not be intuitively manifeſted to* "*any beſides God, who alone, as the Scri-* "*pture atteſts, is the Witneſs of the Reins,* "*and the true ſearcher of the Heart.*

* *Ordo Naturalis præſtantiaque intellectualium Creaturarum poſtulabant, ne Secreta ſuorum cordium intuitive aliis manifeſtarentur, præterquam Deo, qui ſolùm, ut teſtatur Scriptura, rerum teſtis eſt, & cordis Scrutator verus. In Logic Diſput. 14. Sect. 1.*

2. As

2. As I have ſhewn that the Biſhop's Intention cannot be known *in it ſelf* by any beſides himſelf; ſo, Sir, I now come to ſhew that it cannot be known by any effects.

§. 7. The Reaſon is, It is ſo merely and intirely an Act of the Will, that it is the Act of no other power; and conſequently doth not of it ſelf produce any Term or Effect without the Will; for which reaſon ſuch Acts are called *immanent* both by Philoſophers and School Divines. But it would be needleſs here to cite them. The Term or Effect then being ſhut up in the Will, it is no more diſcoverable than the Act it ſelf, which you, without ground, ſuppoſe to be manifeſted by it; and ſo you have nothing to argue from in that caſe, as from a thing more known, to a thing leſs known, and therefore muſt remain uncertified of the Being of the Act, unleſs you can invent ſome other mean of diſcovery. The Will hath no ſuch dependance upon, nor connexion with any natural cauſe in its acting, as that it muſt impreſs upon the Body any ſenſible marks of its motions, in which we may ſurely read when and what it acts; as alteration of Voice, change of Countenance, or any the like thing from which you pretend to make a judgment of it. *Aquinas* will tell you this, with the reaſon of it. *

No change in the Body neceſſarily attends an Act of the Will, becauſe ſuch an appetite is not the virtue of any [bodily] Organ.

* *In actu appetitus intellectivi non requiritur aliqua tranſmutatio corporalis, quia hujuſmodi appetitus non eſt virtus alicujus Organi,* prim. ſecund. q 22. Ar. 3.

I add, if any motion ſhould *by accident* reſult in the Body from the actual Will, as ſigns of joy, or ſorrow, or ſhame, *&c.* yet this can lead only to the diſcerning ſome affections of the Will, in general; but not any particular Act of it.

Hence I conclude, you can never ſecure your notion of knowing the Biſhop's Intention by obſerving his Action,

Action, *&c.* till you make the Will to be a material power, and *immanent* Actions to be *tranſient*; which yet is impoſſible to be done.

Now becauſe you aſſign no other way of knowing the Intention in particular, than making the fore-mentioned obſervations, I will take the freedom to deal a little more familiarly with you about it.

I will ſuppoſe here, that a Biſhop doth with a laudable ſhew of Gravity pronounce the Words, and do the exterior Action your Church requires to Ordination, and that hardly any Biſhop comes ſhort of that, who pretends to confer holy Orders; but when I have done, I remain ignorant how I may certainly conclude from ſuch his performance, whether he thereby intend to confer Spiritual power, or to do as the Church doth; and therefore would learn that skill from you. Either inform me that there is an individual connexion between his doing the one, and intending the other, or tell me when, and in what circumſtances, the connexion fails. The exterior Action is too dim, and indeed too uncertain a Glaſs to ſee this in.

§. 8. May not a man do a thing *materially good*, and directly commanded by God, without intending the End God requires? What think you of ſome mens relieving the poor, from no higher a Motive than that of vain-glory? *Matt.* 6. 1. What think you of ſome mens frequent ſaying their prayers for the ſame low end? *v.* 5. Our bleſſed Saviour plainly intimates that others may miſtake the Intention of ſuch, and earneſtly applaud them for righteous perſons; and that God only, *who ſees in ſecret*, can detect their carnal purpoſes and crooked wills. Did not *Judas* declare it his deſire to have the Bag ſaved for the ſake of the poor, when he meant it only for his own advantage? *John* 12. 6. He ſpoke good words, and did a ſeemingly-kind action to our Lord, he ſaid, Hail Maſter and kiſſed him, when

he intended not to expreſs any true affection but to betray him, *Matth.* 26. 49. I forbear to multiply inſtances of this ſort, theſe now given being ſufficient to evince, that there is no neceſſary dependance between the exterior actions of men and their interior Intentions, and conſequently it is no ſure arguing from thoſe to theſe.

§. 9. For the Ordainer's Geſture, I think you bring it in to no great purpoſe. Do you fancy *Judas* laught in our Saviour's face when he paſſed upon him that treacherous Ceremony? Or that the Phariſees ſlear'd or made Mowes, when they gave their Alms, or ſaid their Prayers, in token of their acting for undue ends? Are there not *Simons* yet in the world? May not a ſerious face frequently diſguiſe a diſſembling heart? Were the outward appearance always the true Picture of the mind, Hypocriſie would upon the matter, be wholly diveſted of its Eſſence. In an *Irony* there is indeed (as it were) a natural diſcovery of the contrariety of the Mind to the Words ſpoken; but in formal Hypocriſie a ſtudious concealment of the repugnance between the motions of the heart and the outward appearance.

Were your Biſhops wont in an openly ludicrous or ſportive manner to pronounce the Form and apply the Matter of Ordination, your obſervation of their Geſture might tend to your diſcerning that ſometimes they were not in earneſt, but ſtill we want a mean to know when they intend aright. We have proved a grave out-ſide will not aſſure us of this. But I think no Biſhop in the world will do ſo childiſh an act, or expoſe himſelf to ſcorn or hatred, or danger by an apparent mock-Ordination, and ſo your obſerving of their Geſture will not ſo much as enable you to know when they *intend not.* I will put the Caſe further, may not a Biſhop who actually intends to make a Prieſt, chance to ſmile at ſome odd ſight when he is pronouncing the words---

Accipe

Accipe poteſtatem, &c. Or would any man in that caſe pronounce the Ordination a nullity? I think not. Pray tell us then in what manner you are guided to the knowledge of the Ordainer's Intention by your obſervation of his Geſture. I am afraid, when you explain your ſelf we ſhall have a ſad ſtory of it.

Beſides, there is a manifeſt inſufficiency in your Rule of judgment, which is the Biſhop's words, actions and geſture in Ordination; for after your way, you can only pretend to know whether or no he actually intends in the Adminiſtration of Orders: but ſuppoſing you could find that he doth not *then ſo intend*, your obſervation is worth nothing; For, 1. Your Church requires it not as neceſſary that he ſhould *then actually intend*; if he do it virtually, it will anſwer the End it is required for, as is proved before *. 2. Your obſerving his Action afterwards cannot ſurely lead you to an intrinſecally contingent Act of his Will which paſſed a minute or two before the Action done. He may have intended for ought you know, before, (which is called the virtual Intention in the time of the Action) but whether he did or no, you cannot be certified by the ſubſequent Action, except you have a ſingular gift of diſcerning, not known to the reſt of Mankind.

* *Part I. Sect. VII.*

If you have ſuch a gift, and can communicate your skill of knowing the ſecrets of man's heart by obſerving his Words, Actions and Geſtures, it may be of extraordinary uſe to the world. Many ſorts of men might avoid great harms otherwiſe incident to them, by virtue of your inſtructions. Princes would be ſecured from employing ſervants that meant not Faith and Secrecy when they promiſe them. Maſters and Parents would at a notable rate inſpect the minds of ſervants and children. And Mental Reſervations would hereby become unprofitable, which would be a great loſs ſomewhere. If you can in the manner aforeſaid, judge of ſuch a particular

ticular Act of the Will, you are ſufficiently enabled to make all theſe and many more ſuch diſcoveries.

But alas! Your Notion is a mere dream, as I have ſhewed by barely declaring, That the meer interior, elicit Acts of the Will (and *our* Intention is one of them) make not *of themſelves* any ſuch ſenſible impreſſions upon the Body, as that another can make thereby any ſure judgment of them: and that they make no ſuch impreſſions *by accident* as will reach that end.

I have therefore forborn to confirm what I have ſaid of the Nature of the Will and her Acts, by numerous Teſtimony, becauſe I expect no Adverſary here. However I will add a few words more to confront your method of Trial.

§. 10. Your greateſt Authors deſcribe the Intention I ſpeak of, by ſuch Epithets as ſhew they held it not to be knowable by your way. They call it *mental* (a), *properly mental* (b), *internal* (c), *occult* (d), *&c.*

(a) *Intentio Mentalis.* Aquin. par. 3. qu. 64. art. 8. (b) *Proprie mentalis,* Cajetan in locum. (c) *Interna,* Bellar. de Sacram. in Gen. l. 1. c. 27. (d) *Occulta,* Medina in prim. ſecund qu 112. art. 5.

Now they would not have ſpoken thus, merely becauſe the Intention is not knowable *immediately*, or *in it ſelf*, if yet it had been knowable by any neceſſary connexion with ſome other thing we know by the Miniſtry of Senſe or Experience; for they call That evident knowledge which is ſo collected. But they call *it* properly Mental, Occult, *&c.* becauſe it is not ſo connected with any other thing which may ſurely lead us to it. I ſhall illuſtrate this by an inſtance, when outward Actions are done immediately or proximately by the lower executive powers, upon the command (as I may ſay) and motion of the Will, (which are therefore called *imperate*) ſuch Actions are called the actions *of the Will*, or voluntary actions: and yet no wiſe man will call theſe *Occult* or *properly Mental*. For though the motion

motion of the Will be *ſecret* in it ſelf, yet we have now ſome ſenſible effect ſo dependent upon and connexed with it, that all that are not ſtrangers to the Ordinary courſe of Nature, may be aſſured of the preſence of the Will in ſuch Actions. I muſt grant, Sir, your writing an Anſwer to my Argument to be a voluntary action, and that your purpoſe to write it was not viſible in it ſelf; yet it is ſufficiently made ſo by your doing it. And on this ſcore your *Will* or purpoſe to write it ought to be called an *open* or *exterior*, not an *interior* or *hidden* purpoſe. But then if we ſeek after the particular End you *intended* in writing it, we ſhall not be able to find the ſecret. Whether you thereby intended to honour God by vindicating a *ſuppoſed* Truth of his, which I had aſſaulted; or to pleaſe your ſelf by baffling your obſcure neighbour, or to gain ſome reputation (or other advantage) with your party by a dextrous defence of your Cauſe, is, and muſt be, a ſecret to all beſides your ſelf; nor would the beſt obſervation made of your Action and Geſtures, while you was at work, have aſcertained the Spectators of your Intention.

So then your purpoſe to anſwer me is manifeſt by what I ſee; but your *intent* in doing it I muſt remain uncertain of, for want of a ſure ground to argue from, to the knowledge of it.

Well. That concerned in our Queſtion is the Intention of the End, *&c.* which effects nothing without the Will, from whence we may derive any certainty of it, and therefore it is truly called *inward* and *hidden*, and *mental* by your Authors laſt cited; and conſequently the Ordainer's Intention is ſuppoſed by them (and many others that ſpeak the ſame language) not to be diſcoverable by *your* external obſervation.

§. 11. I add, If it be God's prerogative to ſearch the Heart, your Notion of diſcerning the Intention wants foundation, in as much as That doth not only exclude Man from the

the *intuitive*, but alſo from the *diſcurſive* Knowledge of it. For if it might ſurely be known this way, then Men were alſo Searchers of the Heart. On that ſuppoſition, the Thing is not denied to Men, but onely the Mode of it. But if the Manner of Knowing made all the difference here, Why ſhould the Knowledge of the Heart be more eminently aſcribed to God, than the Knowledge of any thing elſe, ſince he knows all things alike, and the ſame way, *viz.* by his own Eſſence? I conclude then the meaning of the Attribution to be this, That God hath reſerved the inſpection of the Heart to his own eye, having by the Spirituality of its Nature, ſo ſhut it up from others, that the Agent himſelf cannot in ſome caſes aſſure another of the Being of its particular Acts. And the Prelate's Intention (as hath been often ſaid) is one of theſe. Hence your ableſt Writers ſpeaking of this Act, do not onely ſay, it may be hid, but that it is always ſo. Take a taſt of ſuch their language.

"*The Intention of the Miniſter is* always *hid from us, without which we cannot know there is a Sacrament, faith* Medina *. And again he ſaith in the ſame Article,

"*They that are preſent* [*at Baptiſm*] "*cannot determine whether the Miniſter* "*Intend to do as the Church doth* ‖.

* *Semper Intentio Miniſtri eſt nobis occulta, ſine quâ Sacramentum non conſtat. in prim. ſecund. qu. 112. art. 5.*

‖ *Qui interſunt non poſſunt ſtatuere an Miniſter habuerit Intentionem faciendi quod facit Eccleſia.*

Now, Sir, what becomes of your pretended Knowledge of the Intention, by obſerving the Action, Words, and Geſture of the Miniſter? Tell us how *You* therein ſee the lively Effigies of it, when it is not viſible to other Men.

Man may indeed gueſs at, and fancy things, but none in the World are ſo Eagle-ey'd, as to ſee *That* in any Effects. *D. Soto*'s eyes were in his Head, and he had occaſion to make a narrow ſearch for this Thing, and after all,

all, he affirms by a Rhetorical Queſtion, that no man could ſurely find it *.

"*Who can be fully certified that he who* "*Baptizeth hath an Intention to Baptize?*

* *Quis poteſt certior omnino fieri, quod ille qui baptizat, habeat Intentionem Baptizandi. De Natura & Gratia,* lib. 3. c. 13.

Thus have I ſaid enough (and I fear far too much) to evince, That the Intention of the Ordaining Biſhop cannot be known by *Reaſon*, as being evident neither in it ſelf, nor in any Effects.

SECT. V.

The Intention is not knowable by Authority, whether Divine or Humane.

Secondly, I ſhall prove the ſaid Intention cannot be known by Authority, in this manner,

§. 1. "*It cannot be known either by any general Revela-* "*tion made by God, nor by the Authoritative Teſtimony of* "*Men*: Ergo, *It cannot be known by Authority.*

I mention not Good Angels here, becauſe, 1. The Secrets of man's Heart, as appeared before, is lockt up from them. 2. Were they privy to them, yet we have no Ordinary *Obſervable* Commerce with them. 3. Nor have Rules to diſcern their true Declarations of Fact from Satanical Deluſions.

I therefore made the Teſtimony of God and Men to be a ſufficient Partition of Authority in the preſent caſe.

I ſhall now make good both Parts of the Antecedent, and then the Conſequent will ſtand firm.

§. 2. 1. It is not knowable by any Revelation of God. For if we read Scripture from beginning to end, we ſhall find neither Prophecy to foretel, nor Promiſe to aſſure, That all the *Roman* Biſhops in general, nor *this* or *that* in particular, throughout the ſeveral Centuries from the Apoſtles days, nor in any one of them, ſhall in their Ordi-

Ordinations *intend* the end of their Inſtitution, or to do therein as the Church doth. Nor doth the Scripture furniſh with any Rule, by which we may certainly judge when they *ſo intend*, and when they *do not*.

Tradition is alſo ſilent here; nor is it, whatever other uſes it may ſerve to, pretended to preſent us with ſuch Notices. Wherefore I conclude, We cannot attain the Knowledge of the Biſhop's Intention by Revelation.

§. 3. 2. We have for *This* no ſuch Humane Teſtimony, as may beget that certain Knowledge of it, which is properly called *Moral Certainty*. (And what is below this, excludes not rational fear, and therefore is but abuſively called certain Knowledge.)

To make this good to full ſatisfaction, 1. I ſhall reckon up the ſeveral things required to found the ſaid Moral Certainty: And withal ſhew what-like Aſſent they breed. 2. I ſhall manifeſt that thoſe requiſites do not concur in our caſe of the Intention, and that therefore we cannot know it with the foreſaid Knowledge. The Houſe cannot be ſtrong, where the Foundation is weak.

§. 4. To Moral Certainty it is required,

(1.) That the Objects of it be Senſible Objects; and ſuch as are obvious to the Obſervers; Things ſo notable or Remarkable, that if ſome Men ſhould chance to make falſe reports of them, others may, or might have contradicted them.

'I note it here as a Thing ordained by the Divine 'Wiſdom, to preſerve us from Impoſtures, that Men 'are (as it were) naturally bent to detect the Errors of 'others, and to expoſe ſuch as they obſerve to advance 'a Fiction for true Fact. A ſecret pleaſure attends this 'work, and a Reputation follows it; and ſometimes an 'uncharitable Temper promotes it. And conſequently 'inſenſible notable Objects, the miſreports of ſome will 'be blaſted, by the contrary affirmation of others, at leaſt 'ſo far, that they ſhall not gain the Authority of an Uni-'verſal, uncontrouled Teſtimony. §. 5 (2.) That

§. 5. (2.) That a competent number of Perſons of known Senſe and Probity, openly and conſtantly declare, that they have a Phyſical Certainty of ſuch Objects; that is, that they ſaw ſuch Sights with their own eyes, or heard ſuch Words or Sounds with their own ears.

'Nothing leſs can be of Weight and Strength to per-'ſwade Men to entertain a prudent Belief of what the 'firſt Reporters ſay, and to ſet on foot a Tradition of it 'to Poſterity.

§. 6. (3.) That no Advantage can be well thought to accrue to the Reporters, by impoſing upon others Falſehood inſtead of Truth.

"*Every Eye ſees what vaſt power Secular Ends have, to* "*deprave the Heart and Tongue of frail Man; and there-*"*fore when it may be reaſonably ſuppoſed, that Perſons may* "*ſay* this *or* that *in a ſubſerviency to ſuch Ends, diſcreet* "*Men cannot entirely credit them.*

§. 7. (4.) That none qualified, as I have ſuppoſed the firſt Reporters to be, oppoſe their Experiences in Contradiction of them.

"*Were there ſuch Oppoſers, it would forbid all Certainty.* "*For the Eyes and Ears of one Man may be as good, and* "*ought to be regarded as much as the Eyes and Ears of ano-*"*ther; provided the Object be Evident and Obvious, and* "*the Witneſſes alike credible on both ſides.*

§. 8. Where theſe Requiſites meet together, I take their Teſtimony to be a Virtual Communication of their Senſations to Others. We do, upon the Matter, ſee with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and cannot reaſonably fear, that the Matter ſhould be otherwiſe, than it is repreſented to us. Though That was *phyſically* evident to the Spectators, *&c.* which is onely *Morally* ſo to me; that is, though they had the aſſurance of an Object by *Eye-ſight*, and I only by *Hear ſay*, yet my Hear ſay may be ſo encircled with ſolid and convincing Circumſtances, that I can no more queſtion the Truth of what I hear,

than I can of what I ſee. *Ex. gr.* When our Seamen or Merchants are ſailing, firſt time, for *Amſterdam* in *Holland*, they are no leſs ſure before-hand, that there is ſuch a City, than they are when they arrive there. This certainty is expreſs'd by *Medina* thus *, "*That which is Morally certain, a Man* "*may ſwear to without Heſitation.*

* *Quod certum eſt Moraliter, abſque aliqua hæſitatione poteſt juramento confirmari.* in prim ſecund. qu. 112. art. 5.

His notion, I confeſs, ſeems ſomewhat uncouth, but it amounts to a full deſcription of the Nature of properly-Moral Certainty, as it is excluſive of all Fear, leſt Things ſhould be otherwiſe in the Underſtanding, than they are in themſelves. The Author means the ſame thing, (and no more) by the Words now cited, that he ſets forth in theſe Words ‖,

‖ *Certitudo moralis omnem excludit dubitationem, convincit & neceſſitat intellectum. Nemo enim ſanæ mentis poteſt negare quod Roma ſit.* ibidem.

"*Moral Certainty ſhuts out all doubt, it* "*convinces and neceſſitates the Under-* "*ſtanding to aſſent. For no Man in his* "*Wits can deny, that there is ſuch a place* "*as* Rome.

Melchior Canus, ſpeaking of Things ſo atteſted, comes up to the ſame height *,

* *Hæc non modo negare, ſed in his etiam addubitare ſtultiſſimum eſt.* De Locis Theolog. l. 11. c. 4.

"*It is a moſt fooliſh thing, not only to* "*deny theſe things, but even to doubt of* "*them.*

It reaches ſo near to the Certainty of Senſe, that *Suarez* advanceth ſuch an atteſtation to a kind of *Evidence* ‖.

‖ *Humana quædam evidentia.* De Trip. virt. Theol. Diſp. 10. Sect 2.

Having thus recounted the Pillars that bear up Moral Certainty, and alſo ſhewn the weight of the Aſſent, that reſts upon them, I ſhall now ſet forth *by way of Compariſon*, that the pretended Knowledge of the Intention hath no ſuch Firmament to ſupport it.

§. 9. (1.) It is not a Senſible Object, but a Spiritual or immaterial Act, ſhut up in a Faculty, which (as we have ſeen already *) is inacceſſible to the eyes of Men and Angels.

* *Part II. Sect. 4.*

§. 10. (2.) And

§. 10. (2.) And conſequently, as no creature can ſee it but the ſingle Agent himſelf, ſo none is capable of contradicting his Relation of it, if it ſhould be (as it may be) in it ſelf falſe. So then a grand Rule of Trial moſt conducible to Moral aſſurance, is wanting on this ſcore, and then what a rational ſtreſs can be laid on ſuch Teſtimony?

§. 11. (3.) Were the Object *of it ſelf* liable to common obſervation, yet one witneſs is not ſufficient to challenge our Credence.

God himſelf was pleaſed in the Old Teſtament * to intimate, that a ſingle witneſs was leſs credible than many, and not to be truſted in matters of moment; and our Bleſſed Saviour hath repeated it in the New ‖; *---That in the mouth of two or three witneſſes every word may be eſtabliſhed.* From whence we may eſtimate how ſlender a ſatisfaction the Biſhop's word would give in that great concern, if he ſhould ſay, *I intended to do as the Church doth, in my Ordaining ſuch a perſon.*

* *Deut* 19 5.

‖ *Matth.* 18. 16.

§. 12. (4.) As there can be no more but a ſingle witneſs in the Caſe, ſo he may reaſonably be ſuſpected to affirm on his own behalf, or for his own Intereſts: and if ſo (which will appear ſhortly) it will much leſſen the value of his Teſtimony. With a reſpect to *This* our Bleſſed Saviour ſaid *, *If I bear witneſs of my ſelf, my witneſs is not true.*

* *Joh.* 5. 31.

Gagneius's Gloſs upon the Text may both illuſtrate and accommodate it to my Caſe, ‖ *Jeſus ſpeaks as a meer man: and it is unuſual to give credit to a meer man when he bears witneſs on his own behalf.*

‖ *Loquitur ut purus homo: hominis autem puri teſtimonium de ſe recipi non ſolet.* in 8. cap. *Johannis.*

§. 13. Now that any Biſhop in the world may be a party concerned (and therefore an incompetent witneſs) in affirming he intended as the Church requires, will be eaſily made appear. If he be declared Anathema (as he is by the *Trent*-Council) who denies the ne-

ceſſity of the Intention to the Sacraments, ſure no light puniſhment would be allotted to that Biſhop who ſhould diſcover that he defeated his Ordinations of their Efficacy by omitting to intend as the Church requires. This crime is called Sacriledge by your Authors; and it muſt be ſuch in a high degree according to your Hypotheſis, it being beyond compariſon, more hainous to rob mens ſouls of Sacramental Grace, than Churches of conſecrated Cups or Patens. Excommunication may be well ſuppoſed to be inflicted upon the Criminal Biſhop, which Cenſure is followed with ſuſpenſion from Office and Benefit, and with the loſs of the priviledges of the Laws, as your Authors teach ‖.

‖ *See for this Card.* Cajetan's *Summula verb. Excom.*

At beſt ſhame and reproach will attend ſuch a diſcovery: on which account I find ſome of your Caſuiſts ſhie of adviſing the Miniſters of the Sacraments to reveal the matter, when they have rendred them ineffectual through their *Not-intending* or otherwiſe. For example, when a Prieſt hath given an *invalid* Abſolution, he muſt be cautious of making it known *, *Leſt ſome ſcandal or infamy follow his revealing it to the Penitent.*

* *Nè ſi pœnitens admoneatur, ſequetur ſcandalum vel infamia.* Suarez. tom. 4. par. 2. diſp. 32. Sect. 6.

But on the contrary, he is obliged (ſay they) to make the defect known, *when it may be done without any great harm to himſelf, and without ſcandal* ‖.

‖ *quando ſine gravi nocumento ipſum confeſſorio & ſine ſcandalo fieri poteſt.* ibid.

But guilt is jealous of the harms ſometimes ſubſequent to ſuch diſcoveries; and ſince the offender will be judge, he will hardly think himſelf ſafe, ſave in a deep concealment of ſuch his faults; and therefore will like thoſe Authors beſt that furniſh him with the beſt Evaſions.

§. 14. Thus have we found that the Biſhop's confeſſion of their Not-intending aright, may expoſe them to loſs, or ſhame, or both; and ſad experience tells us that many are more tender of their Riches and Reputation,

tion, than of their Conſcience; and apt to ſacrifice Truth to their worldly welfare. And therefore when a Biſhop is askt, *how he intended in ſuch an Ordination*, none knows but ſuch reſpects may prevail with him to make an untrue Anſwer. If he have wilfully offended in that point, we may expect he will cloak his malice with a Lye; if through groſs careleſneſs, he may ſtudiouſly conceal it: But ſuppoſe he hath done his duty, his telling us ſo cannot prove it, becauſe it is but every way the ſame Anſwer they give, who have tranſgreſs'd it.

§. 15. The ſumm hereof is this, There is hardly any thing alike between the two Things I have now compared. *There* an object liable to the obſervation of many; not ſo *here*. *There* ſeveral Witneſſes affirm, *here* is only *ſingularis teſtis*. *There* no perſonal intereſt makes the Teſtimony ſuſpicious, *here* the ſingle witneſs depoſeth for himſelf.

The Inference from hence is this, *There* a ſtrong Aſſent is founded, *here* a weak one. *There* is certainty, *here* is none.

§. 16. I add, I am perſwaded that *Roman* Catholicks ſeldom (if ever) actually have the ſlender ſecurity of the ſaid ſingle Teſtimony. For I never heard in my Converſe with them, nor read in any of their Books, that they uſe to ask their Miniſters, whether they Intend aright or no. They preſume they do ſo, and reſt in that good natur'd belief, without troubling them with ſuch queſtions. But we are to conſider, that a blind Perſwaſion and Intellectual certainty are far different things. *That* is incident to all ſorts of Hereticks, *This* to the Orthodox only.

§. 17. Now, Sir, if I am not a partial judge in my own Cauſe, I have made it plain, that the Ordaining Prelate's Intention cannot be known either by Reaſon or Authority; (than which I find no other grounds of certain

certain Knowledge.) Which was the thing I undertook to prove.

SECT. VI.

Roman Catholicks have but a bare Opinion to ſecure them of the point.

§. 1. IT now remains, Sir, that I only leave the *Roman* Catholicks that weak aſſent to the point, uſually termed *Opination.* Had this been granted me at firſt, *viz.* That you hold your Prieſthood conſidered *in particular*, by no other claim than that of bare Opinion, as Opinion is oppoſed to moral certain Knowledge; I had not taken the trouble of writing much, but gone on immediately to infer from that Grant the crazy eſtate of your Church. I ſhall briefly ſay upon What ſome of your great men found their Aſſent to the preſence of the Miniſters Intention, and then evince that their Foundation will bear up no more than bare Opinion.

§. 2. 1. It is the Probity of the Miniſters of the Sacraments they rely on, as a ſufficient ſecurity that they *intend aright.* *Soto* ſhall declare this for himſelf and others *.

* ...*Cum videmus homines probos uti forma & Materia Eccleſiæ; credimus ſanos etiam Chriſtianoſq; habere mentes dum Sacramenta miniſtrant*, in 4. Sent. diſt. 1. qu 5. art. 8.

» *When we ſee honeſt* [*ſincere, vertuous*]
» *men uſe the matter and form of the Church,*
» *we alſo believe that they have ſound and*
» *Chriſtian minds while they adminiſter the*
» *Sacraments.*

2. To ſhew what a ſmall weight this ground will bear, I will proceed by ſome degrees. But in the way hereunto I premiſe theſe things,

§. 3. (1.) Your Authors agree That thoſe may be true Miniſters of the Sacraments who have neither Faith nor Probity: for which they give this reaſon, Sacraments

ments have their Efficacy from the Divine Inſtitutor, and therefore depend not for *this*, upon the Qualifications of the Miniſter, provided he perform what is required by the Inſtitution. And I find them accurſed by your *Trent* Council, who deny that a wicked Miniſter doth validly adminiſter the Sacraments *.

* *Si quis dixerit Miniſtrum in peccato mortali exiſtentem—non conficere aut conferre Sacramentum, anathema ſit. Seſ. 7. Ca. 11.*

§. 4. (2.) I never found it in practice among you, to judge the Diſpenſing your Sacraments more or leſs valid for the greater or leſs Temperance, Continence, Devotion, *&c.* of your Miniſters.

§. 5. (3.) I then account it your great infelicity, if as the cited words intimate, you cannot be well ſatisfied that any Miniſter *intends aright*, whom you know not to be a good and ſincere Man.

Among the vaſt Numbers of your Clergy, (as it alſo happens to thoſe of other Churches) there muſt be many irreligious and immoral men, not ſo Chriſtianly qualified, as You and I could wiſh: And then according to the Rule laid down, How many Hoſts conſecrated by ſuch, may be adored with doubting Minds; How many Abſolutions given, whoſe Virtue may be rationally queſtioned, *&c?*

§. 6. But enough of this. I will now try how firmly your ſecurity lies, even upon the conceived Probity, or Sincerity of your Miniſters. I take the Argument to be this,

"*Good men will not be wanting to their duty. Good Mi-*
"*niſters will be ſure to* Intend as the Church requires.

What I ſhall ſay to this Argument, is as follows,

I confeſs, a good Conſcience, or a Principle of Grace, is a very Operative thing, and excites to watchful diligence in duty, where it really is: But it is fit we ſhould know, 1. In whom it is, before we conclude the Miniſter's Intention, or any other good Effects from it, in particular. 2. Whether that Effect neceſſarily follow from that Cauſe.

§. 7. *Firſt*,

§. 7. *Firſt*, Let us inquire, how it can be known, where it ſurely is. For ſatisfaction in which Point, I ſhall lay this down as evident, That we know not any other Man's frame of mind, ſo well as himſelf knows it; as whether he ſigh for his ſins in ſecret, ſtrive to mortifie the unruly Motions of his Heart, values himſelf chiefly upon God's Mercy, through Chriſt, loves God above all things, and purpoſes to obey him without Reſerve, *&c.*

Having ſaid this, I ſhall determine according to your own Doctrine, (for I am not concerned here to interpoſe my own judgment) how far your Miniſters of the Sacraments are certain, that themſelves are ſincere Chriſtians, or in a ſtate of Grace: And then compare That with What others know of it.

§. 8. (1.) Themſelves cannot infallibly know this, without ſpecial Revelation, as your *Trent*-Council defines *.

* *Nullus ſcire valet certitudine Fidei, cui non poteſt ſubeſſe falſum, ſe gratiam Dei eſſe conſecutum. Seſſ 6. Cap. 9.*

"*No man can know with the infallible*
"*Certainty of Faith, that he hath obtained*
"*the Grace of God.*

§. 9. (2.) *Roman* Catholicks cannot agree to allow any Man ſuch a Certainty of it, as is equal to Moral Certainty, which excludes all rational Fear of being deceived. *Aquinas* ſaith ‖,

‖ *Homo non poteſt per certitudinem dijudicare utrum ipſe habeat Gratiam. prim. ſecund. qu. 112. Art. 5.*

"*No man can judge certainly, whether*
"*he have Grace.*

And he proceeds to ſay, Men know this only *by way of conjecture*, gained by ſome Signs or other: [*Conjecturaliter per aliqua Signa.*].

Ibidem.

Medina (upon the place) words it thus *, "*A juſt man can have no more*
"*than a conjectural certainty of his Grace,*
"*and ſuch as tranſcends not the limits of*
"*Humane Opinion, which always hath*
"*Fear adjoined to it.*

* *Vir juſtus non poteſt habere certitudinem uæ gratiæ, ſed tantummodo conjecturalem, & quæ non tranſcendit limites Opinionis humanæ, quæ habet ſemper formidinem adjunctam.*

§. 10. (3.) From the Knowledge you allow your Miniſters

niſters to have of their own Sincerity and Grace, it will be eaſie to collect in what meaſure others are able to know their ſtate, if the Rule of judgment, I premiſed, be remembred, *viz.*

"*That every thinking man knows the affections and ſtate* "*of his own Heart, better than another man can do it.*

§. 11. If your Miniſters then, who have experience of their own internal Acts, know not certainly whether they Fear and Love God above all things, (by which I now deſcribe *being in Grace*) much leſs can others, who can view onely outward Signs and appearances, but are ſtrangers to the Root and Spring of them.

§. 12. Suppoſing your Miniſters had undeniably a certainty of their Grace, equal to a Moral Certainty, which admits no fear of the contrary; yet all beſides themſelves, for the Reaſon given, muſt fall ſhort of that Aſſurance, and ſo take up with *Unſtable Opinion.*

§. 13. But ſince you will not agree to allow them to be ſo certain of it, others muſt ſtill proportionably fall below them, and be content with a lean and languid Aſſent, which ſhakes and totters for want of Evidence.

From what hath been thus ſet forth, I ſhall now deſtroy the Argument offered by the cited Author, in favour of your being ſatisfied, that your Miniſters of the Sacraments *duly intend* in the Adminiſtration of them.

§. 14. "*If* Roman *Catholicks cannot be ſo much as Mo-* "*rally Certain of the Probity and Chriſtian mindedneſs (to* "*ſpeak with the Author) of their Miniſters, on which Qua-* "*lifications they ground their confidence of their due Intend-* "*ing; (as I have proved they cannot) then they cannot be* "*Morally certain of their ſo Intending. The building can-* "*not be ſtronger than the foundation; nor the concluſion* "*more evident than the premiſſes.*

§. 15. Moreover: Your caſe is yet worſe than this; For you are greater Strangers to the particular Mental

Acts of your Miniſters, than you are to the Frame and Habit of their Minds. For you may fairly gueſs at This, by obſerving a full courſe of their Outward Actions, but not near ſo well at theſe Acts. The Reaſon is, a good Man may omit a good act, or do an ill one, without the deſtruction of his good habit, which denominates him ſuch. To accommodate this to our caſe, it is to be noted, That the Miniſter's Intention may be obſtructed, not onely by malice or contempt of Religion, or groſs Negligence; but alſo by Natural inadvertence, or ſuch accidental prevalent cares, or fears, or deep concerning Studies, as in groſs, and (as I may ſay) ſwallow up the mind, or hale it from a duty in hand, elſewhither. In theſe latter Inſtances, there may chance to be a defect of the Intention, without a wicked Habit in the Miniſter: So then the Connexion between good Habits and ſuch particular Acts is not certain, and therefore not to be depended on.

§. 16. The reſult, as to our preſent concern, is this, 1. As it is but probable (as *probable* is oppoſed to *morally certain*) your Biſhops have Chriſtian minds, (remember I ſpeak of them *in particular*) So is it but probable that in their Ordinations they intend as your Church requires, the Evidence of the latter depending on that of the former, according to the Argument I deal with. 2. It is not ſo probable that they ſo intend, as it is that they are Chriſtianly affected, a good man being liable to omit a good Act he ought to perform, and this not deſtructive of his gracious Habit. Nothing is left for you, but looſe Sand, inſtead of a pretended Rock, to build your certainty upon.

Having largely examined the moſt plauſible Plea, *Roman* Catholicks have for their Security, that their Miniſters intend as they ought, and diſarmed it of its ſtrength; I ſhall now, in way of ſurpluſage, ſhew how hopeleſs it is, for the end it was brought for, from the Context of the cited place.

§. 17. For

§. 17. For this end, I will repeat the cited paſſage, prefixing to it the foregoing Words.

The Author had declared, that though the interior Intention be required to the Sacraments, yet when men ſee the exterior Actions done, they may quiet their minds with a perſwaſion, that the Miniſters intend as the Church requires them: And ſeeing an Objection ſtare him in the Face, He ſets himſelf to Anſwer it. The Objection is this, *

* *Illa non eſt evidens certitudo.*

That certainty [or perſwaſion] is no Evident certainty.

He returns this Anſwer to it,

Fatemur equidem ingenue: ſed nec requiritur evidens, ſed, illa ſatis eſt ad Conſcientiæ quietem: quoniam neque ſemper certitudinem habemus an Miniſtri ſint veri Sacerdotes. Sed cum videmus homines probos uti, &c.

"*I ingenuouſly confeſs it; nor is an Evident Certainty required; but* That *is* "*ſufficient to quiet the Conſcience: be-*"*cauſe we are not always certain that the* "*Miniſters are true Prieſts. But when we* "*ſee honeſt men uſe the Matter and Form* "*of the Church, We believe that they have ſound and Chri-*"*ſtian minds, while they adminiſter the Sacraments.*

Behold, here a Learned man is ſorely puzled, through the infirmity of his cauſe. He would have men ſatisfied of the validity of their Sacraments, by ſome aſſurance of the Miniſter's Intending as he ought to do. But ſee how he is forced to cook the matter.

§. 18. (1.) He grants there is no Evident Certainty of the Thing: And conſequently that it is not liable to the view of the Underſtanding.

§. 19. To make it as intelligible as I can, I will give a ſhort account of the meaning of the Terms, *Evidence* and *Certainty*. And this I will do (according to the method I have uſed) from one of your Authors. *Peter Hurtad de Mendoza* defines both of them ‖:

‖ *Evidentia eſt claritas ſive perſpicuitas qua intellectus quaſi videt Objecta.*

"*Evidence is that clearneſs or perſpi-*"*cuity, by which the Underſtanding doth* "*as it were ſee Objects.*

Certitudo eſt firma determinatio adhæſioque intellectus ad verum ut verum eſt. Diſp. 10. Sect. 3. de Demonſt.

"*Certainty is a firm determination and* "*adheſion of the Underſtanding to Truth* "*as Truth.*

The Author then having granted that there is no Evident Certainty of the Intention, doth in effect grant, that the Underſtanding cannot view it for want of light, nor imbrace it as a Thing in Being. Evidence doth indeed *Naturally* cauſe certainty. As I can no longer queſtion the Being of what I ſee plainly with my bodily eyes, ſo neither can I, what I ſee with thoſe of my mind. But no Natural Beams lighten this Object; it is confeſſed to lie in darkneſs.

§. 20. (2.) He ſaith, ſuch certainty is not neceſſary, in order to the Quiet of the Conſcience. But, I ſay, ſomething is neceſſary to that End, becauſe Anxiety would oppreſs the Soul, were it left to fluctuate about the weighty matters of Religion, ſuch as the Truth of our Sacraments are acknowledged to be. And it hath been ſhewn that the Truth of theſe cannot be known, unleſs the Miniſter's Intention be ſo too. Well: Evident certainty is given away; but what brings the Author to ſupply it? Why, he lays no claim to that obſcure Certainty that is founded on Authority. He neither ſaith, There is the infallible Teſtimony of God for the Thing, nor yet the credible Teſtimony of men: Which ſilence is a tacit confeſſion, he had no ſuch thing to plead, it being then his Province to ſay all he could to ſecure the Soul in that Point.

§. 21. (3.) He gives this moſt ſorry Reaſon, why it was not neceſſary *ſo* to know the Intention in Baptiſm, (of which he was ſpeaking) *viz.* becauſe, *ſaith he*, we are not always certain that our Miniſters are true Prieſts.

The relation of theſe Words to the former, ſeems to make the whole ſound but *this*, viz. Baptiſm fares no worſe than Ordination; let us hope well of both, but we

are

are certain of neither. When he cannot cure the malady, he gives them Narcoticks to ſtill and ſtun the Spirits, that they may be leſs ſenſible of their pain. Let us not torment our ſelves but believe the beſt, is the effect of his words, to my underſtanding.

§. 22. Yet he minces the matter. We are not always certain, *&c. ſaith he.* Then never certain, *ſay I,* upon the account of the Intention: (which he purpoſely treats of in that Article.) But are there not greater hopes when moral men Adminiſter? Yes. But I have proved there is no certainty.

§. 23. But becauſe of ſome inconveniences which that diſtinction of good and bad Miniſters, as applied before, may chance to breed among *Roman* Catholicks, I will now ſuppoſe that by the words, *Good Men* *, the Author meant to deſcribe all their Miniſters promiſcuouſly. However not daring to truſt this Notion, I have conſidered them as implying the fore-named diſtinction. I would not impoſe a meaning upon any man's words, but take his own, if I knew it. In this method I cannot miſs his Senſe: it muſt be *here* or *there.*

* *Homines probos.*

§. 24. Well, I conſtrue the words *thus,* when we ſee any Miniſter do the Sacramental Actions, we believe he hath a Chriſtian mind and duely Intends. Now I proceed to ſay, it hath already appeared that there is neither Evidence nor Authority claimed by the Author to ſecure the Conſcience in this matter: And therefore I conclude his *Credimus* [We believe] only denotes the judgment of Charity, which he conceives ſufficient to ſtay and ſettle the mind.

§. 25. Sir, I will freely grant you this judgment of Charity for your Miniſters, and conſequently for their intending aright. For where there are not manifeſt tokens of Vice, we are to account every man Virtuous; and for things that look doubtful, we are rather to interpret them in the more favourable ſenſe, when there

is

is an Obligation upon us to paſs our judgment. But this tye of making a charitable judgment is too weak a ſtay for Conſcience in the great concerns of Religion, ſuch as the Miniſter's Intention, on which you make your Baptiſm, the Conſecration of the Euchariſt, *&c.* depend. This will appear by conſidering theſe two things,

§. 26. (1.) The judgment of Charity alwaies ſuppoſes the Object Uncertain; or to ſpeak more properly, the Underſtanding Uncertain. For what needs Charity come into the Scale, if Evidence hath weighed it down beforehand? What needs the Will come into the work, but that the Underſtanding is at a loſs?

§. 27. (2.) The Soul is not a jot nearer Truth by this judgment of Charity. The pious affection of the Will is indeed exerciſed, but it makes not the Act of the Underſtanding more certain. Truth is the Object of the Intellect alone, and therefore certainty is not at all taken from the Will, but from the Evidence of the Object, or from the motive to Faith.

§. 28. I forbear to add, That the Underſtanding may be eaſily, and is often expoſed to the danger of falſehood by the charitable inclination of the Will; and that ignorance may contribute much to the falſe quiet of the mind. The will hath nothing to do with the Underſtanding (that I know of) in order to Knowledge, but barely to ſtir it up to act. When that is done, it muſt judge for it ſelf, and hath Rules of its own to examine things by; but the bent or biaſs of the Will is none of them. And he that makes himſelf (as I may ſo ſay) certain without or beyond Rational Motives, is but blindly perſwaded or pertinacious.

I have ſaid enough, if not too much, to convince That the judgment of Charity concerning the Intention, amounts not to an *intellectual* certainty of it. Which is the only thing I was concerned to make out, in this place.

§. 29. Now

§. 29. Now ſince neither Reaſon nor Authority will aſcertain the Intention, and ſince the Judgment of Charity falls ſhort of the mark, I may, I hope, without preſumption conclude that my Propoſition is verified, *viz.*

That the Intention of the [*Ordaining*] *Biſhop is a Condition which no man living knows whether it be fulfill'd or no in Ordination.*

And then the premiſes being true, the concluſion is ſo too, *viz.*

The Church of Rome *requires a condition to Ordination which no man living knows whether it be fulfill'd or no.*

I confeſs I have extended my proof to a far greater Latitude (as I have done ſome other things in theſe Papers) than any thing you have offered, exacted from me: but I had rather be accuſed of being over than ſhort. Beſides, I had a mind to prevent the often re-hearing of the Cauſe, to which ſeveral little new Suggeſtions might give occaſion, by a more particular ſifting of it. I had alſo a reſpect to ſome others, who had never ſeen the Subject ſet in a full light. But after all, I am ſenſible I have done ſomething more than needed.

§. 30. I have indeed conſidered the Propoſition only under the limitation before expreſs'd, excepting the Ordaining Biſhops out of *no man living* knows. Who may therefore pretend to know their own Intention, and by conſequence that there are true Prieſts among you. But if an Interpretation I gave you of my Propoſition at *Pz.* had not (without Reaſon) been diſpleaſing to you, what I have already done would have left your Biſhops unſecured of your Prieſthood, as well as all the reſt of your Communion.

However I ſhall with little ado cure that defect by offering the ſame thing in ſuch words, as will not, I think, be evaded.

SECT.

SECT. VII.

The Ordaining Bishops not certain whether there be true Priests in the Roman *Church.*

HAving already proved, That all *Roman* Catholicks, except the Ordaining Bishops, are Uncertain whether the said Bishops Intend aright in their particular Ordinations, and consequently as uncertain whether they make any true Priests, I come now to prove That the Ordaining Bishops (so called) are uncertain whether or no they Intend with such an Intention as is available or effectual to Ordination.

In order hereunto I will let my first Syllogism stand as before *. The *minor* Proposition of it, which only could regularly be denied, is this, *The* Roman *Church requires a condition to Ordination which no man living knows whether or no it be fulfill'd.*

* *Part I. Sect. 1.*

To wrap up the Bishops in the same uncertainty with the rest, I prove it thus,

'The Intention of a person who is a true Bishop is a 'Condition which no man living knows, the Ordainers 'themselves not excepted, whether it be fulfilled in Or-'dination.

'But the *Roman* Church requires the Intention of a 'person who is a true Bishop to Ordination. *Ergo*,

'The *Roman* Church requires a condition to Ordina-'tion, which no man living knows, the Ordainers 'themselves not excepted, whether it be fulfill'd in Or-'dination.

The *minor* is clear, for it is not every man's using the Matter and Form of the Church, and intending to do as the Church doth, (although you say, This may suffice to Baptism) that you hold to be sufficient to Ordination. You judge not only Lay-men but simple

Priests

Prieſts uncapable of doing that work, as the Curſe of your *Trent*-Council makes appear *.

" *If any one ſhall ſay, That Biſhops are* " *not Superior to Prieſts, or have not the* " *power of Confirming and Ordaining, or* " *that the power they have is common to* " *them with Prieſts, let him be Anathema.*

* *Si quis dixerit Epiſcopos non eſſe Presbyteris ſuperiores, vel non habere poteſtatem Confirmandi & Ordinandi, vel eam quam habent illis cum Presbyteris communem eſſe, Anathema ſit.* Seſſ. 23. Can. 7.

The Ordainer then muſt of Neceſſity be a Biſhop. This for the *Minor*.

If there be any difficulty in the matter, it reſpects the *Major:* But I am now to ſhew there is none at all. This then I lay down as evident, except the Ordainer know that he is in Truth what he is called, *viz.* a Biſhop, he knows not that his Intention is ſuch as operates in, and is effectual to Ordination, nor conſequently that he makes a true Prieſt. My Medium, you know, points directly at this, and the connexion is unqueſtionable, according to your ſelves. Which being ſaid, it onely remains that I make out,

That none of your Biſhops know that they are true Biſhops. I do it thus,

" *No Biſhops that are Uncertain, whether or no they are* " *true Prieſts, know that they are true Biſhops.*

" *But all the* Roman *Biſhops are uncertain, whether or no* " *they are true Prieſts.* Ergo,

" *No* Roman *Biſhops know that they are true Biſhops.*

To verifie the *Major*, I need but ſay, 1. Your Church holds, That no man can be a Biſhop, who is not firſt a Prieſt. A taſt of Authority may ſatisfie for this.

" *If any one* (ſaith Suarez *) *ſhould* " *of a Deacon be made Biſhop without firſt* " *taking Prieſts Orders, he doth not only* " *remain ſuſpended, but Unconſecrated:* " *becauſe the Epiſcopal Character, if there* " *be any ſuch, Eſſentially requires the* " *Prieſtly Character.*

* *Si quis ita conſecretur Epiſcopus per ſaltum ut Sacerdotii Ordinem præterm ittat, eum non ſolum manere ſuſpenſum, verum etiam non manere conſecratum: quia character Epiſcopalis, ſi quis eſt, eſſentialiter requirit characterem Sacerdotalem.* Suarez. Tom. 5. Diſp 31. §. 53.

D. Soto delivers the matter in ſhort ‖.

"*The Epiſcopate depends on the Prieſt-*
"*hood; for the making a man Biſhop be-*
"*fore he is made Prieſt, would be of no*
"*avail.*

‖ *Epiſcopatus dependet à Sacerdotio, nam conſecratio Epiſcopi antequam ſit Sacerdos, non valeret.* De juſt. & jure, ſ. 10. qu. 1. art. 2.

The Reaſon hereof, is, No man can give that which he hath not himſelf; the Pre-eminent power the Biſhop hath, was eſpecially given him for Conſtituting Prieſts for the Service of the Church; and therefore it is neceſſary, that he have what he confers.

"*The power of the Keys is founded*
"*in the Prieſtly Character*, ſaith Gab.
"Biel *.

* *Poteſtas clavium fundatur in characterе Sacerdotali.* Lib. 4. Diſt. 19. qu. 1. art. 1.

Though your leſſer Orders may be jump'd over, I am ſure you will not ſay, This can; Which if he want, he hath the Name of Biſhop, and no more. This for the Dependence of the two Orders.

2. As your Ordainers know not whether they had Prieſtly Orders, ſo they cannot know, for that Reaſon, whether they had Epiſcopal Orders. The Uncertainty of the *former* neceſſarily deſtroys all certainty of the *latter*. *Thus much for the Major.*

As for the *Minor* Propoſition, it is largely proved before-hand, viz. *That all* Roman *Biſhops are Uncertain, whether or no they be true Prieſts, for want of knowing their Ordainer's Intention.*

Now the Premiſſes being ſafe, the Concluſion is ſet beyond all hazard, viz. *No* Roman *Biſhops know that they are true Biſhops:* And conſequently they know not that their *Intending* is available to Ordination.

But ſuppoſing them to know that they were truly made Prieſts, (which yet, as appears, they neither do, nor can know) yet they cannot know that they are true Biſhops, for the ſame Reaſon that Prieſts cannot know that they are true Prieſts, *viz.* Their Ignorance of their Conſecrator's Intention. Biſhops are as far from inſpecting

ſpecting the Hearts of their Conſecrators, as Prieſts are from inſpecting the Hearts of the Biſhops. There is Parity of Reaſon on both ſides.

I will advance one other Medium, to prove your Biſhops to be Uncertain of their Orders. I take my Argument from their Not-knowing that they were indeed Baptized. And I will take your Simple Prieſts along with them for Company. In Form it runs thus,

"*No Biſhops or Prieſts, that are uncertain whether or on* "*they were truly Baptized, know whether or no they be* [re-"ſpectively] *true Biſhops or Prieſts.*

"*But all* Roman *Biſhops and Prieſts are Uncertain, whe-*"*ther or no they were truly Baptized.* Ergo,

"*No* Roman *Biſhops or Prieſts know whether they be true* "*Biſhops or Prieſts.*

The Major Propoſition muſt be granted, if theſe two Things appear,

(1.) That there is a Neceſſary Dependence of Holy Orders upon Baptiſm.

(2.) That there is between them a Dependence of Knowledge, as well as Being. What ſhines not of it ſelf, I ſhall, after my wont, prove from your own Authority.

For the *Firſt*. Your Angelical Doctor hath long ago acquainted us *,

"*That he is not capable of receiving* "*any other Sacrament, who hath not the* "*Baptiſmal Character.*

And he doth not only ſay this in general, which yet had been ſufficient, but he applies it to our particular:

"*Baptiſm is the Gate of the Sacra-*"*ments, and therefore ſince Order is a* "*certain Sacrament, it preſuppoſes Bap-*"*tiſm.*

* *Qui characterem baptiſmalem non habet, nullum aliud Sacramentum recipere poteſt.* Addit. ad tertiam partem. qu. 34. art. 3.

1 *Baptiſmus eſt janua Sacramentorum, ergo cum Ordo ſit quoddam Sacramentum præſupponit Baptiſmum.* Ibidem.

He goes on to certifie us *, "*That if* "*any* Unbaptized *perſon be promoted to* "*the Prieſthood, he is no Prieſt, nor can* "*he either conſecrate, or abſolve, &c.*

* *Talis ſi promoveatur ad Sacerdotium, non eſt Sacerdos, nec conſecrare poteſt, nec abſolvere, &c.* ibidem.

To be ſhort, Your Canon teacheth ‖, "*That they who are promoted to Orders;* "*unbaptized, ſhall be Baptized and Re-*"*ordained.*

‖ In Decret. li. 3. ti. 43. cap. 1. 3. de Presbyt. non Baptizat.

This I have ſaid, is enough to evince the neceſſary dependence Orders have upon Baptiſm, which is the Gate through which your other Sacraments enter; and which being ſhut, they are kept forth.

For the *Second*, I need add nothing to enlighten it: For the aboveſaid dependence being acknowledged, no man hath power to deny, That he who is uncertain that he was Baptized, muſt be ſo that he was Ordained. This for the proof of the *Major*.

The *Minor* is this, *All* Roman *Biſhops and Prieſts are Uncertain whether or no they were truly Baptized*. But this is proved before-hand, by thoſe Arguments that convinced, that the Miniſter's Intention is not Knowable by any beſides himſelf.

Now the Premiſſes being ſtedfaſt, the concluſion ſtands moſt firm, viz. *No* Roman *Biſhops or Prieſts know whether they be true Biſhops or Prieſts.*

I ſhall not be reckoned to have made ſuperfluous proof of this Point, if the *Reader* ſhall conſider the Fruit it yields, the ſeveral Mediums being ſo many Hammers to break to pieces the pretended Certainty of the *Roman* Prieſthood. If it be born in mind, that the Intention is a Mental contingent Act, which the Agent may, or may not do, at his pleaſure; and that none can diſcover, whether he exert that Act, or not, it will be very obvious here to view the ſeveral Grounds of the Uncertainty of their Prieſthood. If the Biſhop was not Baptized with due Intention, he cannot Ordain. If he was not *ſo* made

Prieſt,

Prieſt, he cannot Ordain, if he was not *ſo* conſecrated, he cannot Ordain. And it plainly appears that himſelf cannot be certain of any of theſe, and therefore cannot be certain he makes a Prieſt, becauſe all theſe go to qualifie him for that Work. And the Prieſt, beſides theſe inſuperable uncertainties, common to the Biſhop with him, is vexed with one more as bad as the reſt. He knows not that the Biſhop (if he ſhould chance to be capable of doing it) intended to communicate Spiritual Power to him.

So that there are *three* hazards to allay the Biſhop's confidence of his making Prieſts, and a *fourth* more to allay That of the Prieſt.

But this may be accounted a ſmall thing in compariſon of what follows. The Conſecrator of our preſent Biſhop was liable to the ſame *three* Uncertainties, and theſe are chargeable, in their Effects, upon our Biſhop. If his Ordainer and Conſecrator were not truly Baptized, made Prieſt, and Biſhop, (and God only knows that) They had no Faculty to Ordain or Conſecrate, and then our Biſhop hath but an empty Name. And the *fourth* comes in too, he knows not what his Conſecrator Intended.

So then our Biſhop and his Conſecrator, with reſpect to their Knowledge, whether they ordain Prieſts, are neceſſarily liable to *Six* Contingencies, any of which falling out will Un biſhop him, and therefore make void his Ordinations.

Think then how vaſtly theſe Contingences will multiply from the Apoſtles times to ours, and that our preſent Biſhop is *ſo far* chargeable with any one of the ſaid Omiſſions of Intention, that he hath loſt his Power and Office, if any ſuch hath happen'd in a *direct* deſcent.

According to the Suggeſtions of common Reaſon, your Maſs-books, and other Books contain Suppoſitions, That there may be defect of due Intention: And Prieſthood comes

comes down no other way but by a claim of Succeſſion; Intention is neceſſary to hold the links together, and is concerned in the manifold particulars ſpecified; and if any of the links be broken all falls to pieces; No Biſhop or Prieſt afterwards in that particular Line to the worlds end.

Now I refer it to every inquiſitive man, whether the ground be not too ſlippery for Certainty to ſtand on, amidſt the manifold variety of thoſe contingencies 'forementioned.

Though I allowed you, for Argument ſake, the judgment of Charity for *all* your Biſhops of *this time*, yet ſuppoſing they mean never ſo honeſtly in their Acts, it appears *now* That is not ſufficient to decide the queſtion; for their Intention may be void and ineffectual, though not through want of *Will*, yet for want of *Power*. Their Baptizers or Ordainers may have neglected them, and Theſe upon this ſcore are made uſeleſs to others. The fault may have been committed ſeveral Ages ago, which yet the poor Gentlemen can neither know nor remedy. What room then is there for certainty in this thick contexture of hazards?

We ſhall find that even the dark judgment of Charity will run very low, if we follow the Ordainers up into ſome diſtant Ages, wherein Ignorance and Vice ſtrove, as it were, for maſtery in the *Roman* Church. What ſay you of the 9*th*. and 10*th*. Ages, and the *four* next following, wherein Learning was *generally* fallen aſleep in the Weſtern *Europe*, and wickedneſs as much awake in it? If Hiſtorians of thoſe times may be credited (as they muſt, or *farewel* Authority) great breaches might very probably be made in the Succeſſion of Biſhops in many Sees; for ſuch as are blind and careleſs of their own Souls will hardly be ſure to *look out ſharp*, and be regardful of the Salvation of others, in their Adminiſtrations.

It

It ought to be obſerved, With what eaſe and ſpeed Nullities may be diffuſed and multiplied. Let us put a fair caſe, Suppoſe a Biſhop, within whoſe Dioceſe the greateſt Univerſity of a Nation is, ſhould out of unbelief, contempt of Religion, ſupine careleſneſs, or from any other cauſe, omit to Intend as is required, in his frequent Ordinations of the Collegians: it would follow that the Biſhops taken out of theſe Prieſts, though never ſo good men and careful to Intend as they ought, muſt yet act ineffectually, and fill many places with empty names, inſtead of power. The more ſuch, ſo much the worſe; and the longer they live, the bigger is the miſchief. And who can ſecure us againſt this Suppoſition? Now conſidering that Nullities may have at any time thus ſpread, (I ſpeak ſtill with a Relation to your doctrine) and that the farther they go, they grow far more numerous, what can a thoughtful man find amidſt all this for the certainty of the *Roman* Prieſthood!

If it be ſaid, No man knows on the other hand, that they fail to Intend. I *anſwer*, It is not enough to *Certainty* not to know that they fail, we are to know that they fail not. Knowledge ſtands not in *Negatives*, it is *Poſitives* that ſtay the Underſtanding.

Give a poſitive Reaſon why they muſt hit the mark, and I ſhall be ſure they cannot miſs it. But none we have found can do this.

The reſult is, Not one of the *Roman* Church, except the Ordaining Biſhops, can know the Intention of the Ordainers. They know it not either in it ſelf, or in its Cauſe, or by any Effects. They are not aſſured of it either by Divine Revelation, or by ſufficient Humane Authority. And therefore they have no true certainty of their Prieſthood which depends upon it. They have not (to uſe your own terms) either a Metaphyſical, or Mathematical, or yet a Moral certainty of it. They have

have not (to ſpeak my own language) either Divine or Theological or yet Moral certainty that any one of all the reputed Clergy of the *Roman* Church is a true Prieſt.

For the Ordaining Biſhops, They may indeed know whether themſelves Intend, but know not whether there be any force or virtue in their Intention for making Prieſts, for want of knowing the Intention of the whole Succeſſion of their Baptizers, Ordainers and Conſecrators. So that not one Soul in the Church of *Rome* hath any true certainty of the matter.

You ſee I have laid the weight of what hath been ſaid, on theſe two grounds: 1. That a Mental interior Intention is required to the very Being of your Sacraments, which hath been ſhewn from your own Authors. 2. That Holy Orders is a Sacrament, and ſo as much depends upon the Intention, as any other of them. This I have indeed taken all along for granted; but ſhall now prove it from the Council of *Trent* *.

* *Dubitare nemo poteſt Ordinem eſſe vere & proprie unum ex ſeptem Sanctæ Eccleſiæ Sacramentis.* Seſſ. 23. cap. 7.

" *None ought to doubt that Order is*
" *truely and properly one of the ſeven*
" *Sacraments of the Holy Church.*

Theſe Two (I ſay) are *your own Principles*, and from them I have concluded your Uncertainty of your Prieſthood conſidered *in particular*, and ſo have made good my word.

It now remains that in the next Section I draw from hence ſuch Conſequences or Corollaries as will ſet the feeble eſtate of the *Roman* Church in ſo full a Light, that all that wink not, muſt needs ſee it.

SECT.

SECT. VIII.

Conſequences drawn from the Uncertainty of the Roman *Prieſthood: and the feeble condition of that Church, iſſuing from thence, ſhewn.*

§. 1. IF no *Roman* Catholick can be certain that there is any one true Prieſt *in particular*, in their Church, This neceſſarily follows in the general, That each of them muſt be uncertain whether he have the benefit of any one Sacrament which depends upon the Prieſtly character. Now you teach that all your Sacraments do ſo depend, except Baptiſm and Matrimony: So then *five* of the *ſeven* are unavoidably uncertain to each of you, by immediate inference from the Uncertainty of your Prieſthood.

§. 2. Moreover, You are uncertain upon the ſame ground, *viz. your ignorance of the Miniſter's Intention*, of having the *two other*, whether adminiſtred by Prieſts who are the ordinary Miniſters of them, or by others whom neceſſity makes ſuch in the Prieſts abſence.

Chriſt ſurely inſtituted his Sacraments for great Spiritual Ends, which are as ſurely attained by the worthy partakers of them. How deplorable then is the eſtate of the *Roman* Church, ſince not one of its Members knows that in his whole life time he receives any One Sacrament! *this in general.*

§. 3. I will now infer more particularly, from the Virtue of the Premiſſes already laid down and proved;

1. Not one Member of your Church can without ſpecial Revelation (which is excepted in the State of our Queſtion) be aſcertained he had the Bleſſing of Chriſtian Baptiſm, which you hold to be a Sacrament neceſſary to all; and without which your *Trent* Council ſaith, *There is no Salvation* *.

* *Siquis dixerit Baptiſmum non eſſe neceſſarium ad ſalutem. Anathema ſit.* Seſſ. 7. c. 5.

§. 4. I know the Canon is generally interpreted thus, An *adult* is ſavable by Contrition and the *deſire* of Baptiſm, if the Miniſter chance to have robbed him of it by Not intending. But behold the miſeries he is yet liable to, notwithſtanding that: (1.) You cannot plead that ſuch a one is capable of any Office purely relating to the Service of God's Church, (2.) nor that he is capable of the Benefits of any other Sacrament. Sacraments, as I ſaid, were appointed by Chriſt for great Bleſſings to his people, as being not only ſigns, but alſo inſtrumental cauſes of the Grace they ſignifie: and therefore the next to the miſery of wanting them, it is moſt lamentable to be Uncertain whether or no a man indeed has them; which is apparently the Caſe of all *Roman* Catholicks.

§. 5. But if an Infant dye defrauded of the Baptizer's Intention, (and none can be aſſured that any particular one is not) according to the current of your doctrin he is eternally ſhut out of the Kingdom of Heaven; in as much as he is not capable of making up the defect by Contrition and deſire of Baptiſm. If there be no aſſurance had of the Baptizer's Intention, there can be none had of the Child's Salvation, according to your doctrin. Which muſt make the Funerals of poor Babes far more bitter to their Chriſtian Parents and Friends, than they would be, had they juſt grounds of ſecurity for their Reigning with Chriſt in Glory.

§. 6. 2. No *Roman* Catholick is ſure that after a Confeſſion of ſins made to his Prieſt, he gains from him a true Sacramental Abſolution.

As Baptiſm is, with you, neceſſary to all without exception, for taking away Sin, and for the infuſion of Grace; ſo is Penance neceſſary to all them that after Baptiſm have fallen into mortal ſin: and the effects of it are no leſs, ſay you, than Pardon and Reconciliation. This is the only Plank to ſwim ſafe to ſhoar on, after a moral

moral Shipwrack; without which all ſuch ſink down into the *Abyſs* of Perdition. Well, the more neceſſary you eſteem This to be, and the more valuable its Effects, the more comfort would proportionably fall to your ſhare, if you were ſure you had it. But on the contrary it will be your miſery not to know you are inriched with that treaſure. When you have come to the Prieſt Contrite, and opened all your ſins to him without Reſerve, and are diſpoſed to ſatisfie for all injuries done by you, it is a mournful thing, after all this, to come away Uncertain of your being indeed Abſolved, for want of Knowledge that the Prieſt could Effectually, and did Actually Intend to Releaſe you of your ſins. *Which is the ſad caſe of every* Roman *Catholick.*

§. 7. 3. No *Roman* Catholick is certain that he at any time receives the Sacrament of the Euchariſt.

Though you make not This altogether ſo neceſſary, as you do Baptiſm and Penance, yet you hold it to be matter of great advantage to the Soul. The Subſtantial Body of Chriſt, *you ſay*, is received there, and with, and by it Spiritual Nouriſhment, whereby the Graces of the Spirit are ſuſtained and increaſed; and the Soul conſequently made more vigorous for performing all Chriſtian duty. Now the more excellent the Effects of this Sacrament are known to be, the greater comfort it is apt to yield to all that are certain they receive it, and do this, as they hope, Worthily. But on the contrary, how doleful is it to be uncertain (how great ſoever their preparations have been for it) whether they at any time truly have it, for want of Knowing that the Prieſt could Effectually and did Actually Intend to Conſecrate, without which the Elements remain Unſanctified, and cannot be Vehicles of thoſe Bleſſings deſigned by Chriſt to be communicated that way to the Soul. *And yet this is the ſad caſe of* Roman *Catholicks.*

§. 8. It remains that I add, you are not only unhappy in not knowing This, with reſpect to the foreſaid Bleſſings to be received by it; But alſo with reſpect to two great Duties (as you count them) to be done, which depend upon the Conſecration. One is the Adoration of the Hoſt; the other the Offering it as a Sacrifice both for the quick and dead. If your Church do both theſe on Uncertain grounds, it will look a very ſad thing: And that ſhe doth ſo, will be inferred from what hath been already proved, Conſecration it ſelf, which alone can be ſuppoſed to ſupport them, being found to be an Uncertain thing. That nothing may remain obſcure, touching theſe matters, I ſhall take room enough to explain them.

For the *Firſt*, viz. Adoration of the Hoſt; The *Trent*-Council delivers this Doctrine to warrant the practice of it:

There is no place left for doubt, but all the faithful of *Chriſt* may exhibite Adoration, which is due to the true God, to this moſt Holy Sacrament, in their Veneration of it.*

* *Nullus dubitandi locus relinquitur, quin omnes Chriſti fideles— latriæ cultum qui vero Deo debetur, huic ſanctiſſimo Sacramento in veneratione exhibeant.* Seſſ. 13. cap. 5.

And the Council there ſubjoins, that the Cuſtome was piouſly and religiouſly brought into the Church, of Yearly ſetting a Day apart, for carrying the Sacrament in Solemn Proceſſion, through frequented Ways and publick Places, in order to its being Adored, *&c.*

It is too well known to be inſiſted on, that aſſoon as the Prieſt hath conſecrated, he pays to the Sacrament the Worſhip that belongeth to God alone; and the People preſent, upon the Uſual Notice given them, do the ſame: And that in the moſt populous Towns of the *Roman* Communion, when it is carried through the Streets to any Sick perſon, under a Canopy, all that meet it fall down and adore it.

§. 9. I have ſaid all this, to evince that the Adoration ſpoken

ſpoken of, hath not for its Object our Bleſſed Saviour conſidered as corporally preſent in Heaven, but as preſent under the *Species* of Bread or Wine; or both. It is the Sacrament that is to be Adored, your Council and practice tell us. But now the Body is no Sacrament without the *Species*, for there would be wanting in that caſe a Viſible Sign, which is the *Genus* of a Sacrament. This Point being fixt, I come to ask, What if there happen to be no true Conſecration, when the Exterior Sacramental Action is done, which is a thing you all grant may happen?

§. 10. Why, the ſame Adoration is paid ſtill, upon a preſumption of true Conſecration. If I ask again, What is adored in that caſe? It muſt be anſwered, a Creature, *viz. the Bread*, is adored inſtead of God.

And then this is in one ſenſe or another, Idolatry.

It follows alſo, upon the ſame ground, That when men are Uncertain whether there be true Conſecration, they are alſo uncertain whether they commit not Idolatry in ſuch their Adorations.

Now I conclude, that *Roman* Catholicks are at no time certain, that they commit not Idolatry in Worſhipping the Hoſt.

I add, God is very jealous of his Honour, and Men ſhould be tender of it too; and therefore I would think they ſhould have either ſimple Evidence or Revelation for the Divinity of the Object, before they pay to it that greateſt Tribute of Adoration: But *Roman* Catholicks light far ſhort of that Certainty of the matter, and yet venture to adore, hit or miſs.

§. 11. For the *Second*: The Euchariſt, according to you, is a proper Sacrifice: That is, the Body and Blood of Chriſt, are by the Prieſt truly and properly offered to God in the Maſs, under the viſible *Species* of Bread and Wine: And this is a Propitiatory Sacrifice. God being pleaſed with this Oblation, grants to thoſe, for whom it

is

is Offered, Grace, Repentance, Remiſſion of many and grievous Sins, and Supplies for their ſeveral Neceſſities. Nor doth this profit Men alive onely, but after Death. *Thus your Church teaches.*

I cannot but acknowledge that this Doctrine is believed among you, for I find that moſt Men of Eſtates in your Communion, do at their Death leave good round Sums of Mony to certain Prieſts, who in conſideration of it, are to ſhorten their Benefactors ſtay in the acute pains of Purgatory, by ſaying of Maſſes, or Offering this Sacrifice in their behalf. And if this Doctrine be true, the Service done them is worth their Mony; which cannot be better employed otherwiſe.

§. 12. But if there be no Conſecration made by thoſe reſpective Prieſts, who promiſe to help them by that Means, there will be a great diſappointment ſomewhere. But I ſhall ſay no more of that. However, this I may ſay, (having laid down a Warrant for it) that neither Prieſts nor People are certain, that there will be a return of Maſſes for the Mony, as not knowing whether they be true Prieſts, and ſo (intend how they will) capable of turning the Bread and Wine into the Body and Blood of Chriſt, which are the ſuppoſed Matter of that Sacrifice. *In this condition are all* Roman *Catholicks.*

Thus, Sir, ſuppoſing, for Argument-ſake, your Doctrin of Tranſubſtantiation to be true, (though I profeſs, it was never in my power to believe it) the ſundry things I have here alledged, do nevertheleſs hold good againſt you.

§. 13. 4. No *Roman* Catholick is ſure that he ever partakes of your other Sacraments, not yet particularly mentioned by me, as Confirmation and extreme Unction, as not knowing whether the Miniſters of them could effectually, and did actually Intend in the Adminiſtration of them. Without which, as I have often ſhewed, there is no Sacrament. Being almoſt weary of enlarging on particulars, I have put theſe together. Num-

Number and deſcribe all the great Effects you can attribute to them, (and in any thing of this kind I will grant your Suppoſition, for argument-ſake, as I have all along in theſe Papers) and after you have done this you will find, that no *Roman* Catholick is ſure he ſhares in any one of them, for the Reaſons often alledged before. Biſhops, Prieſts, and all other Members of your Communion are wrapt up in an inextricable Uncertainty.

§. 14. All I can honeſtly (to the beſt of my Knowledge) grant you, according to your Principles laid down, is this, That the Miniſters of Baptiſm know that thoſe they have Baptized are partakers of that Sacrament. I mean it only of Infants, who could not put in a bar againſt the Efficacy of it. But yet neither the ſaid Miniſters nor any other of your Body knows that himſelf was Baptized, as not Knowing how he Intended who Baptized him. So that what I inferred ſtands firm, *viz.* that not one of you knows that he doth or hath received any one of your Sacraments.

§. 15. I advertiſe, This is it which makes the difference in this reſpect between the Miniſters of Baptiſm and thoſe of your other Sacraments, treated of before, Thoſe need no ſpecial character to qualifie them for that work. Any man or woman, whether *Jew*, *Heathen*, or *Turk*, may Baptize with Effect, provided they Intend to do what the Church doth; *according to your doctrin:* Whereas the Miniſters of the other Sacraments (Matrimony excepted) muſt have ſpecial power and authority from Chriſt to Adminiſter, or elſe they Act in vain. And though Matrimony depend not (to ſpeak your language) on the Prieſtly character, the parties Marrying being the proper Miniſters of that Sacrament; yet I cannot grant them the ſame Certitude with the Miniſters of Baptiſm, becauſe Two muſt there Intend alike, or nothing is done; and neither of them can be ſure judges ſave of their own reſpective Intention.

That

That they make a civil Contract to lead an individual life plainly appears, when he ſaith, *I take thee for my Wife*: and ſhe, *I take thee for my Husband.* But whether both parties alſo Intend to make thoſe Words ſignifie the ſacred Conjunction of Chriſt with his Church, (in a general or ſpecial Senſe, in a more diſtinct or confuſed) and thereby to obtain Grace, cannot appear to either party. The man can be ſure but for himſelf, nor can the woman but for her ſelf.

§. 16. Here is to be noted, when I make the Contracting parties Miniſters of Matrimony, I follow only the greater part of your Authors. Where you vary, I cannot repreſent you as agreed. But for thoſe that make a Prieſt the Miniſter of it, they are not a whit the nearer Certainty, becauſe they know not his Intention.

Before I move forward, I ſhall re-mind the Reader that the Inferences hitherto drawn ſpeak forth miſery to *Roman* Catholicks on theſe two grounds, put together. (1.) There is no *Sacramental Grace* conveyed, where there are no *true Sacraments.* The Terms are eſſentially Relative. (2.) There is an equal Uncertainty of the Sacraments, and of the fruits of them.

Now I ſay, each *Roman* Catholick, for ought he can know, wants the Sacraments, and by conſequence their Effects; and if he have them, he yet wants the comfort of Knowing it. Which makes the *Roman* Church in a ſad condition.

Sir, When you have conſidered what hath been already ſaid, I would commend a few Inferences more to the exerciſe of your thoughts.

§. 17. 1. If none of you can know that any particular man in your Church is a true Biſhop or Prieſt, (which is proved) it follows that the Jeſuits, who lay ſo much weight upon the Papal Chair, cannot know the Pope to be ſo much as a Prieſt, nor conſequently that he is an Infallible Judge of Faith.

Thoſe

Thoſe they account Succeſſors of Saint *Peter* in the Univerſal Paſtorſhip of the Church (to whom they appropriate ſpecial Priviledges, and particularly that of Infallibility) are not to be Lay-men ſure, but ſuch as have the Sacerdotal Character. But ſince no man alive (as is proved) is ſure according to your doctrin, that any particular man is Prieſt, no man is ſure the Pope is ſuch, and conſequently that he is an Infallible Judge of Controverſies.

The Intention of him who Baptized and Ordained the Pope, and the capacity of his Ordainer were, and ever will be hidden things: and hence ſprings the Uncertainty.

§. 18. 2. Now a word to thoſe called the *Pariſian* Divines. If you cannot know that any particular men are true Biſhops or Prieſts, you cannot know that any of your *Roman* Councils have defined Infallible Truth, in as much as your ſelves hold that the promiſe of Divine Aſſiſtance, by which alone they can be ſuppoſed to be preſerved inerrable, is not made to any Aſſemblies but ſuch as conſiſt of men in Holy Orders.

You are indeed content that Lay-men be preſent there, and act in a certain inferior Sphere, *viz.* That they aſſiſt in examining difficulties, conſult, debate, approve, protect, *&c.* But to none of them do you allow the power of Determination or Deciſion. Thoſe Synods then, as your ſelves hold, are to be made up of Biſhops, or Prieſts, or both.

Now becauſe it cannot be known that theſe ever had Prieſtly Orders, for want of Knowledge that they were truly Baptized and Ordained, you muſt be Uncertain whether ſuch were true Councils, and conſequently whether they decreed and defined Infallible Faith.

Although you may have ſome true Prieſts in general, yet in regard you are uncertain who they are, How know you that the major part of ſuch Councils, *ex. gr.*

that of *Trent*, were true Prieſts and conſequently capable of making Infallible determinations? I will ſpeak a leſs word, How know you that the 4*th* part *there* were ſuch? You might have a true Clergy, I ſay, and yet it is poſſible that few or none of them might be in that Synod. For the Clergy in a Council uſually bears but a very ſmall proportion, for number, to the reſt. Many of *theſe* may poſſibly have true Orders, when moſt of the Members of ſuch a Council want them. Unleſs you know both the capacity and Intention of thoſe who Baptized and Ordained ſuch Members, you are not (as hath been proved) aſſured they were Biſhops or Prieſts; and conſequently that the Holy Ghoſt aſſiſted them in their work.

If ſending men to a Council will indeed by *Poſt-fact* juſtifie mens Baptiſm and Orders, it were well worth the while (whatever it coſt) to have as frequent Councils as poſſible; and to ſend numerous flocks of the Clergy thither to ſtay one Seſſion, to be ſucceeded ſtill by more, till the Uncertainty of the Baptiſm and Orders of moſt of the Biſhops and Prieſts be removed. But I think my ſelf the *firſt* that ever ſpoke of this Cure for this Diſeaſe, and therefore think it will never be pleaded againſt me by my Adverſaries. However, the diſtemper remains till ſome Remedy be found out, you know not that the Members of your Council are true Prieſts, and ſo intereſſed in the promiſe of Divine Aſſiſtance, and ſo capable of making *infallible* deciſions.

§. 19. 3. For thoſe that hold Pope and Council, when conjoyned, to be Infallible, I ſay but this to them, Neither Pope nor Council will be more ſurely proved to have had Baptiſm and Orders, when they are together, than when they are a-ſunder; that is, it cannot be proved at all, if the *Roman* doctrin by me exhibited be true: and then they can hardly be thought to be Infallible Determiners of Faith.

§. 20. 4.

§. 20. 4. If no *Roman* Catholick can know that any particular man of theirs is a true Prieſt, then the boaſted Argument taken from the Un-interrupted Succeſſion of Lawful Paſtors in the *Roman* Church, is of no force, till they can be ſure of the Intention of the reſpective Baptizers of every Pope, and that every Pope from the Apoſtles days hitherto was Ordained by ſuch as were capable of giving them Orders, and Intended to do it in each reſpective Ordination, (which, as I have evinced, can never be known) their Succeſſion reſts but upon bare preſumption without proof, and therefore amounts not to a cogent Argument.

Thus have I, as I think, accompliſh't my Undertaking, not leaving one Member of the *Roman* Communion certain that there is among them any one true Prieſt *in particular*, nor any Sacraments *in particular*, given or received in the *Roman* Church: and all this from the Medium I laid down at firſt, *viz.* your doctrin of the Intention.

§. 21. Now I think fit to re-mind the Reader, that to do This (1.) I have explicated the Terms from *Roman* Catholick Authors. (2.) I have taken *their* doctrines for the grounds of my Inferences: nor have I in Order to any part of my work, needed to ruffle or quarrel any of their Notions, otherwiſe than my mere deductions from their Principles will do it. It is all one to me if they would make Seventy inſtead of Seven Sacraments, provided I prove they are not certain of their Giving and Receiving them. It is all one to me if they ſhould make each Biſhop of their Church as Infallible as the Jeſuits make the Pope; and every Provincial Council as Infallible as they do thoſe they call General, provided I prove they cannot be ſure that thoſe Biſhops, or Members of Councils are in Holy Orders, and thereby capable of that power of Deciſion or Determination, which they would attribute to them.

None then ought to wonder, that I ſpeak their language, without croſſing ſeveral Principles of theirs, which I have occaſion to mention, ſince it hath been my only deſign to render all their things looſe and uncertain from their own Doctrine.

§. 22. If it be ſaid, I have proved ſome things which *Roman* Catholicks deny not. I anſwer, (1.) The worſt that will follow hence, is, There is a little labour loſt. (2.) It may be of ſome advantage to the Truth to publiſh That among the Vulgar, which though the more learned *Romaniſts* cannot deny, yet they would gladly bury in ſilence. This Article of the Intention, I believe to be one of that kind.

For want of repreſenting This honeſtly and generally, the Credulity of Perſons of both Perſwaſions is apt to be abuſed.

§. 23. 1. Not a few of the *Romaniſts* are liable to be filled with an ungrounded Confidence, that Sacramental Grace ever attends the performance of the exterior Sacramental Actions. One of that ſort I can name, who upon receiving an Abſolution from his Confeſſor, came forth of his Houſe, and leapt up for joy, and told ſome judicious Proteſtants, (who were occaſionally before his Door) That he was then as free from Sin, as is an Infant newly Baptized.

Had this Man known and conſidered the Truth I have here ſifted out, he would either have been modeſtly ſilent, or tempered his Speech with theſe Conditions, If I be a true Penitent, and if my Confeſſor be a true Prieſt, and be thereby capable of Abſolving me, and alſo did I intend to do it, then am I freed from Sin. But I fear moſt of your Laity entertain the like confidence, bottomed upon the like Ignorance.

§. 24. 2. The vulgar People of our Communion, for want of skill in this Point, are more obnoxious to the Snares of your Prieſts, who tell them they both can, and will

will forgive them their Sins, if they will come into the Boſom of the *Roman* Church, and confeſs them. Now the Conſcience being afraid of nothing, but Sin, a confident promiſe of Remiſſion is oft hearkened to readily, and with ſome pleaſure, even when there is nothing ſufficient to warrant it.

Whereas, if all our People knew, that thoſe ſtout Promiſers could never prove, that themſelves were truly Ordained, nor conſequently Authorized to forgive Sin; nor ſo much as that themſelves were ever Sacramentally Abſolved from any one of their Sins, (all which I have proved.) They [our people] would ſmile at their Confidence, and bid them go find out a way for their own ſafety.

§. 25. The Concluſion is, My true Repreſentation of Things, to ſuch as have not had the opportunity to know them before, may excuſe my inſiſting upon ſome few things, which perhaps may not be denied by *Roman* Catholicks, when they are ſqueez'd to a Declaration of the Truth.

SECT. IX.

The Banks Mr. G. hath caſt up to ſecure the Roman *Prieſthood, taken in general, caſt down.*

SIR, I had, together with the laſt Section, ended all the trouble I purpoſed to give You, had you not by your way of Anſwer drawn me ſomewhat farther. I have ſaid more than once, I thought it Manifeſtation enough of the weak Eſtate of your Church, to prove her Uncertain, whether ſhe have any true Prieſts or Sacraments *in particular*. And I leave it to the judgment of the diſcerning Reader, whether I have not effected that, by ſhewing the Uncertainty both of the Biſhop's Intention, conſidered in it ſelf, and alſo of the Validity

of

of it, in caſe he doth Intend. But becauſe you would have more, you ſhall.

§. 1. And this *more* ſhall be chiefly to caſt down or demoliſh the Bulwarks, you have caſt up for the Security of the Biſhop's Intention, in order to the Defence of your Prieſthood *in general.* And truly this is all, that in ſtrictneſs can be required of one that Undertakes to prove a Negative. What he does more, may well be accounted Surpluſage.

Having premiſed this, I ſhall again ſet down your Diſtinction in your own words, and then try what tendency it hath to the End you bring it for.

§. 2. '*You muſt give me leave,* ſay you, *to diſtinguiſh in* '*the major Propoſition of the former Syllogiſm, between that* '*knowledge which is obtained by the Obſervation of exterior* '*Actions and Geſtures, and attention to the words of the* '*Prelates in any particular Ordinations; and that knowledge* '*which we have from the Conſideration of the Nature and end* '*of Ordination in general, and which is alſo neceſſarily dedu-* '*ced from other known Principles of the* Roman *Catholick* '*Church grounded upon Divine Revelation.*

'*Firſt then, if you underſtand by* knowing *here, knowing* '*in the former way onely, which you ſeem to me to do, I deny* '*this your firſt Propoſition to be true. For ſuppoſing (not* '*granting) that the* Roman *Catholick Church doth make* '*Prieſtly Ordination to depend upon a Condition, that no man* '*living knows in the former way (viz. by obſerving onely* '*what is outwardly done,* &c.) *whether it be fulfill'd or no, yet* '*it doth not follow, that ſhe muſt be uncertain, whether ſhe* '*hath any true Prieſthood, becauſe others, beſides the Ordain-* '*ing Prelates, know that ſhe hath true Prieſthood by the ſecond* '*way of Knowledge above-mentioned; that is, from the Na-* '*ture and End of the Thing, and neceſſary deduction from* '*other true Principles.* Thus far you.

§. 3. I ſhall now examine this diſtinction, taking in your Explication of it, and try how far it may beſtead You. To

To gain an opportunity of making a diſtinction, and applying it with ſome ſhew of pertinence, you ſeem to fancy my ſenſe of the matter to be this, *viz.* The Ordainer's Intention cannot indeed be known by obſerving his exterior Action and Geſture in his particular Ordinations, but it may be known ſome other way. What elſe do theſe words of yours ſignifie, viz. *If you underſtand*, ſay you, *by knowing here, knowing in the former way onely, which you ſeem to me to do*, &c. This, Sir, is a groundleſs conceit, hatcht on purpoſe, I think, to ſerve a turn. For, as to your Ordinations *in particular*, upon which your Prieſts *in particular* depend for their Being, (which it was my only aim to deal with) I have denied that the Biſhop's Intention in them can *any* way be known, and have made my denial good. If then you apply both the Members of your diſtinction, with a reſpect to this Acception of the Terms, you pronounce my Propoſition falſe, upon a figment of your own brain, which yet you would father on me, though I never gave you the leaſt temptation to entertain it. But if you make the latter Member of your diſtinction, not to reſpect the Thing conſidered *in particular*, but onely *in general*, then (1.) It is not applied *ad idem*, and therefore gives you no relief againſt my declared deſign. (2.) If it only reſpect (I ſay) the Ordainer's Intention *in general*, I deny that it can be known *infallibly* either of theſe ways, or any other whatſoever: And then there is no room here for your Suppoſition. It remains then that theſe Words in my Propoſition---- *a Condition which no man living knows*, &c. are abſolutely Negative, with reſpect and proportion to the State of the Queſtion laid down before.

Which ſtate had you called for, before you gave an Anſwer, your Things would have been no leſs pertinent.

§. 4. As you have without cauſe made me think what beſt liketh you, ſo you are too oft leaving the thred of my Argument, which yet you are altogether to keep to, if

if you will be pertinent. I expected you would (as you ſhould) have ſpoken here with a formal relation to my Propoſition, which is this, *all Churches that make Prieſtly Ordination depend upon a Condition which no man living knows whether it be fulfill'd, muſt be Uncertain whether they have any true Prieſthood.* Hence it evidently appears it was my direct buſineſs to prove you uncertain of your Prieſthood from your Uncertainty of the performance of a Condition required to Ordination: and you did not, could not deny the firm Connexion of the *Medium* with the *Extream.* Let us ſee now how you order your Matter.

§. 5. You diſtinguiſh of *Knowing* without mentioning, for ſome time, any object of that Knowledge: which you ſhould have ſupplied thus, I diſtinguiſh between *Knowing of a Condition required to Ordination*, &c. Then though you mention a Condition, yet you do not keep to it, but forthwith as it were forgetting it, run from it to Prieſthood it ſelf; that is, you run away from the conſideration of a Sacrament to the [*res Sacramenti*] Effect of it. Your words are theſe -- *Suppoſing the* Roman *Catholick Church makes Prieſtly Ordination to depend upon a Condition that no man living -- knows in the former way -- whether it be fulfill'd or no, yet it doth not follow She muſt be Uncertain whether ſhe hath any true Prieſthood.* This is true if the Condition can be known to be fulfill'd any other way: but it is impertinent in this place, for it ſhould have been thus ſaid -- *Yet it doth not follow ſhe muſt be uncertain whether the ſaid Condition be fulfill'd or no.* Or, *if it may not be known that way, yet it may be known another.* Here then is a manifeſt ſliding from the Condition required to Ordination (which I afterwards made to be the Ordainer's Intention) to the Prieſthood.

§. 6. Now had I in my Reply groſly ſwallowed this *Gudgeon*, and ſubmitted my ſelf to deal about the proof of

of the *Roman* Prieſthood in an indefinite unlimited manner, I muſt have loſt my preſent Argument which preciſely depends upon the incapacity of all men to know another man's Intention. But know, Sir, your Anſwer is no Anſwer to me, farther than you ſpeak relatively to my Argument: and though you ſeem willing to ſlink away from a Condition to Ordination to Prieſthood, the Effects of it; which you would find ſome plauſible way to maintain, if you could ſhake off my Medium, yet I will ſurely keep you to it. It is an Argument, *ad hominem*, I grant, but it will bite you ſorely.

§. 7. Here I ſhall take occaſion to advertiſe the Reader, that though an Argument *ad hominem* be in many caſes leſs conſiderable, yet in mine who argue againſt *Roman* Catholicks from their eſtabliſhed doctrin, it hath as much Virtue and Cogency againſt them as if I made my Inferences from the *four* Goſpels, or the Divine Epiſtles. For they hold the voice of their Church in their Councils of *Florence*, *Trent*, *&c.* to have the ſame Obligation upon Conſcience that thoſe Goſpels and Epiſtles have. If my deductions be good, they muſt either grant the whole to their great loſs, or by denying the Principles I go upon, looſe and undo the whole frame of the *Roman* Church.

Other Churches that aſſume not Infallibility, in ſuch a caſe, part only with a particular Tenet, the reſt of their frame ſtanding as it did before; but *Roman* Catholicks who attribute un errableneſs to their Church (on which pretended ground their preſent Fabrick ſtands) utterly ruin their whole Building, if they grant their Councils to have been miſtaken in any one Article they have defined for Faith.

§. 8. Now I come to the Matter your Words preſent us with, for aſcertaining the required Intention of your Ordaining Biſhops, conſidered (I ſuppoſe you mean) in general.

As your Words ſeem to run at firſt ſight, you lay down two Grounds for this. 1. The Nature and End of Ordination in general. 2. Deductions from other known Principles of the *Roman* Catholick Church. I ſhall conſider both theſe.

§. 9. For the *firſt*, I know indeed that every Inſtitution ſets forth the Nature of what is to be obſerved, and the Ends they are appointed for, are notified by the Inſtitutor: but I never learned that Inſtitutions carry power in them to cauſe themſelves to be obſerved. The Churches named in the *Revelation*, which long ſince periſhed, (theſe and others) once had all Chriſtian Inſtitutions, but in proceſs of time loſt or left them, what proof then is the Nature and End of Ordination of its true Exiſtence, or due performance in the *Roman* Church?

But if you intended the *Two* I mentioned to be but *one* Ground-work by their conjunction, ſo that the Senſe is this, The Nature and End of Ordination in general, in Union or together with Deductions from other known Principles of the *Roman* Catholick Church, *&c.* I am well content, as not being inclined to make any man's words (howſoever put) to ſignifie what their ſpeaker or writer meant not. And I confeſs ſome of your own words perſwade me they look this way. I ſhall therefore conſider them together under the next particular.

§. 10. For the *ſecond*. You tell of the Biſhop's Intention to be Knowable by way of Deduction from ſome known Principles of the *Roman* Church, grounded upon divine Revelation. The Reader may mark, you do not ſay, This Knowledge is immediately deducible from divine Revelation, but from ſome Principles *grounded on it*. For ought I ſee by this, you are not *agreed* to claim an Infallible certainty of the Intention of your Ordaining Biſhops, even conſidered *in general*; that is, that there are any

any at all in the *Roman* Church that exert the *required* Intention. And yet without this, we have found there is no Ordination, and ſo no Prieſt, nor any of thoſe 5. Sacraments that you conſent to ſay depend on the Prieſtly character, or laſtly, that your Church is a true Church; which yet is leſs than an *Infallible* Church. Deductions are but the work of Reaſon, and Reaſon is but a fallible Principle, ſay many of you.

The dependence of all the links of this Chain hath been made good before, ſave the laſt, which is this, where there is no true Prieſthood there is no true Church: Where there is no Infallible Certainty of the Being of a Prieſthood, there is is no Infallible Certainty of the Being of a Church. To confirm this I need but ſay little.

Thomas Aquinas lays down this diſtinction. A thing may two manner of ways be called *neceſſary* in reſpect of an End: 1. When the End cannot be had without it: as Meat is neceſſary to ſuſtain man's life. And this is ſimply neceſſary to an End. 2. When the End cannot ſo conveniently be obtained without it: as a Horſe is neceſſary for a journey. But this is not ſimply neceſſary to an End.

This being premiſed for the clearer Reſolution of the Caſe in hand, he adds,

" *There are three Sacraments neceſſary by* " *the firſt way of Neceſſity; two to particular* " *perſons*, viz. *Baptiſm ſimply and abſolutely,* " *and Penance upon ſuppoſition of mortal ſin* " *committed after Baptiſm. But the Sacra-* " *ment of Order is* [viz. *ſimply*] *neceſſary to* " *the Church. But other Sacraments are neceſ-* " *ſary by the ſecond manner of neceſſity*, &c. *

* *Primo igitur modo neceſſitatis ſunt tria Sacramenta neceſſaria; duo quidem perſonæ ſingulari: baptiſmus quidem ſimpliciter & abſolutè, pœnitentia autem ſuppoſito peccato mortali poſt baptiſmum. Sacramentum autem Ordinis eſt neceſſarium Eccleſiæ. Sed ſecundo modo neceſſaria ſunt alia Sacramenta*, &c. Sum. Theol. par. 3. q. 65. art. 4.

Nor have any of his Commentators, that I have met with, excepted againſt This, nor any others of your Church. Your ſelf a little beneath grants the point, where you ſay with relation hereunto, *The means are*

neceſſary to the end. Several of your men, *Bellarmine* in particular *, contend that Proteſtant Churches are no true Churches, becauſe as they alledge they want a true Prieſthood. Beſides, enough is to be fetcht for this purpoſe out of your *Trent* Council ‖, but it is needleſs to do it.

* *De Clericis*, cap. 3.

‖ *Seſſ.* 23 *de Sacram. Ordinis.*

§. 11. From hence then I preſent you with this *Scheme* founded on your own Authority, you are no ſurer you have a true Church, than you are that you have a true Prieſthood; you are no ſurer that you have a true Prieſthood, even taken *in general*, than you are that you have true Ordination; you are not ſurer that you have true Ordination, than you are that your Ordaining Biſhops Intend as your Church requires. Now in regard you agree not to claim for the Intention, the Infallible Certainty of Faith which immediately depends upon divine Revelation, I ſee not how you can reaſonably agree to claim the Infallible Certainty of Faith for the truth of your Church. Which I commend to the Reader's obſervation.

§. 12. You firſt tell us in general of ſome Known Principles of your Church from which the Knowledge of the Intention is deducible, and afterwards reckon them to be theſe, *viz.* That the *Roman* is the only Catholick Church; That God will continue and preſerve that Church to the Worlds end: and all this, *ſay you*, appears from divine Revelation. You conclude hence they muſt have a true Prieſthood, the Means being neceſſary to the End.

Therefore, *ſay you*, whatſoever Intention of the Prelates is by them believed as Neceſſary for this End, they do certainly believe according to their Principles that God's Providence will ſecure it; his Omnipotence is able to make good his Fidelity.

§. 13. *For reply*, 1. I obſerve to the Reader, That though you have preſented us with a liſt of thoſe Principles

ciples from which you pretend to deduce the Knowledge of the Ordainer's Intention, yet you only *ſay*, They appear from Divine Revelation, without ſhewing either what this Revelation is, or where it is to be found.

§. 14. 2. As our diſcourſe was at firſt Perſonal, every one will conceive, that if your thoughts had then enabled you to make the above-named diſtinction, I muſt have asked, What the Revelation was and where it appeared, on which your ſaid Principles are pretended to reſt: Nor could you have refuſed to ſatisfie my Queſtion, without bringing a Cloud upon the Cauſe you manage.

And you may eaſily believe, that if I had known what you had been writing at *London*, I ſhould have wiſht you would have ſet down What and Where the Revelation you ſpeak of, is; that ſo I might have conſented with you, or refuted you, according to the beſt judgment I could make of the Thing exhibited. I aſſure you, Sir, to obtrude upon the World, Doctrines, under the Notion of Articles of Faith, without due proof of their Divine Original, is too great an Empire for Creatures to arrogate to themſelves; nor can one reaſonably ſubmit to another in ſuch caſes, whether they reſpect God's honour, or their own ſafety. Therefore when you talk of Divine Revelation, you ſhould have ſhewed it.

§. 15. You would ſurely enroll me in the Catalogue of Franticks, if I ſhould upon this Occaſion ſpend Years in hunting through all Books for Texts of Scripture, which your Popes, or their Subjects have fancied to be uſeful for proving the *Roman* to be the Univerſal Church, and in confuting their vain Gloſſes, when I have found them. Your Perſon is not adverſe to me, but your Cauſe; and therefore you leave the Field, and ceaſe to be my Adverſary, unleſs you ſhew me your places of defence, and wherein their ſtrength lies, and then defy my Aſſaults. But this is not done here.

Tell me, is the Revelation you ſpeak of, recorded in the

firſt

firſt *Verſe*, or Chapter of *Geneſis*, or the laſt Verſe of the *Revelation*, or in any *Verſe* between thoſe. Have you not read that Pope *Boniface* the *VIII.* proved the Pope of *Rome* to be the ſole Head of the Chriſtian Church (with relation to which Head you call yours the *One* and the *Whole* Church) out of the firſt *Verſe* of *Geneſis*, *In the beginning God created*, &c. He collected the Argument thus, *Dicitur in principio non in principiis*, &c. It is ſaid, quoth that Pope, in the *Beginning*; not, in the *Beginnings*, &c. And this is urged to prove, that there muſt be One viſible Head of the Church, and *this* the Pope of *Rome*, with whom all Chriſtians muſt believe, and to whom all muſt ſubmit. Have you not read how Pope *Gregory* the *VII.* a great while before that, fetcht a proof for the Point, out of the *16th. Verſe* of that Chapter, *God made two great lights, the greater light to rule the day*, &c. ---*Illa* [*dignitas*] *quæ præeſt diebus, id eſt Spiritualibus, Major eſt.* That is, ---That Dignity that rules the *Days*, that is *Spirituals*, is greater. I ſhall omit the compariſon between Popes and Kings, which this Text is brought to ſettle, and only apply it to the Point in hand;

That God made the Pope to Rule all Chriſtians, is all that I ſhall take Notice of, as proved by it.

I have brought theſe two *infallible* Interpreters of Scripture upon the Stage, (and which of you ſhould be ſuch, if your *Popes* be not) only to ſhew it would be endleſs to ſeek out thoſe many Texts ſuppoſed by *Roman* Catholicks to tend to make out, that the *Roman* is the One Catholick Church of *Chriſt* upon Earth, and to expoſe their extravagant Miſ-expoſitions of them. I might ſoon begin with *Geneſis*, but might be long before I had run through the Bible. If theſe two Popes had ſpoken onely in general words, as you do, of Divine Revelation for their Headſhips, (on which your Matter vertually depends) I am ſo dull, I ſhould never, unleſs by chance, have found out what Scriptures they referred to for it: And ſo, though I had

diſcuſſed

diſcuſſed a hundred other Texts, if thoſe had been left out, it might have been ſaid, I had left my work undone. But wiſe Men will not judge I ought to undertake Unreaſonable tasks, or ſeek a Needle in a Bottle of Hay.

But I ſpend time: For, it had been enough to ſay, I am only proving a Negative, and need do no more than over-turn what you are pleaſed to erect for your Defence. You have ſet me no more work here than I have conſidered, and ſo I have no more to do here about your *divine Revelation*, whether you refer to Scripture, or any thing elſe.

§. 16. Yet it cannot but be worth our Notice, That your Method of maintaining your Church is moſt eaſie and expedite. When you find your ſelves unable particularly to prove your performance of thoſe things which your Councils require to the making your Inſtitutions valid, yet your work is done by *ſaying*, We are the Catholick Church, which God hath promiſed to preſerve to the World's end; and therefore all we require will be certainly performed, though we cannot *otherwiſe* make it out.

You may alſo prove all your more ſpeculative Doctrines (had you a thouſand more than you have) by the ſame eaſie Method. We are the onely Church, *you may ſay*, to which God hath promiſed his Spirit to lead us into all Truth, and therefore our Articles cannot be falſe, tho' we cannot *otherwiſe* prove them to be true.

§. 17. If this be ſufficient, how imprudent have many of your Men been, to ſpend their pains, and health, and time, about evincing your particular Points to be founded on Revelation, when a few general Words would have done it to rational Satisfaction. Beſides, as Cart loads of Books, on this ſuppoſition, are unneceſſarily written, ſo the Readers of them are at unneceſſary expence of Moneys in buying them, and of labour in peruſing them. What an eaſie World ſhould we have had, if this your

Method

Method had all-along generally obtained. To ſhorten the way to knowledge is a praiſe-worthy enterprize, and to teach how to defend truth without care and trouble is a mighty thing. Well; You have ſhewed us an expedite Art of Controverſie, and ſuch as may be taught even illiterate Plow-men in half an hours time. And I leave it to the Reader to determine, whether a Plowman of your Perſwaſion, could have ſaid leſs in this Matter, than you have done, *We are the Onely Church*, &c.

§. 18. However, conſider, Sir, This you uſe, is but an *accidental* Argument, and can beſtead you no longer, if any other Body of Chriſtians ſhall pleaſe to call themſelves the Catholick Church, without offering the leaſt proof of it. Which is moſt apparently your caſe *here*. The *Donatiſts* of old, who appropriated to themſelves the name of the Catholick Church, might have eaſily quelled all Arguments brought againſt them, at your rate of anſwering: For the ſaid name being arrogated, and the premiſſes belonging to it, all the reſt will follow readily.

§. 19. If you think to relieve your ſelf by ſaying, I am bound to *accept* any deductions you ſhall make from any of your Principles, I *reply*, no ſurely. I was indeed to *prove* a Point from ſome of them, and have, I hope, done it. The more you ſpeak of That, I fear you expoſe your ſelf the more to deriſion.

§. 20. From the view of your Anſwer, it will appear, that though you called to me, out of due time, for the Explication of more than a few Terms, yet you have not had the heart to explain one of them in your Anſwer, neither what you mean by *Intention*, nor what by *Certainty*, nor any of the reſt. Inſtead of ſaying, what is the particular nature of the Intention required by your Church, you deſcribe it no otherwiſe than thus---*Whatſoever Intention of the Prelates is by them believed as neceſſary*---. Inſtead of telling us the particular nature of your knowledge of the Intention, you only ſay, *I deny not that it may ſufficiently be known*---.

You

You have no mind it ſeems to ſwim out of your depth, it being a ſilly thing to court danger: nor are you ſo hardy a Champion as to ſtep a few paces out of your hold to meet an enemy, being mindful enough of the old Proverb, *It is good ſleeping in a whole skin.* Your frank opening your ſelf this way might have led me, if I had miſtook any thing of yours, to the true mark, but could not have cauſed my digreſſion from it; and therefore though you were not bound in rigour (further than to make your Anſwer appoſite and uſeful) to have done this, yet it would have lookt brave and generous to have done it. Whether others ſhall interpret your carriage in this kind to be due caution or no, I ſhall not concern my ſelf. Nevertheleſs I muſt ſay this, you knew the point muſt be beaten out at laſt, and it had been manly to have contributed ſomething towards it: whereas he that knew not the particular Nature of the Subject before, knows it but very little better by any help you give him in your Anſwer. I hope the Reader will excuſe me for ſtaying a little too long here, in recompence of the labour I have been at in the firſt part of this Tractate, to make the ſtate of the queſtion plain to him.

§. 20. Whatſoever ſhall become of any *higher* Certainty which you cannot challenge me to yield upon Principles you have hitherto barely beg'd, without offering the leaſt colour of proof for them; you ſeem to have a mind to ſecure to your ſelf a *moral* Certainty of the Intention of your Biſhops in *general.* Your words are theſe,

" *It is morally impoſſible that all the Prelates in the* Roman " *Catholick Church ſhould be ſo* malicious *as wilfully to have* " *omitted any thing in Ordination which they believed to be Eſ-* " *ſential to it, and which the Church requires as ſo, ſuppoſing it* " *poſſible for them to do it and not be diſcovered. It is impoſſible* " *for us to believe, according to our Principles, that they ſhould* " all *turn devils*---*and* conſpire *to damn the whole Church*---- " *when withal they could propoſe no advantage at all to them-* " *ſelves by this, but the clean contrary:* Thus you.

I *Reply*: The Pillar you have placed here for ſupporting your moral certainty of the Intention, is too weak to bear it up. Which will appear by conſidering the following particulars.

§.21. 1. You ſay not, It is impoſſible that any one, or ſeveral, or many of your Biſhops ſhould out of Malice withdraw the *required* Intention.

You only ſay, It is morally impoſſible that *all* ſhould turn devils and conſpire to damn the whole Church----

§.22. 2. I ſay, if Some may withhold their Intention through Malice, (which you deny not) Others may upon other accounts omit it, *viz.* for Unbelief, culpable Ignorance, groſs Negligence, natural Inadvertence, *&c.* I ſhall ſpeak a little of ſome of theſe.

§.23. For *Unbelief.* It is Morally poſſible that ſome of your Biſhops have internally or mentally embraced Paganiſm or Judaiſm notwithſtanding their profeſſion of the Chriſtian Religion. It is notorious that the Inquiſitors of Heretical pravity in *Roman* Catholick kingdoms have often met with ſuch men, after they had many years lain hid under the diſguiſe of the Chriſtian profeſſion: and is it any way repugnant that the ſame Cloak which frequently covers Merchants and Gentlemen and others, ſhould cover Prieſts and Biſhops alſo? Now theſe disbelieving the virtue of all Chriſtian Inſtitutions, and that of Ordination in particular; nay judging them to be the devices of certain Politick men, or the Off-ſpring of deluded Fancies, may omit *Intending* in their Ordinations, without deſigning to damn or otherwiſe hurt the Ordained party.

§.24. For *Culpable Ignorance*, which the Schools call *Antecedent.* It is morally poſſible that more than a few in your Church have in ſeveral ages been promoted to the dignity of Biſhops, who have been men of very little Learning and much lazineſs, and ſo may have faln ſhort of Knowing either That your Church requires the ſaid Intention at all, or at leaſt under the ſaid Neceſſity: and no wonder then

then if they may have omitted it. But here is yet no *malice* nor *devils* in the caſe; for I may ſuppoſe if ſuch had known it, they would have rouſed up themſelves to the performance of their duty.

§.25. For *Supine Negligence*: It is too frequently ſeen that many groſly ſlight and neglect thoſe duties which yet they know are to be done for the good of others, without harbouring any malicious deſign againſt them.

§.26. It is enough to hint to the Reader, that the Intention may fail through occaſional Cares, or Fears, or Croſſes, or deep Studies (ſpoken of before) which either put the Thoughts often to long ſtands or pauſes, or elſe hurry them away from duty elſe whither. Many men are enabled by ſad experience to conceive this I have ſaid, to be very probable.

§.27. Beſides *Natural Inadvertence* incident to all men, There is in many a very dull unactive temper of Mind ariſing either from Natural Conſtitution, or ſometimes from contracted Bodily diſtempers, whereby the thoughts are many times hindred from riſing higher than to what is ſenſibly to be done. And it cannot be denied that it is morally poſſible that ſuch Imperfections may be incident to your Biſhops, (as well as other men) and that their *due Intending* may be obſtructed by them.

§.28. Now, Sir, I muſt put you in mind, you have not made any tolerable Enumeration of the Cauſes of the defect of Intention: and while you have only put a Bar againſt an Univerſal Conſpiracy from *malice*, you give room for the defect from all other Cauſes which you have no way provided againſt; and ſo you are ſtark lame in your defence. If you are well acquainted with *Roman* Catholick writers, I wonder you ſhould take up ſo ſhort, ſince they aſſign the ſame Cauſes I have done.

Suarez doth in one place, add to Malice other two Cauſes of this, among other things, viz. *Culpable ignorance, and Natural Inadvertence which excuſeth from ſin**.

* *Sive id fecerit ex malitia, ſive ex ignorantia culpabili, ſive ex naturali inadvertentia quæ excuſat peccatum.* Tom. 4. diſp 32.

And your Authors in their applying Remedies againſt this Evil ſeem to have their eyes chiefly fixed upon other Cauſes than Malice. To ſhew this, and the defectibleneſs of the Intention, I ſhall produce only one Teſtimony. It is a paſſage in the famous Maſs-book, *ad Uſum Sarum* *.

* *Cautelæ Miſſæ.*

'*If any Prieſt in the time of Conſecration* '*be diſtracted from Actual Intention and de-* '*votion, he nevertheleſs conſecrates, provided* '*the Habitual Intention remain in him.*—— '*But if through very great diſtraction his Ha-* '*bitual Intention be taken away as well as the* '*Actual, it ſeems that he ought to reſume the* '*Words of Conſecration* [ſay them over a-'gain] *with Actual Intention.*

Siquis tempore Conſecrationis ab actuali intentione & devotione diſtractus fuerit, nihilominus conſecrat dummodo intentio habitualis in eo remanſerit. Si autem per ſummam diſtractionem habitualis intentio cum actuali tolleretur, videtur quod deberet verba conſecrationis cum actuali intentione reſumere.

Here note, that the words *Habitual* and *Virtual* have the very ſame ſignification, as to our caſe: and that *Aquinas* with the other elder Schoolmen deſcribed this Intention by the word *Habitual*, till *Scotus* his time, who ſubſtituted the word *Virtual* as more proper to expreſs the ſaid Notion, and is followed ever ſince by the writers of the *Roman* Church.

§. 29. Now I go on to ſay (1.) This paſſage of the Maſs-book is an expreſs acknowledgment, that Prieſts when they do the Exterior work of Conſecration may fail to Intend both Actually and Virtually. *Which upon the ſame ground is equally applicable to Biſhops with reſpect to Ordination.*

(2.) It preſcribes this Remedy againſt the ſaid defect, that the Offending Prieſt go to the work again, and do it better. I wiſh the advice had power to neceſſitate thoſe it is addreſſed to, to follow it. But that (alas!) cannot be hoped for.

§. 30. (3.) This advice is not offered to ſuch as withdraw their Intention through perſonal malice, or contempt of Religion, (which is the thing I here directly aimed to ſhew,) but to ſuch as fail by *inadvertence* or diſperſion of thoughts.

And ſuch are omitted in this addreſs perhaps for this Reaſon, That ſuch cannot be well lookt upon as capable (in

(in any proximate degree) of the Advice given, whereas ſome, at leaſt, of thoſe other careleſs blundering (yet charitable) Prieſts may.

(4.) I obſerve once again, from the ſcope of the cited paſſage, againſt a certain Perſon I mentioned before, That the diſtraction or diſturbance here mentioned, as the Cauſe of the failure of the Intention, cannot be meant of the diſtemper of Frenzy or Madneſs. For, 1. The Advice is offered to ſuch as perceive their own defect, which Mad men, as ſuch, cannot do. 2. Wiſe men (and ſuch I hope the Compilers of the *Sarum* Miſſal will be held to be) adviſe that Phyſick be given to Mad-men for the Recovery of their Reaſon, rather than directions to act wiſely by, which ſuppoſeth them already in the ſtate of it. If a Mad-man (who had gained a Habit of Baptizing before his diſtemper) ſhould ruſh into a Houſe, and waſh an Infant, newly born, with the Invocation of the moſt Bleſſed Trinity, no wiſe Man would deſire him to do it again with due heed and Actual Intention, his ſuppoſed condition, forbidding him either to hit the Intention at firſt, or to amend it in the repeated Action. This advice then given, muſt be concluded to be directed to perſons capable of receiving it; which therefore cannot be frantick Prieſts. Hereby is confounded the affirmation of the Prieſt I point at, viz. *That none but madmen could fail to intend aright.*

§. 31. You ſee, Sir, ſeveral purpoſes are ſerved by this Citation, beſides that I directly brought it for, but all of them tend to the illuſtration of the Subject treated of. I ſhall only add this at parting with it, That it is not to be lookt upon as a ſingle Teſtimony only, but inſtead of a thouſand ſuch, as implying the judgment of all thoſe Clergymen, who uſed and approved that renowned *Miſſal.* And what a conſiderable part of our Nation that Book obtained in, before that of Pope *Pius* the *V.* was framed for the general Uniformity of your Worſhip, I leave you to think of: and conſequently, what a vaſt Company of your Clergy (who ſure were the beſt Judges in this caſe) did implicitely and by true Interpre-

terpretation acknowledge, that there may be a defect of the Intention, both Actual and Virtual, which may proceed from other Cauſes, than that of Malice, which yet is the only thing alledged by you to that purpoſe.

§. 32. Next, as an enforcement why there could be no malicious conſpiracy of your Prelates, you add this, *They could not*, ſay you, *propoſe any advantage to themſelves by it, but the clean contrary.*

But you forget the *Genius* of Malice, to which doing miſchief is an agreeable thing, without any allurements of Worldly profits, or the like. Remember the ſad Inſtance of Satan's murdering our firſt Parents. This I ſay not, as believing any ſuch conſpiracy; nor is the fancying ſuch a thing at all needful to my buſineſs, having ſhewed that what Malice may do in ſome, the ſame may other Cauſes effect in others, as to the ſpoiling of the Intention: I ſay it only to ſhew that to be weakneſs, which you bring to ſtrengthen your Ground.

§. 33. There will need no conſpiracy of any ſort to render you uncertain of the validity of your Ordainer's Intention, if you remember what I ſaid before, (after the diſpatch of my firſt task) *viz.* That all the defects of Intention, in your Ordaining Biſhops from the Apoſtles death, hitherto, are chargeable upon, and utterly diſable all that are reputed to derive power from them; and that the longer the Line is ſpun out by time, there will be more Nullities in the Intention, both of Biſhops and Prieſts.

§. 34. To rivet this, I ask, What if the Catholick Church for many Ages after *Chriſt* did not require this Intention, as neceſſary to the Sacraments? If ſo, the grand Motive to vigilance and heedfulneſs of Intending was wanting, and ſo it is more probable, defects might then ariſe, which might baffle and enervate the greateſt care and circumſpection of ſucceeding Biſhops. I cannot find that it was uninterruptedly ſo required; but if you can, I intreat you to ſhew it.

The Sum hereof is, (1.) You have attempted to arm your

your ſelf only againſt one of the many Cauſes of defect of Intention, letting in the reſt like a Flood upon you. (2.) You have falſly ſuppoſed, that the effectual valid Intention cannot have failed in your Church, without an Univerſal Conſpiracy of the Biſhops of one Age: Whereas the defect may have been let in by degrees, and ſo may have overſpread your Church, for any thing you have ſaid to the contrary on this Head.

SECT. X.

Mr. G.'s Argument, urged by way of Retort, examined and enervated.

NOW you come to inſtance in, and frame an Argument upon a *deſperate* Subject, which you take to be exactly parallel to mine, and ſay, That is vicious, and therefore Mine muſt be ſo. And to make the clearer way to your Syllogiſtick Forms, you pretend to lay down two Principles of our Church, as the Ground-work of them.

Of the *Firſt* you expreſs your ſelf thus,

"*You take it for a Principle amongſt you, that there is a cer-*
"*tain Number of thoſe that are truly Elected to Salvation in*
"*your Communion.* You mean in the Church of *England.*

§. 1. For *Reply.* Holding you to be well ſeen in the Doctrine of our Church, I would deſire you to inſtruct me, where I may find that Principle. I had thought our Church had dealt with *ſuch* Things only in a general way, with a reſpect to the Univerſal Church; and left particular Churches to try their Election, by making ſure their Calling. Of our Articles, the 17*th.* only concerneth this point; Which ſo far, as I am concerned to produce it, runs thus,

"*Predeſtination to life is the everlaſting purpoſe of God,*
"*whereby He hath conſtantly decreed by his Counſel,* ſecret to
"us, *to deliver from curſe and damnation* thoſe whom he hath
"choſen

"choſen in Chriſt out of Mankind, *and to bring them by* "*Chriſt to everlaſting Salvation, as Veſſels made to honour.*

And of the Promiſes relative unto this, the ſame Article ſaith, "*Furthermore we muſt receive God's promiſes in* "*ſuch wiſe as they be* generally *ſet forth in holy Scripture.*

You ſee how indefinitely our Church ſpeaks in this Matter ---- *Thoſe whom he hath choſen in Chriſt out of Mankind:* And-- *We muſt receive God's promiſes, as they be generally ſet forth in holy Scripture.*

'Tis our Principle, you ſee, That ſome in God's Church belong to the Election of Grace; and that God will make good his Promiſes by Saving them. But we deſcend no lower, nor need we, as thinking it ſufficient for any particular Church to be able to ſay,

We have all neceſſary Doctrine, both *Dogmatical* and *Moral*, and may be Saved, if we truly Believe, and Sincerely obey it; to both which God in his mercy call us. We venture not to ſay, God hath Elected and promiſed to Save thoſe in *Italy*, or theſe in *England:* But we ſay, Whoſoever truly Repents and Believes the Goſpel ſhall be Saved, whether in *Italy* or *England*, or any other place. We have Divine Warranty for this: But we have none to give a Local or Perſonal deſcription of thoſe that are Elected, and ſhall through Grace be Saved.

§. 2. Nevertheleſs we have as great ground of Hopes, judging of the Tree by the Fruits, that many of the Members of this Church are of the Number of the Elect, and ſo will be ſaved, as you can have that the Members of the *Italian*, or *Spaniſh*, or *French* Church are ſuch. But we do not, cannot (I ſay) undertake Unerrably to determine the Eſtates of particular Men, or Men of particular places. When we bury Men of the moſt pious and exemplary converſations, you may remember we expreſs our ſtrong *Hopes* onely, but not perfect aſſurance of their Bliſs. *Secret things belong to God.*

§. 3. However, this will not alter the Nature of our proceeding,

ceeding, becauſe you afterwards ſay, The Argument may be thus applied to any Chriſtian Church in the World, or *to all of them put together.*

The Univerſal Church exiſts in all of them put together, and ſince you make the Caſe of That and particular Churches *all One*, as to this Matter, I have the Liberty to make the Argument to reſpect all of them put together, or the Univerſal Church.

You mention a Second Principle in this manner,

" *And you will allow this alſo as a Principle, That theſe Elect* " *muſt have true Saving Grace in their Hearts, as a Condition* " *neceſſary to their Salvation.*

This, Sir, I acknowledge to be one of the Principles of our Church, and of all other Chriſtian Churches in the World.

Then you proceed from hence to add this,

Which ſaving grace, becauſe you do not know to be in any particular man, therefore you cannot be certain that He is one of thoſe that is Elected to Salvation. Which is unqueſtionably true.

Now I am to examine your Forms of Argumentation, pretended to be parallel to thoſe, I urged againſt you. Your firſt is thus,

" *That Church which makes Salvation depend upon a Condi-* " *tion, which no Man living knows, whether it be fulfill'd, in* " *order to Salvation, muſt be Uncertain whether they have any,* " *who ſhall be ſaved in their Communion. But the* Engliſh " *Church doth ſo.* Ergo, *The* Engliſh *Church is Uncertain,* " *whether they have any which ſhall be ſaved in their Commu-* " *nion.*

§. 4. Now becauſe you ſay, *The Argument may be thus applied to any Chriſtian Church in the World, or to all of them together*; I ſhall alter the Form a little, and make it reſpect all of them. Thus it goes,

" *Whoſoever makes Salvation depend upon a Condition, which* " *no Man living knows, whether it be fulfill'd in Order to Sal-*

"*vation, muſt be Uncertain whether they have any who ſhall be*
"*ſaved in their Communion. But all the Chriſtian Churches in*
"*the world put together, do ſo.* Ergo, *All the Chriſtian Churches*
"*in the world put together, are Uncertain whether they have*
"*any which ſhall be ſaved in their Communion.*

In regard, I ſay, One and all Chriſtian Churches fare alike, according to your own acknowledgment, with reſpect to this Argument, I have placed this latter form alſo in view. And what I ſhall ſay of them, is as follows.

§.5. I ſhall admit the parity of either of theſe Syllogiſms with my *firſt*, under your own Notion of them newly mentioned: yet muſt tell you, in my way to your other, that though you made a diſtinction, and, at leaſt, unneceſſarily applied it to my firſt Propoſition, and thereupon cauſeleſly pronounced it falſe; yet I ſhall not imitate you in your indiſcretion; but grant your *Major*, as generally put, to be true, becauſe of the Connexion of a neceſſary Condition with That it is required to: whether it be *in deed* neceſſary, or only ſo in the *Eſtimation* of the Church that requires it. For the Not-knowing a Condition to be fulfilled, upon which the Being of a Thing is ſuſpended, evidently neceſſitates the Uncertainty of the Thing it ſelf.

§.6. Pray know, Sir, had I not been prevented by your Compliance and Conceſſions, I would have dealt more diſtinctly with relation to the Inſtance you have put before I had given an Anſwer to it. I would *in time* have asked you a few of thoſe queſtions you asked me *out of time*, as what Knowledge or Certainty you denied in your Inſtance, *&c.* or parted the ſundry ſenſes my ſelf, and applied them; but I perceive I now need not.

I ſhall then only deny the *Minor* which you prove in this manner, "*True Grace in the Heart is a Condition which no*
"*man living knows whether it be fulfill'd or no in Order to Sal-*
"*vation.*

"*But the* Engliſh *Church* [or, *all Chriſtian Churches put to-*
"*gether--*] *requires Grace in the Heart in Order to Salvation.*
Ergo.

"*The*

» *The* Engliſh *Church* [or, *all Chriſtian Churches put toge-*
» *ther---*] *requires a Condition in Order to Salvation, which no*
» *man living knows whether it be fulfill'd or no.*

§.7. Before I ſpeak to this, I advertiſe That you here pretend only to make one man Uncertain of the truth of Grace in another man's Heart, as I did to make one man Uncertain of another's Intention when you gave this Anſwer. And indeed the making your Inſtance a parallel to mine confines the ſenſe hither. So that here is, according to your ſelf, room left for every man to judge as well as he can, of his own Grace, and ſo whether he be one of God's Elect. Which thing falls not here into diſpute.

§.8. This premiſed, I will thus diſtinguiſh in the *Major* of this Syllogiſm, of true Grace *in the Heart*. By Grace *in the Hearts of men* is meant either--- in the Hearts of men conſidered [*determinatè*] *in particular*, or--- in the Hearts of men conſidered [*indeterminatè, vel in confuſo*] *in general*.

§.9. If when you ſay True Grace in the Heart is a Condition which no man living knows, *&c.* you mean it of men *in particular*, I will freely grant your Propoſition to be true. For no man hath full certainty that another hath true Grace in his Heart, God having reſerved that prerogative to himſelf, *who is the only ſearcher of the heart* *. * *Jer.* 17. 10.

§.10. But then I add, my granting this brings no diſadvantage at all upon us. The Knowledge of our having the true means of Grace, (with their Effects) as God's holy Word and Sacraments, and Perſons duly Authorized to Adminiſter them (the Knowledge hereof, I ſay) is not any whit obſtructed or clouded by our ignorance of another man's grace: inaſmuch as a graceleſs man may be a true Miniſter of them, and the Efficacy of divine Ordinances depends upon the merciful Operation of their Inſtitutor, and not on the Grace of thoſe that Adminiſter them. Whereas on the other ſide, your ignorance of the Intention of your Miniſters *in particular*, renders you Uncertain whether you have the true means of Grace, and conſequently

the Benefits God is ordinarily wont to confer by them; as hath above been ſhewn. Which amounts to a vaſt difference.

§.11. But if you mean it of Grace in the Hearts of men taken *in general*, (which acception alone your Inſtance ſeems to reſpect) So that the Senſe of the Propoſition is This, True Grace in the Heart of ſome or other, ſome where or other, is a Condition which no man living knows, *&c.*

§.12. I, without more ado, deny your *Major* as utterly falſe in this Senſe: and ſo may either diſmiſs you *re infecta*, or put you to the trouble of making another Syllogiſm before I need to aſſign the manner of Knowledge, whereby we know Grace to be in ſome or others. But I will be good natur'd and ſupply your defect. You ſhould then have gone on to urge to this purpoſe.

» *If true Grace in the heart be a Condition which any man* » *living knows whether it be performed in order to Salvation,* » *then he knows it either by ſome Principles evidently grounded* » *on divine Revelation, or ſome other way.*

» *But he knows it neither by any Principles evidently grounded upon divine Revelation, nor any other way*: Ergo,

» *Grace in the heart is a Condition which no man living knows* » *whether it be performed in order to Salvation.*

§.13. Now, Sir, and not till now, am I obliged to aſſign the way by which true Grace may be known to be in ſome or others, though we know not who. Upon my denial of the *Minor* when you are pleaſed to ſay, *ad partes*, I muſt tell which way I know it, or give up my Cauſe.

§.14. Well. Without the formality of your diſtinction I ſay, This may be known by a Knowledge grounded immediately on divine Revelation. The whole of this matter appears in Scripture.

1. When our B. Saviour promiſeth *That the gates of hell* *Matt. 16. 18.* *ſhall not* prevail againſt his Church *: He ſaith in effect, that in deſpight of men and devils, he will at all times even to the worlds end maintain ſome in his true Faith and Worſhip, and alſo ſave them at laſt.

2. He

2. He determines true Grace or Purity of heart to be neceſſary in order to the Salvation of ſuch. *Bleſſed are the pure in heart for they ſhall ſee God* *. Which words by true and unqueſtionable implication exclude all impure perſons from Salvation. * *Mat.* 5. 8.

But in many Texts ſuch are formally excluded from it. *Without holineſs no man ſhall ſee the Lord* ‖. ‖ *Heb* 12. 14.

3. His promiſe to maintain and continue ſuch a people cannot fail by reaſon of his divine Perfections--- *God that cannot lye promiſed* *. *He is faithful that hath promiſed* ‖. * *Tit.* 1. 2. ‖ *Heb.* 10. 23.

§. 15. Thus according to expreſs Scripture we find, that Grace in the heart is neceſſary to Salvation: that God hath promiſed he will ever preſerve and ſave ſome in the world who are Faithful and Gracious: that his promiſe cannot fail. All which put together truly grounds our Knowledge, that there is true Grace in ſome Members of the Chriſtian Church, though we know not who or where they are in particular.

Thus have I ſpoke to your Argument conſidered in itſelf, and this more regularly than you have done to mine, if I flatter not my ſelf.

§. 16. But that which is the main concern, I do not find that parity you pretend there is between your ſecond and mine: pray where find you in the divine Oracles that the Intention I have deſcribed, is as neceſſary to the Being of the Sacraments, as they teach that Grace is to the being Saved. Had God indeed knit them individually together, and declared the neceſſary dependence the Sacraments have of this Intention, we ſhould have been ſure from divine warranty (as I have proved we are in the matter of Grace) that ſome Biſhops and Prieſts in God's Church have from time to time duly Intended. But alas! you have exhibited nothing of divine Revelation to ſhew this; the chaffy general words you have given have nothing of weight or cogency in them. This grand diſparity is very apparent, and you have ſaid nothing to hinder any man from apprehending it ſuch; and ſo the deſign of your Inſtance is defeated, and ſhares with the reſt of your Anſwer in its misfortunes.

§. 17. I

§. 17. I may well forbear to ſpeak of other things; for, Fancy what promiſes you pleaſe, as peculiarly made to Men of your Communion, yet know, God is not bound to enable Men to believe and perform what himſelf hath not made neceſſary, in order to Grace and Salvation.

§. 18. I ſhall now, Sir, deſire the Proteſtant Reader to remember, as an Antidote againſt Temptations from *Roman* Catholicks, the uncertain comfortleſs Eſtate you are in. For pick you out the moſt diſcerning Layman amongſt you, and ſuppoſe all your reputed Clergy to paſs leiſurely by him, one by one, yet he ſhall not upon ſure Grounds be able to ſay, of any of the whole Number, This is a true Biſhop, or a true Prieſt: Nor can any of Them with better Warranty affirm of themſelves, I am ſuch a One.

Nor can one Member of your whole Body aſſuredly ſay, I have once in my life time been partaker of one true Sacrament. All this I have made good.

If you could ſay, ſome or other of our Clergy are true Biſhops and Prieſts; and ſome or other of our Body have received true Sacraments, tho' we know not who, or where thoſe are; yet it is a very lamentable thing for each of you to be uncertain concerning himſelf, and uncapable of applying thoſe Mercies to any particular Perſons. And yet it appears you have taken no great Care to ſecure even this *heartleſs* General Good to your Church.

Had you armed your Paper with any particular ſtrength, with relation hereunto, you ſhould have found me an eaſie Enemy, inaſmuch as I had not, nor needed to have, any deſign that way upon you, what I have done otherwiſe, being ſufficient to expoſe your Nakedneſs.

SIR, After you have delivered what you call your *Full* Anſwer, (which I have examined) you write ſomething more, though not under that Notion. And that I may appear juſt and fair to your Expectation, I will in ſhort acquaint the Reader, what the Severals of it are; and ſubjoin a few Words to each of them.

§. 1. 1. You deſire me to declare, What our Doctrine is of the Subject in queſtion. Anſwer.

Anſwer. It was the only buſineſs I undertook, to diſtreſs you with Conſequents from your own Doctrin; and while I am a doing this, you call to me, Pray, Sir, What is the Doctrine of your Church? Now let the World judg, whether your requeſt be not a calling me off from my proper Work, and very probably ſeeking an Occaſion to leap aſide from your Province. For whatever we hold, (which yet you was long enough a Student amongſt us to underſtand) what could my telling you that, boot you, ſo long as I evince that your own Doctrine intails afflictions on you?

§. 2. 2. You call for an Explication of ſeveral Terms.

Anſwer. I have told you how unſeaſonable your Call was, but withall have done at large what you requeſted.

§. 3. 3. You ſay, It would have been more for the Satisfaction of my Proteſtant Auditors, if I would have proved (as you propoſed) the Lawfulneſs of our Separating, at the pretended Reformation, from every Communion of Chriſtians in the World: or that any one Term of your Communion (you ſay, you gave me my Choice) was Unlawful, or juſt Ground of our Separation.

§. 4. Anſwer, 1. Among ſundry other things then ſtarted, thoſe you ſpeak of were indeed mentioned, and I gave ſuch Grounds of Reſolutions of them, as ſeemed ſufficient to my ſelf, and the Proteſtant Auditors. And I gave more than you had a Mind of, for when I was laying down the Terms of Chriſtian Communion, you flung off from the Conſideration of it, ſaying theſe Words, *You now enter into the Merits of the Cauſe?* As if that was no time or place for it. And this the Auditors ſay, They very well remember.

§. 5. 2. Your great Undertaking is well worth obſerving. You take no leſs upon you, than to maintain for juſt and lawful, every Term the *Roman* Church requires to her Communion. Your Province is Wide, and requires an Univerſal skill in the Controverſies between the two Churches, as will thus appear. (1.) She requires the Belief of all thoſe Articles your Councils have defined to be Matter of Faith. And theſe will be found not a few, if we compare Pope *Pius* his,

his, with the Ancient Creeds. (2.) She requires an Aſſent to, and Compliance with your whole Worſhip. Now each of theſe Articles you are, it ſeems, furniſh'd to maintain, as alſo the whole frame of your Worſhip: and this not againſt me onely, but alſo againſt Dr. *Wr.* Mr. *P.* and (for ought I know) all Comers.

§. 6. Sir, I love courage in any Man, but I love Caution too. Pray tell me, How it happens, that in your Study of Theology, for full *twenty* years in our Communion, you were not able to find one of their diſtinguiſhing Articles defenſible; and now in One years time ſee them all perſpicuous and ſurely founded. Your concern to ſearch for truth was the ſame before, as lately, your Purſe enabled you to buy Books, and your Education and Parts to read them; and you will not, I ſuppoſe, be Unwilling We ſhould believe you weighed the Arguments on both ſides. Pray then tell us, how, all at once, you hapned to find all thoſe Points we call Popery, to be Warranted by Divine Authority.

§. 7. If you be inſpired, I am ſure to have the worſe in contending with you. If you be not, I have no reaſon to dread your Challenge.

§. 8. But I have found out your ſtrength; you can juſtifie all your particular Points with a few begg'd general words, viz. *We are the only Catholick Church, and therefore whatſoever We teach for Faith, cannot fail of being true. And what we require as neceſſary, cannot fail of being done.*

§. 9. I confeſs you are able at this rate to baffle all the Proteſtants in the World, and on that Score may dare us, even from *Dan* to *Beerſheba*. But we onely ſmile at ſuch impotent conceits.

I have ſet forth the Matter of this laſt part of your Letter, though our preſent Controverſie is not touched in it, that You may have no Colour to Complain, I have ſuppreſſed any thing of Yours.

§. 10. It was my onely buſineſs to preſent You with a View, of the Feeble Eſtate of Your Church, which I hope I have performed, and ſo reſt, *Yours*, &c.

FINIS.

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